Lenin (real name Ulyanov) Vladimir Ilyich - an outstanding Russian political and statesman; founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state; one of the leaders of the international communist movement, born on April 10 (22 according to the new style) April 1870, in the city of Simbirsk - died on January 21, 1924.

Lenin was the greatest revolutionary of the twentieth century, a man with a strong pragmatic mind and enormous determination and will. In some political spheres, he was able to achieve results that were of fateful significance for the entire history of the century: the formation of the Russian Marxist party, the formation of the international communist movement, the creation of the world's first socialist state

Mountains of books have been written about Lenin, but to this day he remains an incomparably greater mystery than the other political leader of Russia in the 20th century. He served as an icon to millions for decades, and still remains so to so many.

Lenin's generation entered into social life in a period of disappointments and disappointed hopes. After the assassination of Alexander II (March 1, 1881), the liberal reform activities of the authorities turned into a deep rollback to the foundations of the autocratic regime. But trampled hopes rarely disappear without a trace. In strong characters they only strengthen the thirst for struggle. Many people then joined the opposition, the revolution, and the terror.

From the very beginning, Lenin stood out for his determination, self-confidence, firmness and sharpness in polemics - all that, as a rule, was lacking in the majority of revolutionary intellectuals. Lenin formulated his lifelong credo: Give us an organization of revolutionaries, and we will turn Russia over” for the sake of democracy and socialism. It was a struggle, with all our might and means, a struggle to the end, without doubts or hesitations, without retreats or compromises.

The Tsar left Petrograd on February 22, 1917, and on the 23rd, riots began there: rallies and demonstrations, which on February 24 turned into strikes, taking on an even larger scale (they became more crowded, clashes arose between the police and the troops supporting them.

On February 25, the movement began to develop into a general political strike, which practically paralyzed the life of the city. Red flags and banners with the slogans “Down with the Tsar!”, “Bread, Peace, Freedom!”, “Long Live the Republic!” were raised above the strikers and demonstrators. This is how they declared themselves political groups and organizations.

Back on February 25, on the initiative of some members of the "Union of Workers' Cooperatives of Petrograd", the Social Democratic faction of the IV State Duma, the Working Group of the Central Military-Industrial. In the defensive direction, the idea arose of creating a Council of Workers' Deputies. However, this idea was realized only on the 27th, when the leaders of the working group of the Central Military Commission, who had just been released from the “crosses,” appeared at the Tauride Palace, and together with a group of Duma Social Democrats and representatives of the left intelligentsia announced the creation of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

On February 27, almost simultaneously with the creation of the Petrograd Council, the leaders of the “Progressive Bloc” of the IV State Duma formed the so-called Provisional Committee, the head of which M. Rodzianko was already making attempts to enter into negotiations with Nicholas II in order to persuade him to make constitutional concessions.

On March 2, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived in Pskov, where Nicholas II was located. In the presence of the Minister of the Court B. Fredericks, the head of the military chancellery General K. Naryshkin, generals Ruzsky and Danilov, they outlined to the Tsar their version of abdication (in favor of Alexei). In response, Nicholas II stated that he had decided to abdicate in favor of his brother Mikhail Alexandrovich.

By the time of the abdication of Nicholas II, a Provisional Government had been formed in Petrograd. The program and composition of the government were largely the result of an agreement between the Duma provisional committee and the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

On March 3, Mikhail abdicated the throne until the final decision on the issue of the political system of the Russian Constituent Assembly, which was to be convened by the Provisional Government.

When the first information about what had happened in Russia reached Zurich, where Lenin had lived since the end of January 1916, Lenin did not believe them. But then he began to actively work on his political program. In Petrograd, local Bolshevik leaders were arguing about the subtleties of political formulations, about developing party tactics in relation to the Provisional Government, and Lenin had already decided everything. He has already formed the foundations of the political line that the Bolshevik Party will pursue under his leadership.

On April 3, Lenin arrived in Petrograd through enemy German territory in a sealed carriage. Immediately upon arrival, he published his now famous “April Theses”. They weren't a surprise. Back on March 13, at a meeting of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, Lenin’s telegram was read out, which prescribed the tactics of complete distrust of the Provisional Government and a categorical ban on rapprochement with other parties. The theses did not contain a call for violent, armed action in the struggle for power. They were a program of struggle for the peaceful “development” of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

With Lenin’s arrival, the party felt and understood: an undisputed leader, a leader, had appeared. Lenin’s complete “immersion” in the idea of ​​revolution, the power of his extraordinary energy, self-confidence, almost complete absence of internal hesitation, irreconcilability towards political opponents, the ability to discern him weak sides and use it in the struggle, bringing it to the end - all this raised Lenin high above other competitors as a political leader.

