Armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. Volksarmee. Investigation of the GDR National People's Army Air Force

After the division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR, the city of Berlin was entirely located on the territory of the GDR, but was also divided into Soviet and Anglo-American-French regions.occupation sectors.In 1948, the allies, regardless of the opinion of the Soviet administration, began carrying out monetary reform. The reform is carried out under rather strict conditions, and residents of West Berlin, taking advantageby chance, they shop money in the east noy part of the city, wherethey were in circulation. Food and essential goods began to disappear from the shelves quite quickly. Soviet administration, shockedfrom this turn of events and introducesa ban on movement between the western and eastern parts of the city.The reaction of the Western leadership was unequivocal - the Russians want to create a famine in Berlin, and we prevented them - and they called for noreceive foodin Soviet

sector, and wait for the bombardment of raisins by the hawks of democracy. It got to the point that the Western administration persecuted those citizens who received food in the east, and the British created barbed wire fences on the border of the British and Soviet sectors - 13 years before the appearance ofconcrete wall. And it is still widely believed both among them and among us that

If it weren’t for the air bridge, the unfortunate Berl would have died The Indians are starving.

After Germany's defeat in World War II, by the decision of the Conference of the Heads of Government of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA, held in Potsdam from July 17 to August 2, 1945, it was prohibited to have an Armed Forces and the Wehrmacht was dissolved. However, with the fall of the Hitler regime, the common political goals of yesterday's allies also disappeared. The USSR on the one hand and the coalition represented by the USA, Great Britain and France on the other hand began to pursue their own policies towards Germany. As a result of this, by 1949, two German states emerged on the territory of the former Third Reich. The Federal Republic of Germany (DBR) is formed from the American, British and French occupation zones. The Soviet zone of occupation becomes the German Democratic Republic (DDR).

The Paris Agreements of the USA, Great Britain and France of 1954 and the decision of the May 1955 Session of the NATO Council of the Federal Republic of Germany allowed the creation of the Armed Forces. By the end of the year, the German army under the name Bundeswehr (Die Bundeswehr) already exists in reality.

In response, the USSR in 1956 allowed the GDR to recreate its Armed Forces. These forces are called the National People's Army (Volksarmee der DDR). Years of existence: March 1, 1956 - October 2, 1990. On November 12, 1955, the German government announced the creation of the Bundeswehr.

Having learned about the creation of the Bundeswehr, the East German comrades were also forced to create their own army in 1956. On January 18, 1956, the People's Chamber of the GDR adopted the Law on the creation of the National People's Army (NPA) and the formation of the Ministry of National Defense. March 1, 1956, when the first units of the NPA took the military oath, was celebrated as National People's Army (NPA) Day. Until 1962, it was recruited and NPA formations were not present in East Berlin.

The main part of it consisted of former Wehrmacht soldiers and officers who had undergone denazification. The Bundeswehr basically copied uniforms, ranks and other procedures from the West into its own

Lastly, in the NNA of the GDR, part of the orders, including uniforms and paraphernalia (epaulets, cockades, belts, etc.), remained from the Wehrmacht or from old Prussia, the rank system was partially borrowed from the USSR.

The NPA was formed in 1956 from the so-called. “barracks police”, which was part of the structure of the People’s Police and consisted of three branches of the military:

Land Forces (Landstreitkräfte);

Navy (Volksmarine);

Air Force (English)Russian. (Luftstreitkräfte der Nationalen Volksarmee)

Article 7.2 of the 1968 GDR Constitution stated:

The German Democratic Republic organizes the defense of the country, as well as the protection of the socialist system and the peaceful life of its citizens. The National People's Army and other national defense organs protect the socialist gains of the people from all attacks from outside. In the interests of preserving peace and ensuring the security of the socialist state, the National People's Army maintains close military brotherhood with the armies of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

As of 1987, the ground forces of the NNA of the GDR numbered 120,000 military personnel
employees. Included 2 armored divisions, 4 motorized divisions, 2 brigades of surface-to-surface missiles, 10 artillery regiments, 9 air defense regiments, 1 air support regiment, 2 anti-tank battalions and other support units. Officer training was carried out at higher officer schools and at the Military Academy named after. Friedrich Engels. For 1973 social background about 90% of officers and generals came from workers and peasants.

Structure

The territory of East Germany was divided into two military districts - MB-III (South, headquartered in Leipzig) and MB-V (North, headquartered in Neubrandenburg) and one artillery brigade, which was not part of any of the military districts, in each of which included two motorized divisions (motorisierte schützendivision, MSD), one armored division (panzerdivision, PD) and one missile brigade (raketenbrigade, RBr).

Each armored division consisted of 3 armored regiments (Panzerregiment), one artillery regiment (Artillerieregiment), 1 motorized rifle regiment (Mot.-Schützenregiment), 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment (Fla-Raketen-Regiment), 1 engineer battalion (Pionierbataillon), 1 battalion material support(Bataillon Materielle Sicherstellung), 1st battalion

chemical defense (Bataillon Chemische Abwehr), 1 sanitary battalion (Sanitätsbataillon), 1 reconnaissance battalion (Aufklärungsbataillon), 1 missile department (Raketenabteilung).

Each motorized rifle division consisted of 3 motorized regiments (Mot.-Schützenregiment), 1 armored regiment (Panzerregiment), 1 artillery regiment (Artillerieregim

ent), 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment (Fla-Raketenregiment), 1 missile department (Raketenabteilung), 1 engineer battalion (Pionierbataillon), 1 logistics battalion (Bataillon Materielle Sicherstellung), 1 sanitary battalion (Sanitätsbataillon), 1 chemical defense battalion ( Bataillon Chemische Abwehr), 1st logistics battalion (Bataillon Materielle Sicherstellung).

Each missile brigade consisted of 2-3 missile departments (Raketenabteilung), 1 engineering company (Pionierkompanie), 1 logistics company (Kompanie materielle Sicherstellung), 1 meteorological battery (meteorologischen Batterie), 1 repair company (Instandsetzungskompanie).

The artillery brigade consisted of 4 departments (Abteilung), 1 repair company (Instandsetzungskompanie), 1 logistics company (Kompanie materielle Sicherstellung).

The air force consisted of 2 divisions (Luftverteidigungsdivision), each of which consisted of 2-4 attack squadrons (Jagdfliegergeschwader), 1 anti-aircraft missile brigade (Fla-Raketenbrigade), 2 anti-aircraft missile regiments (Fla-Raketenregiment), 3- 4 radio engineering battalions (Funktechnisches Bataillon).

East German Navy

Of all the small fleets of the USSR allied countries under the Warsaw Pact, the Navy of the National People's Army of the GDR in the late 1980s. was the most combat-ready. It was based on modern ships that entered service in the 1970-1980s. In total, by the time of the reunification of Germany in 1990, it consisted of 110 warships of various classes and 69 auxiliary vessels. The naval aviation included 24 helicopters (16 Mi-8 type and 8 Mi-14 type), as well as 20 Su-17 fighter-bombers. The number of personnel in the Navy is about 16 thousand people.

