Rehabilitation of Sophia and Vasily Golitsyn Man is prone to simplifications: if not white, then black. This also applies to history. The reformist image of Peter the Great over time automatically turned his political opponents into retrogrades, although often this was not about

Crimean campaigns- military campaigns of the Russian army against the Crimean Khanate, undertaken in 1689. They were part of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686-1700 and part of the large-scale European Great Turkish War.

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First Crimean campaign

The troops advanced from different regions were supposed to gather on the southern borders of the country by March 11, 1687, but due to delays, the gathering ended later than this date, in mid-May. The main part of the army gathered on the Merle River and set out on the campaign on May 18. On May 23, she turned towards Poltava, moving to join Samoilovich's Cossacks. By May 24, the hetman's army arrived at Poltava. As planned, it consisted of about 50 thousand people, of which approximately 10 thousand were specially recruited burghers and villagers. It was decided to send the Cossacks to the vanguard of the army. After waiting for all the troops to arrive, on May 26, Prince Golitsyn conducted a general review of his army, which showed that there were 90,610 people under his command, which is not much lower than the listed number of troops. On June 2, the troops of Golitsyn and Samoilovich met at the intersection of the Hotel and Orchik rivers and, united, continued to advance, making small transitions from one river to another. By June 22, the troops reached the Konskie Vody River. After crossing the Samarka River, it became difficult to supply the huge army - the temperature rose, wide rivers were replaced by low-water streams, forests - by small groves, but the troops continued to move. The Crimean Khan Selim I Gerai was at that time on Molochnye Vody; no Tatar troops were encountered on the way. Realizing that his troops were inferior to the Russian army in numbers, weapons and training, he ordered all uluses to retreat deep into the Khanate, poison or fill up water sources and burn out the steppe south of Konskie Vody. Having learned about the fire in the steppe and the devastation of lands right up to Perekop, Prince Golitsyn decided not to change the plan and continued the campaign, by June 27 reaching the Karachekrak River, where a military council was held. Despite sufficient supplies of provisions, the advance through the scorched and devastated territory had a negative impact on the condition of the army, the horses became weak, providing the troops with water, firewood and horse feed turned out to be extremely difficult, as a result of which the council decided to return the army to the Russian borders. The retreat began on June 28, the troops went northwest to the Dnieper, where the Russian command expected to find surviving sources of water and grass for horses.

To fight the Tatars, approx. 20 thousand Samoilovich Cossacks and approx. 8 thousand people governor L.R. Neplyuev, who were supposed to be united with almost 6 thousand people. General G.I. Kosagov. Messengers were sent to Moscow with the news of the end of the campaign. However, when the army retreated, it turned out that the supplies of water and grass along the retreat route were insufficient, the loss of livestock increased, and cases of illness and heat strokes became more frequent in the army. The army was able to replenish supplies and rest only on the banks of Samarka. During the retreat, rumors arose in the Russian camp about Hetman Samoilovich's involvement in the arson of the steppe, and a denunciation was sent to Moscow against him.

When the army reached Aurelie, the head of the Streletsky order, F.L. Shaklovity, arrived from Moscow and expressed support for Golitsyn’s decision to retreat. The Russian government, realizing the extreme danger of continuing the campaign in such conditions and wishing to preserve the reputation of the command of the retreating army, chose to declare the Crimean campaign a success. The tsar's letters stated that the Crimean Khanate had been sufficiently demonstrated to have enormous military strength, which should have warned it against future attacks on Russian lands. Subsequently, in order to avoid discontent on the part of the military people, they were given cash benefits and other awards.

While Golitsyn's army was crossing to the right bank of the Dnieper, the Crimean Khan decided to take advantage of the division of the Russian army and at night attacked Kosagov's troops left on the left bank of the river. The Tatars captured part of the convoy and stole herds of horses, but their attack on the army camp was repulsed. Moreover, Neplyuev’s horse and foot soldiers arrived to help Kosagov, quickly putting the Tatars to flight and recapturing some of the captured property from them. The Tatar cavalry appeared again the next day, but did not dare to attack the Russian camp again, limiting themselves to attacks on foragers and the theft of several small herds of horses.

In response to the denunciation of Hetman Samoilovich, on August 1, a messenger arrived from Moscow with a royal decree, which ordered the election of a new hetman who would be more suitable for the Little Russian army. Instead of Samoilovich, I. S. Mazepa became hetman, but units loyal to Samoilovich opposed this and started a riot, which stopped after Neplyuev’s units arrived in the Cossack camp.