At the First Congress of Soviets in June 1917, where only 10% of the delegates supported Lenin, he declared: “there is such a party ready to take power - this is the Bolshevik party.” By this time, Lenin’s arithmetic of the revolution boiled down to the fact that soldiers are the same as peasants; like soldiers they want peace, like peasants they want land. But besides the promises of peace, land and free bread taken from the rich, a political slogan was needed, and Lenin puts forward a simple and accessible slogan: “All power to the Soviets!” He never tires of explaining at rallies and meetings the content of the April Theses and the slogan calling for people to stand under the banners of the Soviets.

Back in December 1916 - January 1917, the tsarist government, by agreement with its Entente allies, decided to launch an offensive on the Russian-German front in the spring of 1917. In combination with the actions of the Allied forces in the West, it should have and most likely would have led to the defeat of Germany. Nicholas II hoped that a successful offensive and victory in the war, raising a wave of patriotism, would improve the situation in the country. The February explosion dashed these hopes. However, as events developed, the idea of ​​an offensive, capable of realizing not only strategic but also political calculations, came to life again, this time in the mouths of representatives of the new government. A member of the Central Committee, cadet V. Maklakov, formed plans related to the offensive in the following way: “If we really manage to advance... and wage the war as seriously as we waged it before, then Russia will quickly recover completely. Then our power will be justified and strengthened...”

According to the plan developed by the Headquarters, the offensive will be scheduled for July. The main blow should be delivered on the Southwestern Front (com. - General A. Gutor), supported by the Northern, Western and Romanian fronts.

V.I. Lenin believed that with all possible outcomes of the offensive it would mean “strengthening the main positions of the counter-revolution.” Naturally, the Bolsheviks were against the offensive. This meant launching a political struggle to prevent it, even to the point of fraternization with the enemy. Under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda and agitation, under their slogans, anarchic sentiments appeared in some military units both during the preparation period and during the offensive itself. Political opponents of the Bolsheviks directly accused them of a treacherous stab in the back.

The entire grandiose plan of the offensive turned into a real disaster. A disorderly, sometimes panicky retreat of the Russian troops began. This coincided with the release of soldiers of the Petrograd garrison (1st machine gun regiment, 1st reserve infantry regiment), sailors and other military units arriving from Kronstadt onto the streets of the city from July 3 to July 5. There were demands to eliminate the Provisional Government and transfer all power to the Soviets. Petrograd was shocked. The source of such a speech, which was almost immediately suppressed, is still not entirely clear. After an investigation of this case by the Petrograd Judicial Chamber, headed by N. Karinsky and investigator P. Alexandrov, it was decided that this uprising was provoked by the Bolshevik leadership, which acted to undermine Russia's military efforts in the interests of Germany and its allies. In accordance with this resolution, the investigative commission began interrogating a wide range of people involved in one way or another in the events. This investigation was never completed: the Bolshevik coup put an end to it.

Because of the above events, Lenin urgently returned to Petrograd, interrupting his short vacation in Neyvola. G. Zinoviev wrote in his memoirs; for Lenin, “the question of the need to seize power by the proletariat was resolved from the first moment of the current revolution, and it was only a matter of choosing the right moment.” Zinoviev further asserted: “In the July days, our entire Central Committee was against the immediate seizure of power. Lenin thought the same. But when the wave of popular indignation rose high on July 3, Comrade Lenin perked up. And here, probably in the buffet of the Tauride Palace, a small meeting took place, at which Trotsky, Lenin and I were present. And Lenin, laughing, told us, shouldn’t we try now? But he immediately added: no, we can’t take power now, it won’t work now, because the front-line soldiers are not all ours yet...”

Nevertheless, the first test to some extent still took place. The Bolsheviks actually supported the action, including the armed one, of soldiers and workers. Then Lenin argued that evading our support would be a direct betrayal of the proletariat, and the Bolsheviks had to go and did go to the masses in order to give the uprising a supposedly peaceful, organized character and avoid provocation.

Repression fell on the Bolsheviks. Warrants were issued for the arrest of Lenin and some other Bolshevik leaders, but no one came to arrest the leader. In different places of the city, demonstrations were subjected to armed attacks, and fire was opened on them. Meanwhile, the collection of data continued to incriminate some Bolshevik leaders (and above all Lenin) of financial ties with the Germans. Documents published by Germany after World War II provide indirect basis for the conclusion that certain German subsidies ended up in the Bolshevik treasury. But if this is so, then this does not mean that Lenin and other Bolsheviks were German agents and carried out their instructions. Lenin was a personality of such a magnitude that could hardly be compatible with activities on someone else's instructions.

In less than 2 months, it seemed that already defeated, disgraced Bolshevism would once again attract the sympathy and support of those masses who rejected it in July.