The largest ships in the GDR Navy were three patrol ships (SKR) of the Rostock type (Project 1159), built in the USSR at the Zelenodolsk shipyard in 1978, 1979 and 1986, respectively.

The basis of the anti-submarine forces was 16 small anti-submarine ships (MPC) of the Parchim type, Project 133.1. The ships were built from 1980 to 1985 at the Peenewerft shipyard in Wolgast according to a project developed in the GDR with the help of Soviet specialists on the basis of MPK pr.1124. In 1986-1990 12 MPKs of this type were built for the USSR according to the modernized project 133.1-M.

An example of cooperation between the Soviet Union and East Germany in the field of military shipbuilding was the construction in the GDR according to the Soviet project (Project 151) of missile boats (RKA) with a total displacement of 380 tons, which were planned to be armed with eight of the latest anti-ship missiles (ASM) "Uran" (anti-ship missile production according to the Soviet license was planned to be deployed in the GDR). It was assumed that this RKA would enter service with the fleets of the Warsaw Pact member countries. Before the unification of Germany, only two boats of this type were built, four more were found
or in varying degrees of readiness. To replace the outdated Project 205 missile boats (in the late 1980s, all 12 missile launch vehicles of this project were put into reserve), the GDR Navy received five Project 1241-RE missile boats from the USSR. These boats (developed by the Almaz Central Design Bureau on the basis of Project 1241.1-T) have been built for export by the Rybinsk and Yaroslavl shipyards since 1980. A total of 22 RCAs were built for Bulgaria, the GDR, India, Yemen, Poland and Romania. The GDR Navy also included six large torpedo boats, Project 206, built in the USSR in 1968-1976.

Only in the GDR Navy there was such a class of ships as ultra-small (with a displacement of 28 tons) TKA type "Libelle" ( further development TKA type "Iltis") with trough torpedo tubes for 533 mm torpedoes. The torpedo was fired backwards - just as the Soviet G-5 type TKA did in 1930-1940. The East German fleet had thirty Libelle-class TKAs.

The amphibious forces included 12 amphibious ships (DC) of the "Howerswerda" type (with a total displacement of 2000 tons), designed and built in 1974-1980. in the GDR. Two more ships of this type were converted into supply transports.

The GDR Navy had quite a large mine-sweeping force. Since 1969, the construction of base minesweepers (BTS) of the Greiz type (Kondor II) has been underway. The East German fleet received 26 ships of this type, another 18 units were completed in the version of the border TFR (Kondor I type) for the Coast Guard (Grenzebrigade Kuste). Five main ships were converted into rescue and training vessels.

The auxiliary fleet included 69 vessels for various purposes. These were mainly modern ships of relatively small displacement, built at national shipyards, as well as in the USSR and Poland.

On October 3, 1990, the NPA consisted of 88,800 people (among them 23,155 officers and 22,549 non-commissioned officers). On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany were reunified. However, the GDR army was not included in the Bundeswehr, but was actually disbanded.

In the territory former GDR A temporary unified command of the Bundeswehr “Ost” (East) was formed, which assumed the role of a liquidation commission. The military ranks of NNA officers were not recognized by the Bundeswehr, which actually stripped them of their ranks, and service in the GDR army was not recognized for either military or civilian work experience. Conscript personnel were gradually dismissed, a number of officers after appropriate Verki were accepted into service in the Bundeswehr. NNA officers accepted into service in the Bundeswehr received lower ranks. The NPA generals were dismissed from service by GDR Minister of Disarmament and Defense Rainer Eppelmann on 2 October.

Armament and equipment, with rare exceptions (in particular, MiG-29 fighters), were supposed to be sold to other countries or disposed of. The entire fleet of the former GDR was concentrated in Rostock and awaited its fate. The oldest ships that required repairs were immediately scrapped. The German government was intensively looking for buyers, hoping to profitably sell the most modern combat units.

All 16 Parchim-class MPKs were bought by Indonesia in 1992, the ships, after re-equipment and crew training, gradually moved to the Indonesian port of Surabaya (in 1996, the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau proposed to the command of the Indonesian Navy a project to modernize these ships to the level of MPK Project 133.1-M) . In addition, Indonesia acquired 9 Kondor II type BTSCs and all 12 Hoyerswerda type DCs, as well as two supply transports converted from DCs.

Of all the inheritance received by the Federal Republic of Germany, the greatest interest was caused by RKA pr.1241-RE. Considering that among the buyers of Soviet weapons there are unfriendly US government, the command of the US Navy decided to thoroughly study the boat. The choice fell on RKA "Hiddensee" (formerly "Rudolf Egelhofter"). In December 1991, he arrived in the United States on the deck of a transport ship and was assigned to the US Navy Research Center in Solomon (Maryland). The boat was subjected to comprehensive testing according to a special program. American experts highly appreciated the design of the ship's hull, its performance and maneuverability, but they noted the insufficient (by American standards) service life of the propulsion and afterburning gas turbines, and traditionally criticized electronic weapons. The low combat effectiveness of the P-20 missiles (export modification of the P-15 Termit) was also noted; the six-barreled AK-630 gun received a good rating. In general, it was concluded that missiles of this type, armed with more modern anti-ship missiles “Moskit” (Project 12411, 12421) or “Uran” (Project 12418), pose a fairly serious danger to ships of the US Navy and their allies.

The remaining four RCAs remained in Rostock. Periodically, reports appeared about the desire of Poland, which has four similar boats, to purchase two more from Germany. Selling profitably to Indonesia most modern ships, the German government began to actually give away the remaining ones. So, in 1993-1994. a decision was made to transfer three, and Estonia - nine, converted Project 205 boats (the P-15 anti-ship missile launchers were removed from them). Some of the boats have already been handed over. Latvia also received two BTSCs of the Kondor II type. Germany also generously distributed border TFRs of the “Kondor I” type: four units to Tunisia, two to Malta, one to Guinea-Bissau, two (in 1994) to Estonia.

The least fortunate were the three TFR Project 1159 - not finding a buyer, the Bundesmarine command sold them for scrap.

Not a single warship of the GDR Navy entered the German Navy. Three of the newest boats, Project 151 (one was completed in Germany, three were sold in an unfinished state to Poland) were re-equipped and included in the Coast Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz-See) of the Federal Republic of Germany, along with three border TFRs of the “Kondor I” type.

This is how the GDR fleet ended its existence, whose ships now sail under the flags of eight states.

The National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR was one of the most combat-ready armies not only of the Eastern Bloc of the Warsaw Pact, but of all of Europe during the Cold War. An army that awed not only its Western brethren from Germany, but also the entire NATO bloc. In 1973, by social origin, about 90% of officers and generals came from workers and peasants. From the point of view of intellectual training of personnel, the NPA also stood on high level: by the mid-80s, 95 percent of its officer corps had a higher or secondary specialized education, about 30 percent of officers graduated from military academies, 35 percent from higher military schools.