On August 13, Golitsyn’s army reached the bank of the Merla River; on August 24, it received a royal decree to stop the campaign and disband the army participating in it. At the end of the campaign, troops of 5 and 7 thousand people were left on the southern borders of the state “to protect the Great Russian and Little Russian cities.” For the next campaign in Crimea, it was decided to build fortifications on the Samarka River, for which several regiments were left there.

In the Crimean Tatar version of events as presented by the historian Halim Geray, a representative of the ruling dynasty of the Gerays, Selim Geray gave the order to burn all the grass, straw and grain that was on the way of the Russians. On July 17, the Khan’s army met the Russians near the Kara-Yylga area. The exact number of his army is unknown, but it was smaller than Golitsyn’s army. The Khan divided his army into three parts: one he led himself, and the other two were led by his sons - Kalgai Devlet Giray and Nureddin Azamat Giray. A battle began that lasted 2 days and ended with the victory of the Crimeans. 30 guns and about a thousand prisoners were captured. The Russian-Cossack army retreated and built fortifications near the town of Kuyash behind the Or fortress. The Khan's army also built fortifications along the ditch facing the Russians, preparing for the decisive battle. The Russian-Cossack army, suffering from thirst, was unable to continue the battle, and peace negotiations began. By morning, the Crimeans discovered that the army of Russians and Cossacks had fled and they began pursuit. Near the Donuzly-Oba area, the Russian-Cossack troops were overtaken by the Crimeans and suffered losses. The main reason for the defeat was the exhaustion of the Russian troops due to the fall of the steppe, but despite this, the goal of the campaign was fulfilled, namely: to distract the Crimean Khanate from the war with the Holy League. The retreat of the Russian army, which began in June, before the clashes he described, is not reported in Geray’s work; attention is focused on the actions of Khan Selim Geray, other Gerays and their troops, but it is noted that the Russians did not have “provisions, fodder and water.”

In the report of the book. V.V. Golitsyn’s campaign is presented as successful, the absence of any significant battles and the Tatars’ avoidance of battle, characteristic of both Crimean campaigns, is noted: “... the khan and the Tatars attacked... the military men of the offensive came into fear and horror, and put aside their usual insolence , he himself did not appear anywhere and his Tatar yurts... did not appear anywhere and did not give battle.” According to Golitsyn, the Khan’s army, avoiding a collision, went beyond Perekop, the Russian troops vainly hoped to meet the enemy, after which, exhausted by the heat, dust, fires, depletion of supplies and feed for horses, they decided to leave the steppe.

As noted by both pre-revolutionary and modern researchers, before the decision to retreat, Russian troops did not meet a single Tatar on their way; Advance across the scorched steppe stopped only due to fires spreading across it and a lack of provisions, long before any clashes with the enemy. The clashes themselves were in the nature of minor skirmishes, and the Khan’s attack on Russian troops in mid-July was quickly repulsed by them and led the Tatars to flee, although they managed to capture part of the convoy.

On the right flank, the Turkish vassal, the Budjak Horde, was defeated. General Grigory Kosagov took the Ochakov fortress and some other fortresses and went to the Black Sea, where he began building fortresses. Western European newspapers wrote enthusiastically about Kosagov’s successes, and the Turks, fearing an attack by Constantinople, gathered armies and navies towards him.

Second Crimean Campaign

Results

The Crimean campaigns were of great international importance, were able to temporarily divert significant forces of the Turks and Crimean Tatars and greatly contributed to the military successes of Russia's European allies in the fight against the Ottoman Empire, the end of Turkish expansion in Europe, as well as the collapse of the alliance between the Crimean Khanate concluded in 1683 in Adrianople , France and Imre Tekeli, who became a Turkish citizen. Russia's entry into the Holy League confused the plans of the Turkish command, forcing it to abandon the offensive on Poland and Hungary and transfer significant forces to the east, which facilitated the League's fight against the Turks. However, despite the significant superiority in strength, the campaign of the huge army ended in its exodus; no significant clashes occurred between the warring parties, and the Crimean Khanate was not defeated. As a result, the actions of the Russian army were criticized by historians and some contemporaries. Thus, in 1701, the famous Russian publicist I. T. Pososhkov, who had no personal connection to both campaigns and relied on what he heard about them, accused the troops of being “fearful,” considering it dishonorable that a huge army did not provide assistance to those defeated by the Tatar cavalry regiment of Duma clerk E.I.Ukraintsev.