After these events, Lenin was secretly transported to Finland. Lenin reoriented the political course of the Bolsheviks. What was proclaimed in the “April Theses” - the struggle for power through the political struggle with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries within the Soviets - was actually abandoned. Now Lenin came to the conclusion that “these Soviets have failed, suffered a complete collapse,” that the Soviets are now powerless and helpless in the face of the victorious and victorious counter-revolution. From this categorical statement Lenin took a logical step further. He stated that there is no longer any dual power, that the power of the Provisional Government is the power of the “military clique of Cavaignacs (Kerensky, certain generals, officers, etc.)”, that the new government is “only a screen to cover up the counter-revolution of the Cadets and the military clique who have power in hand". But if power actually ended up in the hands of a military clique, only hiding behind the screen of government, then Leninist logic dictated the final conclusion: “... no constitutional and republican illusions, no more illusions of a peaceful path... Only a clear awareness of the situation, restraint, steadfastness of the workers’ vanguard, preparation of forces for an armed uprising.” Frequent changes of main slogans, which no serious political party could afford, became Lenin’s usual tool in the struggle for power.

The goal of the armed uprising is the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat, supported by the poor peasantry, to implement the program of the Bolshevik Party.

As a result, Lenin intended to change the methods of the party’s activities: “without abandoning legality... to establish illegal organizations and cells everywhere and in everything... to combine legal work with illegal work.” This means that while working openly, the party had to hide and prepare to attack at the right, favorable moment.

Politically, Lenin’s turn had enormous, far-reaching implications: it accelerated the movement of the Bolshevik party, and therefore those radical forces from the bottom that followed it, to the left, even to the extreme left, political front of the country. At the end of July, the VI Congress of the Bolshevik Party actually took place legally, at which new Leninist guidelines were adopted, although they did not give them specific, practical content. An important organizational moment in the work of the congress was the admission into the party of a group of “mezhrayontsev” led by L. Trotsky. (His long struggle with Lenin and Bolshevism was well known, but now, in these hot revolutionary days, they found ways to reconcile with each other). The unification of these two people, possessing enormous will and full mastery of the art of political struggle in the revolution, gave Bolshevism such a powerful impetus, which largely determined the victory of October...

At the end of August 1917, the monarchist General Kornilov moved troops to Petrograd, against whom the Bolsheviks also opposed. Thus, they rehabilitated themselves in the eyes of the socialist parties. Subsequently, Kerensky, who saved Lenin from trial and arrest because he believed that the German money of the Bolsheviks could be a stain on all democracy, wrote about the Bolshevik leader: “Without the Kornilov rebellion there would have been no Lenin.” From the beginning of the autumn of 1917, the revolution degenerated more and more into a rebellion. The provisional government led by the Socialist-Revolutionary Kerensky was turning from capitalist to socialist, constantly moving to the left, but did not have time to catch up with Lenin.

Being “underground” throughout the Kornilov putsch, when the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries hesitated on the main issue (the idea of ​​coalition power), Lenin showed a cautious willingness to compromise with them. As explained in his article “On Compromise,” this compromise could consist of the Bolsheviks abandoning their demand for the immediate transfer of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants, and the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries agreeing to form a government entirely responsible to the Soviets.

V.I. Lenin believed that the creation of such a government should mean a significant step in the further democratization of the country, such a democratization that would allow the Bolsheviks to campaign for their views quite freely. This was a fairly accurate calculation: the Bolshevization of the lower classes was growing rapidly, and, receiving unlimited freedom of agitation, the Bolsheviks could very reasonably count on pushing back and even ousting their socialist opponents from the right; playing with revolutionary, populist slogans was supposed to give advantages to the Bolsheviks.

For approximately another 10–12 first days of September, Lenin in his articles continued to vary the thought of a politically beneficial union of the Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. The majority in the Central Committee perceived this course well and were ready to implement it.

The Bolshevik Central Committee, oriented by Lenin's articles, supported the convening of the Democratic Conference, designed to create a new coalition power - a power represented by the socialist parties. The democratic meeting opened on September 14 at the Alexandria Theater. It seemed to everyone that this meeting provided a chance for a reorganization of power, for its shift to the left, through the formation of a new coalition - democratic, homogeneously socialist. And this chance was missed due to internal disagreement in the revolutionary democratic environment.

This meeting confirmed Lenin's worst assumptions, and in mid-September Lenin's position changed dramatically. Not a trace remains of the recent discussion about the benefits of seeking an agreement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries within the framework of the Soviets. Now he simply denounced the possibility of any parliamentary negotiations and agreements with incredible energy.