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 complicated relations between the two countries - Honecker, being a conservative, had a negative attitude towards perestroika. And this is against the backdrop of the fact that in the GDR the attitude towards Gorbachev as the initiator of reforms was enthusiastic. In addition, at the end of the 80s, a mass exodus of GDR citizens to Germany began. Gorbachev made it clear to his East German counterpart that Soviet aid to the GDR directly depended on Berlin's implementation of reforms.

In 1989, Honecker was removed from all posts, a year later the GDR was absorbed by West Germany, and a year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Russian leadership hastened to withdraw from Germany a group of almost half a million, equipped with 12 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, which became an unconditional geopolitical and geostrategic defeat and accelerated the entry of yesterday’s allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact into NATO.

But all these are dry lines about relatively recently past events, behind which is the drama of thousands of NPA officers and their families. With sadness in their eyes and pain in their hearts, they looked at the last parade of Russian troops on August 31, 1994 in Berlin. Betrayed, humiliated, useless to anyone, they witnessed the departure of the once allied army, which lost the Cold War with them without firing a single shot.

After the reunification of Germany in 1990, the fate of NPA officers was unenviable. The GDR army did not become part of the Bundeswehr, but was actually destroyed. The NPA generals were fired. The military ranks of NNA officers were not recognized by the Bundeswehr; in fact, they were stripped of their ranks, and service in the East German army was not recognized for either military or civilian work experience. And subsequently, many specialists who serviced the military equipment adopted by the Bundeswehr, which previously belonged to the NPA, were fired. Officers received lower ranks. And the majority of NPA personnel were not accepted into the Bundeswehr at all. In this way, the leadership of the new Germany insured itself against ideological dissent in the ranks of the “renewed” Bundeswehr.

And just five years earlier, Gorbachev promised not to abandon the GDR to its fate. After Honecker's dismissal, the leadership of the GDR demonstrated neither the will nor the determination to save the country and take truly effective measures for this that would allow the reunification of Germany on an equal basis.At the same time, neither France nor Great Britain considered the issue of German reunification urgent. INIn Paris they were afraid of a strong and united Germany, which had twice crushed the military power of France in less than a century, and didn't want to to see a united and strong Germany at its borders.

In turn, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher adhered to a political line aimed at maintaining the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as compliance with the terms of the Final Act in Helsinki, the rights and responsibilities of the four states for post-war Germany. Against this background, it does not seem accidental that London wanted to develop cultural and economic ties with the GDR in the second half of the 80s, and when it became obvious that the unification of Germany was inevitable, the British leadership proposed extending this process for 10–15 years. Moreover, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was not initially the initiator of West Germany’s absorption of its eastern neighbor, but advocated the creation of a confederation, putting forward a ten-point program to implement his idea. Thus, in 1990, the Kremlin and Berlin had every chance to realize the idea once proposed by Stalin: the creation of a united, but neutral and non-NATO Germany. The preservation of a limited contingent of Soviet, American, British and French troops on the territory of a united Germany would become a guarantor of German neutrality, and the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany created on an equal basis would not allow the spread of pro-Western sentiments in the army and would not turn former NPA officers into outcasts.

Personality factor

All this was quite feasible in practice and met the foreign policy interests of both London and Paris, and Moscow and Berlin. So why did Gorbachev and his circle, who had the opportunity to rely on the support of France and England in defending the GDR, did not do this and easily went for the absorption of their eastern neighbor by West Germany, ultimately changing the balance of power in Europe in favor of NATO? The reunification of two independent German states is one thing, the Anschluss, that is, the absorption of the GDR into the Federal Republic, is another. It is one thing to overcome the division of Germany as a fundamental step towards eliminating the division of Europe. Another is the transfer of the leading edge of the continental split from the Elbe to the Oder or further to the east.

Crash The GDR, and the socialist camp as a whole,like the collapse of the Soviet Union, a vivid example of the fact that the determining factor in history is not some objective processes, but the role of the individual. The entire past of mankind indisputably testifies to this. The French would never have brought most of Europe to their knees if Napoleon had not been their emperor. And there would not have been an October coup in Russia, the most shameful in the history of the country of the Brest-Litovsk Peace,The Bolsheviks would not have won the Civil War if not for the personality of Vladimir Lenin. All these are just the most striking examples, indisputably testifying to the decisive role of the individual in history.

Nothing like thiscould not have happened in Eastern Europe if Yuri Andropov had been at the head of the Soviet Union. A man with a strong will, in the field of foreign policy he invariably proceeded from the geopolitical interests of the country, and they demanded the preservation of a military presence in Central Europe and the comprehensive strengthening of the combat power of the NPA, regardless of the attitude of the Americans and their allies to this. The scale of the personality of Gorbachev and his immediate circle did not correspond to the complex of complex domestic and foreign policy problems that the Soviet Union faced. One of the characteristics of weak politicians is inconsistency in following the chosen course. This happened with Gorbachev: in December 1989, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he unequivocally stated that the Soviet Union would not abandon the GDR to its fate. A year later, the Kremlin allowed West Germany to carry out the Anschluss of its eastern neighbor. Kohl also felt the political weakness of the Soviet leadership during his visit to Moscow in February 1990, since it was after this that he began to more energetically pursue a course towards the reunification of Germany and, most importantly, began to insist on maintaining its membership in NATO.

And as a result: in modern Germany the number of American troops exceeds 50 thousand soldiers and officers, stationed including on the territory of the former GDR, and the NATO military machine is deployed near the Russian borders. And in the event of a military conflict, the perfectly prepared and trained officers of the former NPA will no longer be able to help us. And they are unlikely to want to...

As for England and France, their fears regarding the unification of Germany were not in vain: the latter quite quickly took leading positions in the European Union, strengthened its strategic and economic situation in Central and Eastern Europe, gradually displacing British capital from there.

A selection of documentaries dedicated to the GDR army. All films are in German.

1. Der Schlag hat gesessen 1961

2. Auf Wacht an der Staatsgrenze 1979

- "Militärgeschichte", Ausg. 3/2012

In March 1980, the cover of Der Spiegel featured a photograph of four East German soldiers under a Wehrmacht-style sleeve tape with the inscription: "Honecker's Afrika Korps." The Hamburg magazine reported 2,720 East German military advisers involved, including 1,000 in Angola alone, 600 in Mozambique, 400 in Libya and 300 in Ethiopia. Before this, the bright wording had already been found in other newspapers. In the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit, as early as May 1978, the headline appeared: “Hoffmann's Afrika Korps”; followed in June 1978 by the Bayernkurier and its Red Afrika Korps by Honecker. And in November 1979, Americans read about the “East German Africa Corps” in the New York Times.

Almost all newspapers were ready to publish a sensation about the GDR soldiers in Africa: Le Figaro, published in Paris, reported back in August 1978 that more than 2,000 soldiers from the GDR had been sent to Ethiopia, coming under command Soviet generals. The West Berlin Tagesspiegel in December 1978 published, with reference to Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, that in Angola alone there were 5,000 “soldiers of the GDR army,” primarily “elite units such as airborne troops.” 2,000 of them were "currently engaged in the offensive." In February, the Tagesspiegel reported the redeployment of an East German airborne regiment from Ethiopia to Angola.