Discussing the reasons for the failure of the campaign, the historian A. G. Brickner noted that during the campaign, clashes between both sides were in the nature of only minor skirmishes, without reaching a real battle, and the main opponents of the Russian army were not so much the Tatars themselves, whose number was small , how hot the steppe climate is and the problems of providing for a huge army in the steppe, aggravated by diseases that engulfed the army, a steppe fire that left horses without food, and the indecisiveness of the command.

Prince Golitsyn himself reported on the catastrophic “lack of water and lack of bread” during the campaign across the hot steppe, saying that “the horses under the outfit fell, the people became weak,” there were no sources of food for the horses, and the water sources were poisoned, while the khan’s troops They set Perekop Posads and the settlements surrounding them on fire and never showed up for the decisive battle. In this situation, although the army was ready to “serve and shed their blood,” they considered it wise to retreat rather than continue their actions. The Tatar Murza, who came to the Russian camp several times with an offer of peace, was refused on the grounds “that that peace would be disgusting to the Polish Union.”

As a result, Russia stopped paying the Crimean Khan; Russia's international authority increased after the Crimean campaigns. However, as a result of the campaigns, the goal of securing the southern borders of Russia was never achieved. According to many historians, the unsuccessful outcome of the Crimean campaigns was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the government of Princess Sophia Alekseevna. Sophia herself wrote to Golitsyn in 1689, believing the reports of his successes to be true:

My light, Vasenka! Hello, my father, for many years to come! And again, hello, having defeated the Hagarians by the grace of God and the Most Holy Theotokos and with your reason and happiness! May God grant you to continue to defeat your enemies!

There is an opinion that the failure of the Crimean campaigns is greatly exaggerated after Peter I lost half of his entire army in the second Azov campaign, although he only received access to the inland Sea of ​​Azov. As N.I. Pavlenko noted, the Crimean campaigns were not useless, since their main goals - fulfilling obligations to the League and pinning down enemy forces - were achieved, which was of great diplomatic importance in Russia’s relations with the anti-Ottoman coalition. According to V. A. Artamonov, the previous interpretation of the campaigns as a failure of the book. V.V. Golitsyn is incorrect, since Moscow initially realized the practical impossibility of conquering Crimea and deliberately limited itself to the demonstrative entry of a large mass of troops into the steppe, after which in 1689-1694. switched to their usual method of fighting the Khanate - a border war of attrition.

CRIMINAL CAMPAIGNS, campaigns of Russian troops under the command of the boyar Prince V.V. Golitsyn against the Crimean Khanate during the Russian-Turkish war of 1686-1700. According to the articles of the “Eternal Peace” of 1686, the Russian state pledged to break the Bakhchisarai Peace of 1681 with the Ottoman Empire, protect the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the raids of the Crimean Khans, and also encourage the Don Cossacks to make a campaign against the Crimean Khanate in 1687. The Crimean campaigns were undertaken to stop the Crimean and Turkish raids on the southern outskirts of Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and protect trade routes, as well as to divert the forces of the Crimean Tatars from their possible participation in hostilities on the Dniester and Prut.