Lenin demanded that the Bolsheviks decisively put an end to all illusions regarding the Democratic Assembly and Parliament, because they did not want to create a government capable of leading the country out of the impasse, sending off the impending catastrophe through radical transformations, satisfying the vital interests of the lower working people - workers, peasants, soldiers. He called for no more time to be wasted on empty verbal debates, but to concentrate efforts on work among the workers and soldiers, since they are the source of the salvation of the revolution. In the 20s of September, Lenin generally came to the conclusion that the participation of the Bolsheviks in the Democratic Assembly was a mistake. Any suggestion of the possibility of some kind of compromise and agreement with another party was unconditionally rejected.

And Lenin concluded: the party must begin preparations for a military uprising.

Lenin's sharp turn did not immediately find understanding and support in the Bolshevik leadership. Hopes and calculations associated with the Democratic Assembly and the upcoming Second Congress of Soviets continued to live on.

Lenin's letters about the need for an uprising sometimes remained unanswered, so Lenin faced another struggle against at least part of the leadership of his own party, much like what happened in April, when he “punched through” his “April Theses.” And he, without hesitation, was ready to start this fight.

At the end of September, Lenin announced the possibility of his leaving the Central Committee while reserving the right to agitate for his point of view in the lower ranks of the party and at the party congress. The harshness and categoricalness of his position were determined by the conviction that cooperation in the pre-parliament and waiting for the Congress of Soviets was destructive for the revolution.

At the end of September - beginning of October, Lenin returned illegally to Petrograd. He knew the value of his personal presence and was not mistaken this time either. On October 7, the Bolshevik Central Committee published a message about its withdrawal from the Pre-Parliament. This was Lenin's first success, but not yet final.

On October 10, illegally gathered members of the Bolshevik Central Committee for the first time (after July) with the participation of V.I. Lenin discussed the issue of an armed uprising.

Lenin argued his position by saying that Europe was about to be resolved by revolution; The Entente and the Germans are ready to conspire to strangle the revolution in Russia; the people support the Bolsheviks; a new Kornilov revolution is being prepared; Kerensky decided to surrender Petrograd to the Germans. Despite the fact that Lenin’s arguments were, to put it mildly, unconvincing, he turned out to be right in the main thing - power was lying on the pavement, no one wanted to defend the Provisional Government. Moreover, Lenin understood that it was absolutely necessary to overthrow the Provisional Government before the Second Congress of Soviets in order to confront him with a fait accompli. Only then is it possible to establish a purely Bolshevik, Leninist government.

Lenin directly rejected all the arguments, pointing out that absenteeism and indifference are a consequence of part of the masses being tired of mere words, that the majority firmly follows the Bolsheviks, and that from the international point of view, it is the Bolsheviks who can and should take the initiative. He concluded that the political matter was ripe for the transfer of power to the Soviets, and the facts revived and activated the counter-revolutionary forces and forced them to take decisive action.

The Central Committee adopted the Lenin Resolution, which stated that the meeting “calls on all bodies and all workers and soldiers to comprehensively and intensively prepare for an armed uprising, to support the center created for this by the Central Committee and expressed full confidence that the Central Committee and the Soviets will promptly indicate a favorable moment and appropriate methods offensive."

Lenin's political line won just as it had won at other sharp turns between February and October.

From October 20 to 24, the Central Committee actually did not allow Lenin to enter Smolny; he appeared there without prior approval on the evening of October 24. It was from this moment that Lenin’s energy, will, and efficiency became truly titanic. His articles (“The Bolsheviks must take power”, “Marxism and the uprising”, “Advice from an outsider”), written during this hot time, are direct tactical guidance for seizing power.

In his “Letter to the District Committees,” with the help of which he wanted to put pressure on the still wavering Central Committee through the district committees, Lenin insists on decisive action: “The government is wavering. We must finish him off at all costs! Delay in speaking out is like death.” The performance was successful, power was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, and the capture of the Winter Palace did not present any difficulties.

On the morning of October 25, Lenin wrote an appeal “To the Citizens of Russia”: “The Provisional Government has been overthrown,” despite the fact that the Provisional Government was still meeting in the Winter Palace. Lenin writes decrees about peace, about land (borrowing the program of the Socialist Revolutionaries), about the formation of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government - the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), at the same time ordering the Military Revolutionary Committee: "The Provisional Government must be arrested this night, otherwise the Military Revolutionary Committee will be shot." A new era has begun - “a miracle happened. “If there had not been Lenin, there would have been no October” (Trotsky).