Die Welt in February 1980 spoke of the total number of “military experts from the GDR” in Africa: “about 30,000.” In December 1979, the leader of the opposition CDU/CSU faction in the German Bundestag, Rainer Barzel, declared in the pages of Welt am Sonntag: “Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt no longer has the right to remain silent about the bloody trail of the GDR.” The popular 1977 film The Wild Geese - starring Roger Moore, Richard Burton and Hardy Krueger - also features a scene set on African soil where a mercenary attack on a control tower kills a National People's Army (NPA) officer, easily identified by his uniform cap. In the attacked camp, along with local African and Cuban soldiers, two GDR officers also appear. So were the armed forces of the GDR really involved in Africa?

African requests

Many times, African governments asked East Berlin to send NPA troops. First of all, they asked for military advisers, instructors and military pilots. For example, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and his Minister of Defense Gray Zulu asked to send the NPA to their country in 1979–1980. Specifically, NPA pilots in their aircraft were supposed to protect Zambian airspace. GDR Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann refused immediately, with the wording: “not feasible.” In 1980, during the second attempt, the Zambian president asked to send military advisers. Negotiations with Hoffmann “have not yet led to any solution,” Kaunda wrote to SED General Secretary Erich Honecker after receiving nothing from the GDR defense minister. Similarly, in 1979, the leader of the Zimbabwean (Rhodesian) ZAPU liberation movement, Joshua Nkomo, while visiting the GDR, expressed a desire to see NPA officers in ZAPU camps in Zambia. Army General Hoffmann again refused to send military personnel, this time as "politically inexpedient." Isolated cases of refusal by Zambia and Zimbabwe to send advisers, instructors and pilots reflected the general course of the GDR armed forces towards passivity. The leadership of the GDR acted cautiously: basically, it was restrained and skeptical about requests and requests regarding the sending of military personnel to third world countries. In East Berlin and Strausberg (the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense), it was not without reason that they saw the danger in dragging their soldiers into conflicts and wars on the African continent. Direct participation in hostilities could likely have far-reaching political and military consequences. East Berlin attached importance to the international reputation of the GDR and did not want to give rise to negative publications in the Western press. Thus, the use of the army abroad posed incalculable risks for the GDR. The GDR and its armed forces did not engage in such adventures - except for a few exceptions described below.

In isolated, strictly limited cases, the NPA was still present in Africa: already in 1964, two officers from this army were sent to Zanzibar to advise the then people's republic on the development of its armed forces. Also, until 1970, 15 officers and non-commissioned officers of the Volksmarine (GDR Navy) were sent to Zanzibar as advisers. Individual, mostly limited to a few weeks, business trips of advisers and “specialists” were carried out, for example, to Angola. Large volumes of transport aviation officers and pilots were sent to Mozambique and Ethiopia.

Military advisors and transport pilots in Mozambique

One of the main recipients of GDR military aid was Mozambique. In the country in southern Africa, wars raged for more than thirty years, both with an external enemy and civil. The new state, after gaining independence in 1975, was forced to repel attacks by the armed opposition in a long and bloody war. At the same time, the conflict between East and West also spread to southern Africa. The ruling (to this day) party FRELIMO positioned the country as socialist, armed rebels from RENAMO were supported by South Africa and the USA. Already during the long struggle for independence against the Portuguese colonial authorities, the GDR supported the still weak FRELIMO with weapons and equipment. In December 1984, opposition partisans, among other foreigners, killed eight civilian specialists from the GDR. The East Germans were agricultural specialists who were captured on their way to a state farm where they were supposed to work.

In response, in 1985, the NPA sent several groups of senior officers, and even two generals, to the country to serve as advisers to the general staff, commands, headquarters and formations. The task of the officers, who were in the country for about six months, was primarily to improve the safety of more than 700 specialists from the GDR. Along with this, they were supposed to improve the fighting qualities of the Mozambican armed forces. Since late 1985, three NPA officers have been permanently stationed in the country as advisers. In this regard, there was also the use of transport aircraft by the GDR Air Force from 1986 to 1990. The vehicles, based in the capital, Maputo, provided for the needs of specialists from the GDR working in the country and were supposed to begin evacuating them if the situation worsened. In addition to the officers deployed in the territory, the Mozambican government in 1985 - 1986. repeatedly addressed the GDR, expressing the need for instructors and “mentors” of the NNA. In June 1986, General of the Army Kessler, Hoffmann's successor as Minister of Defense, informed Honecker and Egon Krenz (Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the SED Politburo - approx. trans.) that he also refused such participation: he assessed the work of the "mentors" on the spot as “inappropriate” for “political reasons.” Before this, in January 1986, Krenz rejected as “inappropriate” the deployment of NPA instructors in Mozambique. Apart from the deployment of transport aviation pilots and the work of advisers, references to other uses of the NPA in Mozambique could not be found in the extensive source database.

Operations in Ethiopia

After the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1974, a series of wars began in Ethiopia. In February 1977, together with Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, young military men came to power, striving to radically change the previous internal political situation with its feudal relations, and in foreign policy focusing on Moscow, Havana and East Berlin. Mengistu's reign can hardly be called stable; he fought wars against neighboring Somalia as well as separatists in the north. Mengistu sent dramatic requests for military assistance to the ambassadors of the USSR, South Yemen, Cuba and the GDR: “The people of Ethiopia feel isolated and abandoned, comrade,” he wrote verbatim in a telegram to Honecker in August 1977. Calls from Addis Ababa and Havana did not go unnoticed: already in October 1977, about 150 Soviet officers, including four generals, were here as instructors and advisers. In September 1977, the first 200 Cubans were deployed on the side of the Ethiopians; from December 1977, Havana increased its group. Now it numbered from 16 to 18 thousand people. The GDR sent weapons and equipment - but not soldiers. If NPA units were in Ethiopia, then General Hoffmann, during his visit to the country in May 1979, probably should have met with them and mentioned this visit in one of the reports. The fundamentally skeptical position of the NPA command and refusal of military operations extended in the same way to war-torn Ethiopia. The danger of being drawn into local conflicts, and ultimately into war, due to the presence of the military, was high. However, NPA transport planes arrived in Ethiopia and were deployed.

Between 1984 and 1988 first four and then one more vehicle were stationed in the Horn of Africa. To overcome the consequences of a catastrophically severe drought, in October 1984, Addis Ababa sent urgent requests for assistance to various countries. Since November of this year, the GDR has sent the first two aircraft of the NPA military transport aviation, as well as the civil airline Interflug, to ensure international air traffic. At this stage, 41 people were involved, including 22 NPA officers and non-commissioned officers and 19 Interflug employees. Secrecy had priority. The NPA's involvement in the aircraft and crews had to be hidden. The order clearly ordered that the vehicles be prepared in a “civil aviation version”, that the recognition equipment be dismantled, and that Air Force personnel be provided with civilian service passports. Two An-26s were repainted overnight and fitted with civilian markings. Even on the dishes and technical equipment of the crew, the NPA identification marks were painted over. The staff did not have any uniform. Witnesses claim that NPA insignia was even evaporated from underwear: nothing should have indicated membership in the armed forces of the GDR. The reason for the strict secrecy was rooted not so much in the possible danger of a business trip to Ethiopia, but in the usual practice of the GDR in resolving military issues.