The plan of the first campaign of 1687 provided for the offensive of Russian troops in combination with the actions of the Don and Ukrainian Cossacks. The Don Cossacks, led by Ataman F. M. Minaev, were sent to strike the right flank of the Crimean Tatars, and the Ukrainian Cossacks of the Chernigov Colonel G. I. Samoilovich, together with the governor of the Sevsky Regiment, Okolnichy L. R. Neplyuev, were sent to the lower Dnieper to the Tatar fortress Kyzy-Kermen (Kazy-Kermen). These actions forced the Crimean Khan Selim Girey I to concentrate all his efforts on the defense of his possessions, and as a result he was unable to provide assistance to the Turkish troops operating against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria and Venice. Russian troops gathered in several places: the Big Regiment (close boyar Prince V.V. Golitsyn, boyar Prince K.O. Shcherbatov, okolnichy V.A. Zmeev) - in Akhtyrka; Novgorod category (boyar A.S. Shein, okolnichy prince D.A. Baryatinsky) - in Sumy; Ryazan category (boyar Prince V.D. Dolgorukov, okolnichy P.D. Skuratov) - in Khotmyzhsk; Sevsky Regiment - in Krasny Kut. The regimental commanders set out from Moscow on 22.2 (4.3).1687. At the beginning of May 1687, about 60 thousand soldiers, archers, spearmen, reiters, as well as 50 thousand noble cavalry and artillery were concentrated on the Merlo River. Approximately 67% of the Russian army were regiments of the new system. On the Samara River she was joined by Ukrainian Cossacks (up to 50 thousand) under the command of Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine I. S. Samoilovich. On June 13 (23), 1687, the Russian army, having covered only 300 km in 6 weeks, camped in the Bolshoy Lug tract. The next day, the Russian army began moving towards the Or (Perekop) fortress. Having learned about the approach of the Russians, the Tatars burned the grass over a large area, depriving the Russian army of pasture for their horses. On June 14-15 (24-25), the army advanced less than 13 km, experiencing great difficulties due to the lack of water and fodder. Golitsyn convened a military council at the Karachakrak River, at which it was decided to return to the Russian state. On July 12 (22), Duma clerk F.L. Shaklovity arrived at Golitsyn on the Orel River with proposals from Princess Sofia Alekseevna to continue military operations, and if impossible, to build fortresses on the Samara and Orel rivers and leave garrisons and equipment there to protect Left Bank Ukraine from raids of the Crimean Tatars [in the summer of 1688, the Novobogoroditskaya fortress was built (now on the territory of the village of Shevchenko, Dnepropetrovsk region of Ukraine), where the Russian-Cossack garrison was located and over 5.7 thousand tons of food were concentrated]. During their return from the 1st Crimean campaign, I. S. Mazepa and V. L. Kochubey drew up a false denunciation against Hetman I. S. Samoilovich, in which, among other things, they accused the hetman of being an opponent of the Russian-Polish alliance, erroneously advised to go on a campaign in the spring, initiated the arson of the steppe. 22-25.7 (1-4.8).1687 at the so-called Kolomak Rada, I. S. Samoilovich was deposed, and Mazepa was elected the new hetman. 14(24).8.1687 the Russian army returned to the bank of the Merlo River, where it was dispersed to their homes. The government of Princess Sofia Alekseevna, despite the obvious failure of the enterprise, recognized the campaign as a success and awarded its participants.

Sofya Alekseevna 18(28).9.1688 announced the need for a new Crimean campaign. The Russian command took into account the lessons of the first campaign and planned to begin the second in early spring, so that the cavalry in the steppe would be provided with pasture. At the same time, in 1689, the foreign policy situation of the Russian state became more complicated, since, contrary to the conditions of the “Eternal Peace” of 1686, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. To set out on the second campaign of 1689, Russian troops again gathered in different places: the Great Regiment (Golitsyn, steward Prince Ya. F. Dolgorukov, Zmeev) - in Sumy; Novgorod category (Shane, steward Prince F. Yu. Baryatinsky) - in Rylsk; Ryazan category (V.D. Dolgorukov, Duma nobleman A.I. Khitrovo) - in Oboyan; Sevsky Regiment (L. R. Neplyuev) - in Mezherechy; The Kazan regiment (boyar B.P. Sheremetev), including a special regiment of the Lower Nobles (okolnichy I.Yu. Leontiev, steward Dmitriev-Mamonov), is in Chuguev. On April 15-18 (25-28), troops (about 112 thousand people) united on the Orel River, artillery numbered up to 350 guns. On the Samara River on April 20 (30), the army was joined by a detachment of Cossacks (about 40 thousand people) of the Hetman of Left Bank Ukraine I. S. Mazepa. The Russian army advanced south in the same marching order as in 1687. To repel the offensive of the Russian army, Selim Giray I gathered an army numbering up to 160 thousand people. On May 13 (23), a Tatar detachment (10 thousand people) attacked the Russian camp located on the Koirka River. The next day, the main forces of the Tatars attacked Golitsyn’s army at the Black Valley tract, but, having suffered heavy losses from Russian artillery fire, retreated. Having repulsed the attacks of the Tatar cavalry, the Russian army moved in the direction of the Kalanchak River and on May 20 (30) approached Perekop. The main forces of the Tatars surrounded the Russian army, but their attacks were again repelled mainly by artillery fire. Golitsyn entered into negotiations with representatives of the khan, demanding the return of all Russian prisoners captured during the Crimean raids, stopping the raids, refusing tribute, not attacking the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and not helping the Ottoman Empire. On May 22 (June 1) the demand was rejected by the khan. The power of the Perekop fortifications and the fact that the Russian army was weakened by disease and lack of water forced Golitsyn to retreat, abandoning some of the guns. On May 29 (June 8), Russian regiments pursued by the Tatar cavalry reached the southern borders of the Russian state. On June 19 (29), the army was disbanded. The government of Sofia Alekseevna solemnly welcomed Golitsyn in Moscow.