To the 100th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution

In the year of the centenary of the Great October Revolution, buckets of crude and sophisticated lies and slander will be poured out by haters of the socialist revolution in the name of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

He, who died almost a hundred years ago, even now they are taking revenge for Soviet power, for the USSR and for the breakthrough of humanity to socialism. Protect folk memory The works of honest and conscientious authors who form a powerful cultural layer of Leninism will help us, Soviet people, communists, about Lenin. Particularly valuable among them are works marked by the talent of scientific research and brilliant journalism. It is this kind of talent that you will feel when reading Vladlen Loginov’s book “The Unknown Lenin” (M., 2010).

Dialectical “thought sharpened by feeling”

In our opinion, the author of this book masters the skill of journalistic presentation of scientific truths. Magnificent Russian language, full of relief images, subtle psychological characteristics, sketches of dramas and tragedies of the time under study. Reading V. Loginov’s book, you will feel Lenin’s irony and sarcasm in the angry political denunciations of the bourgeoisie and its servants, revolutionary passion and, of course, historical optimism emanating from the main character - V.I. Lenin.

Outstanding Soviet psychologist S.L. Rubinstein, of course, was right when he asserted: “Thought, sharpened by feeling, penetrates deeper into its subject than “objective,” indifferent, indifferent thought.” In Login’s book, it is thought, sharpened by feeling—dialectical thought—that is dominant.

One of many examples of this. This is how V. Loginov presents to the reader a socio-psychological portrait of the conspirators following the “rebellious” General Kornilov, who is ready to start a civil war in Russia. “Kornilov’s officers marched on Petrograd to pacify the “cattle.” As in the February days of Vasily Vitalievich Shulgin, they were sure that they would “drive the herd into a stall.” At Headquarters they were told that “this is just a walk.” The already mentioned Prince Trubetskoy telegraphed from Headquarters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Kornilov’s success was guaranteed, because at the bottom there was “indifference that is ready to submit to the great blow of the whip.” After listening to these conversations, the head of the British military mission in Russia, General Knox, wrote: “This people needs a whip! Dictatorship is exactly what is needed!” He even provided the Kornilovites with armored cars with English crews, which went to St. Petersburg together with Krymov. But it turned out that gentlemen officers and even English armored cars were powerless against the “cattle”...

...Already on August 30 it became clear that the rebellion was a complete defeat. On August 31, Krymov shot himself. Today they write about the mystery of this act. And even about “Masonic machinations”, fortunately Krymov, like Kerensky, belonged to Russian Freemasonry. But it is unlikely that there was a “fatal secret” in this suicide. The fact that Kerensky insulted Krymov by accusing him of treason is indisputable. And according to the old code of officer honor - if you cannot punish the offender, then you are obliged to shoot yourself. This, apparently, was the whole “mystery” that was incomprehensible to our time.

So, the “cattle” - the huge working majority, led in St. Petersburg by the Bolsheviks, with whom the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshevik internationalists were in solidarity, scattered the idea of ​​a military dictatorship to dust. General Krymov shot himself “according to the code of officer’s honor,” which was above all else for him. Above all the people of Russia, who suffered in a war that was meaningless to them. He suffered through centuries of waiting for a solution to the land issue. These and other similar thoughts come to mind when reading the above socio-psychological sketch by V. Loginov. And the image of an aggressive imperial West emerges: English armored cars and the Russophobic General Knox.

But, perhaps, the most powerful and valuable thing in V. Loginov’s book is the presentation to the reader of the dialectics of Lenin’s revolutionary thought, the revelation of his personality as a people’s leader, for whom a specific analysis of a specific situation determined actions in the interests of the working classes. As Lenin repeatedly said and wrote, there is nothing more primitive and ignorant than passing off as an objective approach to assessing events and people a view from one side or the other, bypassing really existing contradictions. Guided by this kind of “objectivity,” we can say that Lenin, on the one hand, was for a peaceful transition from the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution to the proletarian socialist revolution, as directly stated in Lenin’s famous “April Theses.” On the other hand, he demanded that the Bolshevik Central Committee take power immediately through an armed uprising.

In the common opinion, Comrade Lenin was very “inconsistent.” No, peacefully and only peacefully, without violence and blood. But he insisted on the immediate preparation of an armed uprising and threatened: “Delay is like death.” This is how the modern common man perceives Lenin’s “extremes.” As if in response to this, V. Loginov more than once reproduces Lenin’s idea that the great revolution is an extreme aggravation of the contradiction between the interests of the exploiting and exploited classes, which inevitably (as evidenced by history) leads to civil war. The whole question is whether it is necessary and possible to avoid it, and if not, then how to reduce its inevitable victims to a minimum.

If there is "even one chance in a hundred"

V. Loginov demonstrates in his book not an abstract, but a Leninist dialectical class approach (a specific analysis of a specific situation), which meets the interests of the people. This is how he presents to us, the readers, the situation that developed after the defeat of the Kornilov regime. Kerensky rushes about and bluffs. Having lost the support of an influential part of the generals and cadets, with their withdrawal from the government, he loses ground and remains without support. He hastily forms a new government, headed by himself, Kerensky. Calls it the Directory and declares that it has all the power.