Almost simultaneously with the GDR planes, three C-160 Transalls of the Bundeswehr Air Force also flew to Ethiopia - completely officially and without camouflage. They were also based at Assab airfield, later at Dire Dawa, and were used in the same way as NPA vehicles. Thus, an unusual German-German joint operation took place.

From its base in Assab, the An-26 spent the first weeks mainly flying to Asmara, Axum and Mekele. In the following months - mainly in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Godi and Kabri Dehar. Flights over various territories of Ethiopia were complicated by the ongoing wars, including civil wars. The aggravation of the global conflict between the West and the East also played a role. The Assab base and some portions of the flight were located in particularly hard-fought Eritrea. The planes carried food, as well as medicine and clothing. The operation continued until October 1985, with GDR aircraft also participating in controversial Ethiopian forced relocation operations.

At the request of the Ethiopian government, NPA transport aircraft returned in April 1986, now as an “operational unit of the NPA GDR.” The personnel this time were also presented openly, as employees of the GDR Air Force. Two An-26s were stationed in the capital Addis Ababa. The third transport aviation operation began in June 1987. One Antonov was again stationed at Addis Ababa airport. As with the ongoing operation in Mozambique at the same time, he was tasked with providing services and supplies to specialists and medical teams from the GDR. In addition, in 1987-88. A limited number of NPA officers were deployed as a security group at the GDR-established hospital in Metema.

Despite the support of the GDR, Cuba and other socialist countries, Ethiopian government troops operated in Eritrea from early 1988 until the collapse of the country. Mengistu's regime was under immediate threat. Several times he received emergency assistance from the GDR. Honecker personally decided in 1988 and again in 1989 to make large deliveries of weapons, including tanks. These actions of the GDR could neither delay nor prevent the decline of Mengistu. He was overthrown in 1991. Eritrea gained independence in 1993. And certain internal documents of the GDR already in 1977 characterized Mengistu’s Ethiopia as a “bottomless barrel.”

Purposeful disinformation?

Reports of East German military operations in Africa resonated even in internal documents Federal Government of Germany. For example, in September 1978, Section 210 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to a report from the planning headquarters that put the military presence of Cuba and the GDR in Africa on the same level, objected: “In the policy of intervention, the actions of the GDR lag significantly behind the massive military activity of Cuba.” The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in South Africa, in its communications to Bonn, referred to reports of a GDR military presence in Angola in November 1978 as what they clearly were: “rumours”.

The origin of these misleading messages remains an open question. The links provided by the articles at the time were directed to “security experts” or “Western analysts.” There is much evidence that this was in the best interests of Republic of South Africa. Reports of thousands of GDR soldiers on its borders brought tangible benefits to the Pretoria government: no doubt, it was very interested in presenting the struggle in southern Africa as part of a conflict between West and East, and positioning itself as a close ally of the West. South Africa - due to racial segregation and the violent suppression of the non-white majority ("apartheid") - experienced increasing pressure from Western Europe and Germany. Thus, reactivating the old enemy image of the GDR in Germany seems quite reasonable from a South African point of view. Der Spiegel's 1980 observation that South African intelligence agencies may well have launched disinformation appears to be correct when viewed from the future. As a rule, the press readily picks up and publishes such reports, even if the sources are shrouded in darkness. After intensive research in the archives, today only one conclusion remains: “Honecker’s Afrika Korps” existed only in the minds of journalists, some politicians and intelligence agencies.

An old photograph: November 1989, the Berlin Wall, literally saddled by a jubilant crowd of thousands. Only the group of people in the foreground - the GDR border guards - have sad and confused faces. Until recently, formidable to their enemies and rightly aware of themselves as the elite of the country, they overnight turned into extraneous extras at this holiday. But this was not the worst thing for them...

“Somehow I accidentally ended up in the house of a former captain of the National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR. He graduated from our higher military school, is a good programmer, but has been unemployed for three years now. And around the neck is a family: a wife, two children.

From him for the first time I heard what I was destined to hear many times.

You betrayed us... - the former captain will say. He will say it calmly, without strain, gathering his will into a fist.

No, he was not a “political commissar”, did not collaborate with the Stasi, and yet he lost everything.”

These are lines from the book by Colonel Mikhail Boltunov “ZGV: The Bitter Road Home.”

The problem, however, is much deeper: having abandoned the soldiers and officers of the army we created to the mercy of fate, have we not thereby betrayed ourselves? And was it possible to preserve the NPA, albeit under a different name and with a changed organizational structure, but as a loyal ally of Moscow?

Let’s try to figure it out, of course, as far as possible, within the framework of a short article, especially since these issues have not lost their relevance to this day, especially against the backdrop of NATO’s expansion to the east and the spread of US military-political influence in the post-Soviet space.

Disappointment and humiliation.

So, in 1990, the reunification of Germany took place, causing euphoria on the part of both West and East Germans. It's finished! The great nation regained its unity, and the much-hated Berlin Wall finally came down. However, as often happens, unbridled joy gave way to bitter disappointment. Of course, not for all residents of Germany, no. Most of them, as sociological surveys show, do not regret the unification of the country.

Disappointment affected mainly some of the residents of the GDR, which had sunk into oblivion. Quite quickly they realized: in essence, an Anschluss had occurred - the absorption of their homeland by its western neighbor.

The officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the former NPA suffered the most from this. It did not become an integral part of the Bundeswehr, but was simply dissolved. The majority of former GDR soldiers, including generals and colonels, were dismissed. At the same time, their service in the NNA was not credited either for military or civilian work experience. Those who were lucky enough to wear the uniform of their recent opponents found themselves demoted in rank.

As a result, East German officers were forced to stand in line for hours at the labor exchange and hang around in search of work - often low-paid and unskilled.

And worse than that. In his book, Mikhail Boltunov quotes the words of the last Minister of Defense of the GDR, Admiral Theodor Hofmann: “With the unification of Germany, the NPA was dissolved. Many professional military personnel have been discriminated against."

Discrimination, in other words, humiliation. It couldn’t have been otherwise, for the famous Latin proverb says: “Woe to the vanquished!” And doubly woe if the army was not crushed in battle, but simply betrayed by both its own and the Soviet leadership.

The GDR army was one of the most professional in Europe.
And it is no coincidence that the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany tried to liquidate it as quickly as possible.

However, many will consider the last statement controversial and will note the irreversibility and even spontaneity of the process of unification of the two Germanys. But the point is not that the FRG and the GDR inevitably had to unite, but how this could happen. And West Germany's absorption of its eastern neighbor was far from the only way.