Despite the ineffectiveness of the Crimean campaigns, the Russian state made a significant contribution to the fight against Turkish aggression in Europe. It diverted the main forces of the Crimean Tatars, and the Ottoman Empire lost the support of the numerous Crimean cavalry. However, the Crimean campaigns did not solve the problems of protecting the southern borders of the Russian state and eliminating the source of possible aggression in Crimea. The main reasons for the failures of the Crimean campaigns were: the incompleteness of military reforms of the mid-17th century in the Russian state; the existence, along with the regiments of the new system, of the outdated noble local army and detachments of archers, distinguished by poor discipline; insufficient experience of V.V. Golitsyn as an army commander; dispersion of army control between various government institutions, etc. The lessons of the Crimean campaigns were taken into account by Tsar Peter I in the Azov campaigns of 1695-96.

Source: Correspondence of Patriarch Joachim with the governors who were in the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689. / Comp. L. M. Savelov. Simferopol, 1906; Neuville de la. Notes about Muscovy. M., 1996.

Lit.: Ustryalov N. G. History of the reign of Peter the Great. St. Petersburg, 1858. T. 1; Golitsyn N.S. Russian military history. St. Petersburg, 1878. Part 2; Belov M.I. On the history of diplomatic relations of Russia during the Crimean campaigns // Uch. zap. LSU. 1949. T. 112; Babushkina G.K. International significance of the Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689 // Historical notes. 1950. T. 33; Bogdanov A.P. “True and true legend” about the 1st Crimean campaign // Problems of studying narrative sources on the history of the Russian Middle Ages. M., 1982; aka. Moscow journalism of the last quarter of the 17th century. M., 2001; Lavrentyev A.V. “Note to the sovereign’s measuring versts and camp of that Crimean campaign along the measuring versts wheel” 1689 // Natural scientific ideas of Ancient Rus'. M., 1988; Artamonov V. A. Russia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Crimea 1686-1699 // Slavic collection. Saratov, 1993. Issue. 5; Stevens S. V. Soldiers on the steppe: army reform and social change in early modern Russia. DeKalb, 1995.

The end of the regency of Tsarina Sophia Alekseevna, who ruled Russia from 1682 to 1689, was marked by two attempts to secure the southern borders of the state. They went down in history as Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689. The portrait of the prince opens the article. Despite the fact that the main task assigned to the command could not be completed, both military campaigns played an important role both during the Great Turkish War and in the further development of the Russian state.

Creation of an anti-Turkish coalition

In 1684, on the initiative of Pope Innocent XI, a union of states was organized, called the “Holy League”, and consisted of the Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - a federation of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His task was to confront the aggressive policy, which by that time had gained strength, of the Ottoman Empire, as well as its Crimean vassals.

Having concluded an alliance treaty with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in April 1686, Russia took upon itself the responsibilities of carrying out the military tasks assigned to it as part of the overall strategic plan for the union’s struggle against Muslim aggressors. The beginning of these actions was the Crimean campaign of 1687, which was led by Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn, who was the de facto head of the government during the regency of Princess Sophia. Her portrait is located below.

Burning steppe

In May, the Russian army, numbering 100 thousand people and reinforced by detachments of Zaporozhye and Don Cossacks, set out from the left bank of Ukraine and began advancing towards the Crimea. When the warriors reached the borders of the Crimean Khanate and crossed the border river Konka, the Tatars resorted to the old, and centuries-proven method of defense against the advancing enemy - they set fire to the steppe throughout the territory lying in front of them. As a result, the Russian army was forced to turn back due to lack of food for the horses.

First defeat

However, the First Crimean Campaign did not end there. In July of the same year, the army of the Crimean Khan Selim Giray overtook the Russians in the area called Kara-Yilga. Despite the fact that his army was inferior in number to the army of Prince Golitsyn, the khan was the first to launch an attack. Dividing the forces at his disposal into three parts, he launched simultaneously frontal and flank attacks.

According to surviving historical documents, the battle, which lasted 2 days, ended in victory for the Crimean Tatars, who captured more than a thousand prisoners and about 30 guns. Continuing their retreat, Golitsyn's army reached a place called Kuyash and built defensive fortifications there, digging a ditch in front of them.