This is a bluff of despair. Thus, Kerensky demanded the immediate dissolution of the “arbitrary committees.” And what did he get in response? CEC categorical refusal. “It was obvious,” writes V. Loginov, “that the Central Executive Committee was being pressured by the general mood that dominated the Soviets, as well as by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Mensheviks, whose numbers were continuously growing. These were clear signs that with the new revolutionary wave the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets arose.”

This is what Lenin was thinking when N.K. Krupskaya told him about how the soldiers in the carriage were talking about reprisals against officers and about the uprising. She was sure: Lenin was silent thoughtfully because he was thinking about how best to prepare the uprising. “Here,” Loginov notes, “Nadezhda Konstantinovna is not accurate. He thought - and this seems incredible - about a compromise."

Lenin writes an article “On Compromises”. It states: “The usual idea of ​​ordinary people about the Bolsheviks, supported by the press slandering the Bolsheviks, is that the Bolsheviks do not agree to any compromises, with anyone, never... such an idea does not correspond to the truth.” And then Loginov briefly outlines the logic of Lenin’s judgments. We must be aware of the fact, argues Vladimir Ilyich, that a non-peaceful rise to power is associated with inevitable sacrifices. Moreover, it “means a difficult civil war, a long delay after this peaceful cultural development...” Therefore, if there is even “one small chance” - “if even one chance in a hundred” of the possibility of a peaceful path - it must be taken advantage of.”

“Only in the name of this peaceful development of the revolution,” writes Lenin, “an opportunity that is extremely rare in history and extremely valuable, an opportunity that is extremely rare, only in the name of it can the Bolsheviks... in my opinion, be able and should, in my opinion, make such a compromise.”

The essence of the compromise between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks was set out by Lenin in his article “On Compromises,” to which V. Loginov refers us. “The compromise is, on our part, our return to the pre-July demand: all power to the Soviets, a government of Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.” And also: “The compromise would be that the Bolsheviks, without claiming to participate in the government... would refuse to immediately demand the transfer of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants... The condition, self-evident and not new for the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, would be complete freedom of agitation and convening of the Constituent Assembly without further delays or even in a shorter period of time.”

But on September 2, the joint plenum of the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution in support of the Directory.

On September 3, in the postscript of his article, Lenin writes: “Yes, it is clear from everything that the days when the road of peaceful development accidentally became possible have already passed. All that remains is to send these notes to the editor (to the editorial office of the Pravda newspaper, which was then published under the name “Working Way.” - Yu.B.) with a request to title them: “Belated Thoughts”... sometimes, perhaps, it’s not without interest to get acquainted with belated thoughts " Vladlen Loginov encourages us to do this.

The Bolsheviks “must take power immediately”

In September, a new revolutionary wave rose higher and higher. It was ready to overwhelm the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary parties, and if the Bolsheviks had hesitated to seize power with an armed force, it would have overwhelmed their party as well.

Complete confusion began among the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. Menshevik proletarians en masse went over to the camp of the Bolsheviks, whose agitation reflected their interests and sentiments. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries broke away from the Socialist Revolutionary Party, rejecting an alliance with the bourgeoisie. The ground was slipping from under the feet of the conciliatory Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik leadership. It was no longer possible to think about any compromise with him: the time had come for revolutionary action. The workers carried their owners and managers in wheelbarrows outside the factory gates and took control of production into their own hands. The land of the landowners had practically already been seized by the peasants. The mass of soldiers was looking forward to peace. There was a real danger that a spontaneous mass movement would sweep the country, sweeping away everything in its path. That it, this movement, will result in riots, “i.e. disturbances are unconscious, unorganized, spontaneous, sometimes wild” (Lenin). And this, as V. Loginov writes, worried Lenin most of all.

And the Bolshevik Central Committee, in which the “moderate” core (Kamenev, Zinoviev, etc.) was ready to hesitate and wait and even follow Kerensky’s lead, hid from the party Lenin’s demand for the immediate preparation of an uprising. V. Loginov focuses attention on this and, most importantly, on the fact that, alas, in Soviet time in school and university training courses history was ignored and kept silent. Namely, on the ultimatum that Lenin presented to the leadership of the Central Committee: either his demand for the immediate convening of the Party Central Committee to resolve the issue of preparing an uprising will be accepted, or he will leave the Central Committee and appeal to the masses over his head.