What was the alternative that would allow the NPA officer corps to take a worthy position in the new Germany and remain loyal to the USSR? And what is more important for us: did the Soviet Union have real opportunities to maintain its military-political presence in Germany, preventing NATO expansion to the east? To answer these questions we need to take a short historical excursion.

In 1949, a new republic appeared on the map - the GDR. It was created as a response to education in the American, British and French occupation zones of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is interesting that Joseph Stalin did not seek to create the GDR, taking the initiative to unify Germany, but on the condition that it did not join NATO.

Heinz Hoffmann - Minister of Defense of the GDR until 1985.
During the Great Patriotic War- anti-fascist

However, the former allies refused. Construction proposals Berlin Wall were received by Stalin at the end of the 40s, but the Soviet leader abandoned this idea, considering it to discredit the USSR in the eyes of the world community.

Remembering the history of the birth of the GDR, one should also take into account the personality of the first chancellor of the West German state, Konrad Adenauer, who, according to the former Soviet ambassador to Germany Vladimir Semenov, “cannot be considered only a political opponent of Russia. He had an irrational hatred of Russians."

Konrad Adenauer is one of the key figures in the history of the Cold War.
First Federal Chancellor of Germany

Birth and formation of the NNA

Under these conditions and with the direct participation of the USSR, the NPA was created on January 18, 1956, which quickly turned into a powerful force. In turn, the GDR navy became the most combat-ready along with the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact.

This is not an exaggeration, because the GDR included Prussian and Saxon lands, which once represented the most militant German states with strong armies. This is especially true, of course, for the Prussians. It was the Prussians and Saxons who formed the basis of the officer corps of first the German Empire, then the Reichswehr, then the Wehrmacht and, finally, the NNA.

Traditional German discipline and love for military affairs, strong military traditions of Prussian officers, rich combat experience of previous generations, coupled with advanced military equipment and the achievements of Soviet military thought, made the GDR army an invincible force in Europe.

The GDR army really enjoyed popular love in its country.
At least at first.

It is noteworthy that in some way the dreams of the most far-sighted German and Russian statesmen at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, who dreamed of a military alliance between the Russian and German empires.

The strength of the GDR army was in the combat training of its personnel, because the strength of the NPA always remained relatively low: in 1987 it numbered 120 thousand soldiers and officers in its ranks, inferior to, say, the Polish People's Army - the second largest army after the Soviet one in the Warsaw Pact .

However, in the event of a military conflict with NATO, the Poles had to fight on secondary sectors of the front - in Austria and Denmark. In turn, the NPA was given more serious tasks: to fight in the main direction - against troops operating from the territory of Germany, where the first echelon of NATO ground forces was deployed, that is, the Bundeswehr itself, as well as the most combat-ready divisions of the Americans, British and French.

Tank driver of the GDR army under the state flag

East German Army during exercises

The Soviet leadership trusted its German brothers in arms. And not in vain. The commander of the 3rd West Germany Army in the GDR and later the deputy chief of staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Valentin Varennikov, wrote in his memoirs: “The National People's Army of the GDR, in fact, before my eyes, grew in 10-15 years from zero to a formidable modern army, equipped with everything necessary and capable of acting no worse than Soviet troops.”

This point of view is essentially confirmed by Matvey Burlakov: “The peak of the Cold War was in the early 80s. All that was left was to give the signal and everything would rush forward. Everything is ready for combat, the shells are in the tanks, all you have to do is put them in the barrel - and off you go. They would have burned everything, destroyed everything there. I mean military installations - not cities. I often met with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Klaus Naumann. He once asked me: “I saw the plans of the GDR army that you approved. Why didn’t you launch an offensive?” We tried to collect these plans, but someone hid them and made copies. And Naumann agreed with our calculation that we should be in the English Channel within a week. I say: “We are not aggressors, why are we going to attack you? We always expected you to be the first to start.” That’s how it was explained to them.”

Please note: Naumann saw the plans of the GDR army, whose tanks would be among the first to reach the English Channel and, as he admitted, no one could effectively stop them.

In the event of a NATO attack, this army would be on the English Channel in a week.
NATO strategists were sincerely perplexed why, with such force at hand,
we didn't hit. They just can’t wrap their heads around a simple thing,
that the Russians really didn't want war.

From the point of view of the intellectual training of its personnel, the NPA also stood at a high level: by the mid-80s, 95 percent of its officer corps had a higher or secondary specialized education, about 30 percent of officers graduated from military academies, 35 percent from higher military schools.

In a word, at the end of the 80s the army of the GDR was ready for any tests, but the country was not. Unfortunately, the combat power of the armed forces could not compensate for the socio-economic problems that the GDR faced by the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century. Erich Honecker, who headed the country in 1971, was guided by the Soviet model of building socialism, which significantly distinguished him from many leaders of other countries in Eastern Europe.

Honecker's key goal in the socio-economic sphere is to improve the well-being of the people, in particular, through the development of housing construction and increasing pensions.

Alas, good initiatives in this area led to a decrease in the volume of investments in the development of production and the renewal of outdated equipment, the wear and tear of which was 50 percent in industry and 65 percent in agriculture. In general, the East German economy, like the Soviet one, developed along an extensive path.

Defeat without firing a shot

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 complicated relations between the two countries - Honecker, being a conservative, reacted negatively to perestroika. And this is against the backdrop of the fact that in the GDR the attitude towards Gorbachev as the initiator of reforms was enthusiastic. In addition, at the end of the 80s, a mass exodus of GDR citizens to Germany began. Gorbachev made it clear to his East German counterpart that Soviet assistance to the GDR directly depended on Berlin's implementation of reforms.

What happened next is well known: in 1989, Honecker was removed from all posts, a year later the GDR was absorbed by West Germany, and a year later the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The Russian leadership hastened to withdraw from Germany a group of almost half a million, equipped with 12 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, which became an unconditional geopolitical and geostrategic defeat and accelerated the entry of yesterday’s allies of the USSR under the Warsaw Pact into NATO.

But all these are dry lines about relatively recently past events, behind which is the drama of thousands of NPA officers and their families. With sadness in their eyes and pain in their hearts, they looked at the last parade of Russian troops on August 31, 1994 in Berlin. Betrayed, humiliated, useless to anyone, they witnessed the departure of the once allied army, which lost the Cold War with them without firing a single shot.

M.S. Gorbachev lost the Cold War without firing a shot

And just five years earlier, Gorbachev promised not to abandon the GDR to its fate. Did the Soviet leader have grounds for such statements? On the one hand, it would seem not. As we have already noted, at the end of the 80s the flow of refugees from the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany increased. After Honecker's dismissal, the leadership of the GDR demonstrated neither the will nor the determination to save the country and take truly effective measures for this that would allow the reunification of Germany on an equal basis. Declarative statements not supported by practical steps do not count in this case.