The final defeat of the Russian-Cossack forces

Soon the Tatars approached them and camped on the opposite side of the ditch, preparing to give the Russian-Cossack army a new battle. However, the army of Prince Golitsyn, which had traveled a long way across the waterless steppe scorched by the enemy, was in no condition to fight, and its command invited Khan Selim-Girey to begin negotiations on concluding peace.

Having not received a positive response on time, and trying to avoid the complete destruction of his army, Golitsyn gave the order for a further retreat. As a result, having withdrawn at night, the Russians began to retreat, leaving the enemy an empty camp. Having discovered in the morning that there was no one behind the defensive structures, the khan began pursuit, and after some time overtook the Russians in the Donuzly-Oba area. In the ensuing battle, Prince Golitsyn's army suffered heavy losses. According to historians, the cause of this military failure was the extreme exhaustion of the warriors caused by the burning of the steppe.

The result of the first trip

Nevertheless, the events of 1687, which became part of the military campaign that went down in history as the Crimean Campaigns, played an important role in the struggle of the Holy League against Turkish expansion. Despite the failure that befell the Russian-Cossack army, he managed to divert the forces of the Crimean Khanate from the European theater of military operations, and thereby facilitate the task of the allied forces.

The second campaign of Prince Golitsyn

The failure of the military campaign of 1687 did not plunge either Princess Sophia or her closest boyar, Prince Golitsyn, into despair. As a result, it was decided not to stop the Crimean campaigns, and as soon as possible to strike again at the Horde, who had become more frequent in their predatory raids.

In January 1689, preparations began for a new military campaign, and in early March, the army of Prince Golitsyn, this time increased to 150 thousand people, set out in the direction of the Crimea, which was the nest of the hated Khanate. In addition to cavalry regiments and infantry, the warriors also had powerful artillery reinforcements, consisting of 400 guns.

Considering this period of the war of the European coalition with the Ottoman Empire and its vassals, it should be noted the very unworthy actions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which entered into negotiations with Istanbul and forced Russia to carry out the Crimean campaigns alone. Something happened that was repeated many times in subsequent years, both in both World Wars and in many local conflicts - the main burden fell on the shoulders of Russian soldiers, who watered the battlefields with their blood.

Tatar attack repelled by artillery fire

After two and a half months of travel, in mid-May the Russian army was attacked by the Tatars near the village of Zelyonaya Dolina, located three days’ journey from Perekop. This time the Horde did not set fire to the steppe, saving food for their own horses, and, waiting for the Russian army to approach, they tried to sweep it away with an unexpected blow from their cavalry.

However, thanks to reports from patrols sent forward, the enemy did not achieve the effect of surprise, and the artillerymen managed to deploy their guns in battle formation. With their dense fire, as well as rifle volleys from the infantry, the Tatars were stopped and then thrown back far into the steppe. A week later, Prince Golitsyn’s army reached Perekop, the isthmus connecting the Crimean peninsula with the mainland.

A close but unattainable goal

No matter how great was the desire of the prince’s warriors, having overcome the last kilometers, to break into the Crimea, from where from time immemorial the daring raids of the Horde had been carried out on Rus', and where countless lines of captured Christians were then driven, they failed to make this final throw. There were several reasons for this.

As it became known from the testimony of captured Tatars, throughout the entire territory of Perekop there were only three wells with fresh water, which were clearly not enough for the prince’s army of thousands, and beyond the isthmus the waterless steppe stretched for many miles. In addition, the losses inevitable during the capture of Perekop could greatly weaken the army and call into question success in the battle with the main enemy forces concentrated on the peninsula.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses, it was decided to postpone further advance and, having built several fortresses, accumulate in them the necessary supply of food, equipment and, most importantly, water. However, it was not possible to implement these plans, and soon the prince gave an order to retreat from their positions. This is how Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689 ended.

Results of two military campaigns

Over the next centuries, there were repeated discussions about what role the Crimean campaigns of 1687-1689 played during the Great Turkish War, and what benefits they brought directly to Russia. Different opinions were expressed, but most historians agreed that thanks to the military campaigns discussed above, Russia was able to significantly facilitate the task of the allied forces fighting the army of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Having deprived the Turkish Pasha of the support of the Crimean vassals, the Russian army significantly limited his actions.

In addition, Golitsyn’s Crimean campaigns contributed to the rise of Russia’s authority in the international arena. Their important result was the cessation of payment of tribute, which Moscow had previously been forced to pay to its long-time enemies. As for the internal political life of the Russian state, the failed Crimean campaigns played a very important role in it, becoming one of the reasons for the overthrow of Princess Sophia and the accession of Peter I to the throne.