Since Lenin was in hiding, he submitted his statement of resignation from the Central Committee through proxies on September 29. And on October 1-2 he writes a leaflet “To workers, peasants and soldiers.” In it, he told the truth that was expected in factories and factories, in villages and villages, in the trenches of the First World War. “Comrades!.. Everyone go to the barracks, go to the Cossack units, go to the working people and explain the truth to the people:

If the Soviets have power, then no later than October 25th... a just peace will be offered to all warring peoples. There will be a workers' and peasants' government in Russia; it will immediately, without wasting a day, offer a just peace to all warring peoples. Then the people will know who wants an unjust war. Then the people will decide in the Constituent Assembly.

If the Soviets have power, then the landowners’ lands will immediately be declared the possession and property of all the people.” The leaflet was not published...

On the first of October, Lenin wrote “Letter to the Central Committee, MK, PC and members of the Soviets of St. Petersburg and Moscow Bolsheviks.” In it, he argues that the Bolsheviks “must take power immediately” in order to save “the Russian revolution... and the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in the war.” “Otherwise,” Lenin warns the party, “the wave of real anarchy may become stronger than us” (emphasis added - Yu.B.). V. Loginov highlights this Leninist warning more than once, which is extremely valuable, because even today patriots do not spare paint in order to present the leader of the proletarian revolution as an anti-statist. What would happen to the Russian state if a wave of wild anarchy (Russian revolt, senseless and merciless, according to Pushkin) covered the country?.. Loginov shows how right Lenin was in his warning about the danger of rampant anarchy, spontaneous and uncontrollable. “The mass of soldiers was especially susceptible,” writes V. Loginov, “to spontaneous and wild outbreaks, among whom there were many elements who had largely declassed during the war years... It was they who destroyed shops in Ufa in September and immediately on the streets or sold captured things, or simply trampled them into the mud. In Bendery, Tiraspol, Ostrog, Rzhev, Torzhok, having destroyed military warehouses, drunken soldiers together with hooligans destroyed shops and stores. In Kharkov, the same drunken soldiers, incited by the Black Hundreds, rushed to the Jewish cemetery, intending to dig up gold allegedly hidden there from the graves.

The government’s inability to resolve the issue of peace, bread and land caused a storm of anger and hatred among the masses.” The ground was ready for an anarchic storm.

Reading Login’s book about Lenin in 1917, one cannot help but come to the conclusion: if not for the proletarian avant-garde, which carried away the masses into an organized revolutionary movement; if it weren’t for Lenin, who personified intelligence, honor, conscience and the all-crushing will of the party, who did not succumb to either slander and lies (accusing him of spying for Germany), or the threat of taking his life in case of arrest (so to speak, “when trying to flight"), nor before his isolation from the party through the efforts of the “moderate” Bolsheviks in the Central Committee, if only the Soviets had seized full power, then (we emphasize this) the state catastrophe of Russia would have been inevitable.

Vladlen Loginov’s passionate journalistic account of the dramatic history of Lenin’s struggle with the “moderates” in the Central Committee for the immediate preparation of an armed uprising is read with unflagging interest. Lenin’s “Letter to the Central Committee, MK, PC and members of the Soviets of St. Petersburg and Moscow Bolsheviks” finally reached St. Petersburg and Muscovites and exploded them with indignation at the criminally wait-and-see position of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Co. Two facts are noteworthy in the history of Lenin’s struggle against the “moderates,” which V. Loginov draws attention to.

Having returned to Petrograd illegally, contrary to the decision of the Central Committee, Lenin met with only one member of the Central Committee - Stalin. To him he conveys to the Central Committee his demand for the immediate convening of a meeting of its members to resolve the issue of the uprising. Only in this case is he ready to withdraw his statement of resignation from the Central Committee of September 29. And such a meeting (session) of the Central Committee took place on October 10. It made the historic decision to immediately prepare an armed uprising. Kamenev and Zinoviev voted “against”, but did not abandon their efforts to decision remained unfulfilled. On October 12, at the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets, they distributed to the delegates copies of their letter to the Central Committee, in which they do not deny the uprising in principle, but write about the unpreparedness of the proletariat for it: “The dispute is not about whether an uprising is permissible, but about the assessment of the current moment, about Tom “is the working class now in precisely such a position (to take a decisive battle - Yu.B.). No and a thousand times no!!!”

The letter from Kamenev and Zinoviev, in fact, proposed removing the issue of preparation for the uprising from the agenda. In other words, cancel the Central Committee resolution of October 10. The letter directly stated: “We do not now have the right to stake the entire future on the card of an armed uprising... we can and must now limit ourselves to a defensive position.” In fact, a parliamentary, opportunist way of struggle for power was proposed: “Constituent Assembly plus Soviets” - and no dictatorship of the proletariat. Even those who were preparing to lead the uprising began to have doubts: is it worth the haste? Isn't there a great risk of defeat?