But there is another side to the coin. According to Boltunov, neither France nor Great Britain considered the issue of German reunification to be relevant. This is understandable: in Paris they were afraid of a strong and united Germany, which had twice crushed the military power of France in less than a century. And of course, it was not in the geopolitical interests of the Fifth Republic to see a united and strong Germany at its borders.

In turn, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher adhered to a political line aimed at maintaining the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as well as compliance with the terms of the Final Act in Helsinki, the rights and responsibilities of the four states for post-war Germany.

Against this background, it does not seem accidental that London wanted to develop cultural and economic ties with the GDR in the second half of the 1980s, and when it became obvious that the unification of Germany was inevitable, the British leadership proposed extending this process for 10-15 years.

And perhaps most importantly: in containing the processes aimed at the unification of Germany, the British leadership counted on the support of Moscow and Paris. And even more than that: German Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself was not initially the initiator of West Germany’s absorption of its eastern neighbor, but advocated the creation of a confederation, putting forward a ten-point program to implement his idea.

Thus, in 1990, the Kremlin and Berlin had every chance to realize the idea once proposed by Stalin: the creation of a united, but neutral and non-NATO Germany.

The preservation of a limited contingent of Soviet, American, British and French troops on the territory of a united Germany would become a guarantor of German neutrality, and the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany created on an equal basis would not allow the spread of pro-Western sentiments in the army and would not turn former NPA officers into outcasts.

Soviet and German brothers in arms. Photo from the 1950s
The day will come when the descendants of some will renounce both their country and their allies.
And the heirs of others will suddenly find themselves without a livelihood

Personality factor

All this was quite feasible in practice and met the foreign policy interests of both London and Paris, and Moscow and Berlin. So why did Gorbachev and his circle, who had the opportunity to rely on the support of France and England in defending the GDR, did not do this and easily went for the absorption of their eastern neighbor by West Germany, ultimately changing the balance of power in Europe in favor of NATO?

From Boltunov’s point of view, the determining role in this case was played by the personality factor: “...Events took an unexpected turn after the meeting of foreign ministers, at which E. A. Shevardnadze (USSR Foreign Minister) went into direct violation of Gorbachev’s directive.

The reunification of two independent German states is one thing, the Anschluss, that is, the absorption of the GDR into the Federal Republic, is another. It is one thing to overcome the division of Germany as a cardinal step towards eliminating the division of Europe. Another is the transfer of the leading edge of the continental split from the Elbe to the Oder or further to the east.

Shevardnadze gave a very simple explanation for his behavior - I learned this from the assistant to the President (USSR) Anatoly Chernyaev: “Genscher asked for this. And Genscher is a good person.”

"Good man" Eduard Shevardnadze - one of the main culprits of the GDR tragedy

Perhaps this explanation oversimplifies the picture associated with the unification of the country, but it is obvious that such a rapid absorption of the GDR by West Germany is a direct consequence of the short-sightedness and weakness of the Soviet political leadership, which, based on the logic of its decisions, was more focused on the positive image of the USSR in Western world rather than the interests of one’s own state.

Ultimately, the collapse of both the GDR and the socialist camp as a whole, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, provides a clear example of the fact that the determining factor in history is not some objective processes, but the role of the individual. The entire past of mankind indisputably testifies to this.

After all, there were no socio-economic prerequisites for the ancient Macedonians to enter the historical arena, if not for the outstanding personal qualities of kings Philip and Alexander.

The French would never have brought most of Europe to their knees if Napoleon had not been their emperor. And there would not have been an October coup in Russia, the most shameful in the history of the country of the Brest Peace, just as the Bolsheviks would not have won the Civil War, if not for the personality of Vladimir Lenin.

All these are just the most striking examples, indisputably testifying to the decisive role of the individual in history.

There is no doubt that nothing similar to the events of the early 90s could have happened in Eastern Europe if Yuri Andropov had been at the head of the Soviet Union. A man with a strong will, in the field of foreign policy he invariably proceeded from the geopolitical interests of the country, and they demanded the preservation of a military presence in Central Europe and the comprehensive strengthening of the combat power of the NPA, regardless of the attitude of the Americans and their allies to this.

Heinz Kessler - Minister of Defense of the GDR after 1985 - did everything that depended on him,
to keep the country from dying. But he could not do anything about the growing
lumpy social problems, nor with the betrayal of the Soviet elite.
Others had to solve these problems - but they lacked the will.

The scale of Gorbachev’s personality, as well as that of his immediate circle, objectively did not correspond to the complex of complex domestic and foreign policy problems that the Soviet Union faced.

The same can be said about Egon Krenz, who replaced Honecker as General Secretary of the SED and was not a strong and strong-willed person. This is the opinion of General Markus Wolf, who headed the foreign intelligence of the GDR, about Krenz.

One of the characteristics of weak politicians is inconsistency in following the chosen course. This happened with Gorbachev: in December 1989, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he unequivocally stated that the Soviet Union would not abandon the GDR to its fate. A year later, the Kremlin allowed West Germany to carry out the Anschluss of its eastern neighbor.

Kohl also felt the political weakness of the Soviet leadership during his visit to Moscow in February 1990, since it was after this that he began to more energetically pursue a course towards the reunification of Germany and, most importantly, began to insist on maintaining its membership in NATO.

And as a result: in modern Germany the number of American troops exceeds 50 thousand soldiers and officers, stationed including on the territory of the former GDR, and the NATO military machine is deployed near the Russian borders. And in the event of a military conflict, the perfectly prepared and trained officers of the former NPA will no longer be able to help us. And they are unlikely to want to...

As for England and France, their fears regarding the unification of Germany were not in vain: the latter quickly took leading positions in the European Union, strengthened its strategic and economic position in Central and Eastern Europe, gradually displacing British capital from there.

Hello dears.

Yesterday we had an introduction about new topic: Well, today we’ll start with specific examples.
And let's talk about the not very numerous, but one of the most combat-ready armies in the whole world in those years - about the GDR Volksarmee, aka the National People's Army (NPA) of the German Democratic Republic
The Volksarmee was created in 1956 from 0, and literally in 10-15 years it became a very formidable force.
It consisted of ground forces, air force and air defense troops, navy and border troops.

Issues of the country's defense were decided by the National Defense Council, subordinate to the People's Chamber and the State Council of the GDR.
The armed forces were led by the Minister of National Defense.

General of the Army Heinz Hoffmann 1960-1985 Minister of National Defense of the GDR

There was the main headquarters of the NPA and the headquarters of the branches of the armed forces. The highest body is the Main Political Directorate of the NPA. When creating the NNA, the experience of building the Armed Forces of the USSR and other socialist countries was used.
The NNA is recruited in accordance with the Law on the Introduction of Universal Military Duty (Jan. 24, 1962) and on the principle of voluntariness. Conscription age - 18 years, duration of service - 18 months

Officer training is carried out at higher officer schools and in the Military. Academy named after F. Engels.
As I said above, the GDR army was not the most numerous. As of 1987, the Ground Forces of the NNA of the GDR numbered 120,000 military personnel.

The strength of the Air Force is about 58,000 people.

The number of personnel in the Navy is about 18 thousand people.

The border guards of the GDR were very numerous - up to 47,000 people.

The territory of East Germany was divided into two military districts - MB-III (Southern, headquartered in Leipzig) and MB-V (Northern, headquartered in Neubrandenburg) and one artillery brigade, not part of any of the military districts, in each of which each included two motorized rifle divisions (motorisierte Schützendivision, MSD), one armored division (Panzerdivision, PD) and one missile brigade (Raketenbrigade, RBr).

Each armored division consisted of 3 armored regiments (Panzerregiment), one artillery regiment (Artillerieregiment), 1 motorized rifle regiment (Mot.-Schützenregiment), 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment (Fla-Raketen-Regiment), 1 engineer battalion (Pionierbataillon), 1 logistics battalion (Bataillon materieller Sicherstellung), 1 chemical defense battalion (Bataillon chemischer Abwehr), 1 sanitary battalion (Sanitätsbataillon), 1 reconnaissance battalion (Aufklärungsbataillon), 1 missile department (Raketenabteilung).
The main tank of the GDR army was the T-55, which made up about 80% of the fleet. The remaining 20% ​​were T-72b slingshot and T-72G vehicles, mainly of Polish or Czechoslovak production. The share of new tanks has been steadily increasing.

Each motorized rifle division consisted of 3 motorized regiments (Mot.-Schützenregiment), 1 armored regiment (Panzerregiment), 1 artillery regiment (Artillerieregiment), 1 anti-aircraft missile regiment (Fla-Raketenregiment), 1 missile department (Raketenabteilung), 1 engineer battalion (Pionierbataillon), 1 material support battalion (Bataillon materieller Sicherstellung), 1 sanitary battalion (Sanitätsbataillon), 1 chemical defense battalion (Bataillon chemischer Abwehr), 1 material support battalion (Bataillon materieller Sicherstellung).


Each missile brigade consisted of 2-3 missile departments (Raketenabteilung), 1 engineering company (Pionierkompanie), 1 logistics company (Kompanie materieller Sicherstellung), 1 meteorological battery (meteorologische Batterie), 1 repair company (Instandsetzungskompanie).


The artillery brigade consisted of 4 divisions (Abteilung), 1 repair company (Instandsetzungskompanie), 1 logistics company (Kompanie materieller Sicherstellung).

The air force (Luftstreitkräfte) consisted of 2 divisions (Luftverteidigungsdivision), each of which consisted of 2-4 attack squadrons (Jagdfliegergeschwader), 1 anti-aircraft missile brigade (Fla-Raketenbrigade), 2 anti-aircraft missile regiments (Fla-Raketenregiment) , 3-4 radio technical battalions (Funktechnisches Bataillon). There were also modern aircraft such as Mig-29.


The Air Force also included one of the most legendary and effective units of the Volksarmee - the 40th airborne battalion of the NNA "Willi Sanger" (German - 40. "Willi Sanger Fallschirmjager Bataillon"). The fighters of this unit took part in almost all foreign conflicts involving the Soviet military bloc - in particular, in Syria and Ethiopia. There is also a legend that the special forces of the airborne units of the NPA, as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops, participated in combat operations in Afghanistan.

The Navy (Volksmarine) was very good, and most importantly modern. It consisted of 110 warships of various classes and 69 auxiliary ships.


The naval aviation included 24 helicopters (16 Mi-8 type and 8 Mi-14 type), as well as 20 Su-17 fighter-bombers. The basis of the fleet is three patrol ships (SKR) of the Rostock type (Project 1159) and 16 small anti-submarine ships (MPC) of the Parchim type, Project 133.1

In total there were 6 divisions in the Volksarmey (11 at mobilization)
1719 tanks (2798 during mobilization, in peacetime on conservation)
2,792 infantry fighting vehicles (4,999 during mobilization, mothballed in peacetime)
887 artillery pieces over 100mm
(1746 during mobilization, in peacetime on conservation)
394 combat aircraft

64 combat helicopters

According to the Warsaw Pact, in the event of hostilities, the following NPA divisions were assigned to the armies of the Western Group of Forces:
19th Motorized Rifle Division NNA - Second Guards Tank Army.
17 Motorized Rifle NNA - Eighth Guards Army.
6 Motorized Rifle NPA - reserve of the Western Front.


It’s funny that despite the military doctrine, which was formulated as “the denial of all traditions of the Prussian-German military,” there were many borrowings from the 2nd and 3rd Reich in insignia, ranks and uniforms. Let's just say - a compilation of insignia of the Wehrmacht and the Soviet Army. So the rank insignia of the gefreiters moved from the sleeves to the shoulder straps and became similar to the sergeant stripes of the Soviet Army. The insignia of non-commissioned officers remained entirely Wehrmacht. Officer's and general's shoulder straps remained the same as in the Wehrmacht, but the number of stars on them began to correspond to the Soviet system.

The highest rank of the Volksarmee was called Marshal of the GDR, but in fact no one was awarded this title.
The uniform also had its differences. For example, the Tale-Hartz helmet, which was developed for the Wehrmacht, but was never accepted. Or the GDR version of the AK-47 called MPi-K (we mentioned it here.

National People's Army (NNA, Volksarmee, Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) - the armed forces of the GDR, which were created in 1956 and consisted of three types of control bodies:

• ground forces (Landstreitkräfte);
• navy (Volksmarine);
• air Force (English) Russian(Luftstreitkräfte), and military branches, special forces and services.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ Nationale Volksarmee DDR 1956-1990 | National People's Army of the GDR 1956-1990

✪ Präsentiermarsch der Nationalen Volksarmee

Subtitles

Creation

On November 12, 1955, the German government announced the creation of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundeswehr).

Started work in 1959 Military Academy named after F. Engels.

In 1961, the first command and staff exercises of the NNA of the GDR and the Soviet Army of the USSR Armed Forces were held.

Until 1962, it was recruited and NPA formations were not present in East Berlin.

In October 1962, the first NPA maneuvers took place in the territories of the GDR and Poland, in which Polish and Soviet troops took part.

On September 9-12, 1963, the international military exercise “Quartet” was held in the south of the GDR, in which the NNA of the GDR, Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak troops took part.

Despite its relatively small numbers, the National People's Army of the GDR was the most combat-ready army in Western Europe.

Doctrine

The official position of the leadership of the GDR on defense issues was formulated as “the denial of all traditions of the Prussian-German military,” and was based on further strengthening the defense capability of the socialist system of the GDR, as well as on close interaction with the armies of socialist countries. The NPA continued the traditions of the armed struggle of the German proletariat, as well as the liberation movement of the Napoleonic wars. However, in fact, there was no complete break with the classical military tradition of Germany.

Correspondence of the colors of the edging of the shoulder straps to the branches of the military:

Land Forces (Landstreitkräfte)

Air Force (Luftstreitkräfte)

Navy (Volksmarine)

Border Troops (Grenztruppen)