Lenin could not allow the party to become demoralized at the decisive moment of the revolution. He insisted on convening an expanded meeting of the Central Committee, which took place on October 16. After a heated discussion of Lenin’s “report on the last meeting of the Central Committee,” the resolution proposed by Lenin was adopted by an overwhelming majority: “The meeting ... fully supports the resolution of the Central Committee (dated October 10 - Yu.B.), calls on all organizations and all workers and soldiers to comprehensive and strengthened preparation of an armed uprising." It seemed that all doubts had been overcome, the will of the majority had been determined, the final point had been reached.

However, on October 18, a note “Yu. Kamenev about the “speech”. In it, the author, on behalf of himself and Zinoviev, sets out arguments against the uprising. “...Is it possible to imagine an act more treasonous, more strikebreaking?” - Lenin writes indignantly about Kamenev’s note.

The history of the confrontation between Kamenev and Zinoviev over Lenin’s position is presented by us in a very condensed form. V. Loginov pays great attention to it and does not skimp on the analysis of Lenin’s Bolshevik strategy and tactics of the Russian revolution and the Zinoviev-Kamenev (opportunist) strategy and tactics. In addition to the ideological and political aspects of two incompatible positions, V. Loginov also clearly has a moral aspect. Kamenev and Zinoviev placed themselves above the will of the party. Their “treasonous” act was not an accident. Opportunism is always immoral as a sophisticated betrayal of the working class, of all working people, covered with Marxist and even ultra-revolutionary (Trotskyism) phrases.

History Lessons We Shouldn't Forget

The deeper you delve into the content and logic of Vladlen Loginov’s book, the more persistently you are haunted by the idea that the line of political behavior of the main heroes of the history of the CPSU (b) of the 20-30s of the twentieth century was largely determined by their behavior in 1917 and, most importantly, their attitude towards Lenin and his position.

Stalin was the only member of the Central Committee who proposed then, in mid-September, that Lenin’s letters (we will talk about them later) be sent to the most important party organizations for their discussion. But at a meeting of the Central Committee, the question was put to a vote: who is in favor of keeping only one copy of the letters. For - 6, against - 4, abstained - 6. The protocol says: “Comrade. Kamenev made a proposal to adopt the following resolution (and it was adopted. - Yu.B.): The Central Committee, having discussed Lenin’s letters, rejects the practical proposals contained in them, calls on all organizations to follow only the instructions of the Central Committee and reaffirms what the Central Committee finds in this moment“It is completely unacceptable to perform any kind of speech on the street.” No comments needed.

Trotsky certainly played important role V October revolution 1917, but on the way to it, in July, during the most dramatic period of the rampant reaction - the destruction of the editorial office and printing house of Pravda, the order of the Provisional Government to arrest Lenin - he demonstratively goes to prison. So to speak, he voluntarily surrenders himself into the hands of “justice” (they say, since Lenin’s arrest was announced, then take me too). It was a thoughtful gesture that made it possible to beautifully escape from the impending events that were threatening to the party. It was posturing with a clear claim to put oneself on a par with Lenin, or even higher. This delusion of grandeur will lead Trotsky to present the history of October according to the formula “I and Lenin.”

Kamenev and Trotsky did not behave like Bolsheviks at the Democratic Conference, which took place in Petrograd in mid-September. It was initiated by Kerensky in order to gain time to retain power and create the appearance of a “democratic” solution to pressing issues. The meeting turned into just another talking shop. This is how V. Loginov presented the participation of the Bolsheviks in this talking shop: “Kamenev spoke on behalf of the Bolsheviks. He called on the representatives of Russian democracy sitting in the hall - them, not the Soviets - to take power into their own hands, create a democratic coalition government and a body to which it would be responsible. He was applauded. The next day, the 15th, Trotsky gave a speech to the delegates from the Soviets. Unlike Kamenev, he spoke about the transfer of power to the Soviets, but just like Kamenev, he was focused on the peaceful development of events. He was also applauded."

And here, like a bolt from the blue, are Lenin’s letters to the Central Committee, the titles of which speak for themselves: “The Bolsheviks must take power,” “Marxism and the uprising.” The peaceful mood of Kamenev, Trotsky and others like them in the Central Committee of the party explodes with Lenin’s formulation of the question of power: “The question is that our party now at the Democratic Conference actually has its own congress, and this congress must decide (whether it wants or does not want, but must) the fate of the revolution. The question is to make the task clear for the party: the order of the day is to put an armed uprising in St. Petersburg and Moscow (with the region), the conquest of power, the overthrow of the government.” And as a final optimistic chord: “We have a certain victory, for the people are already close to despair, and we are giving the whole people a sure way out.”

V. Loginov reproduces the reaction to Lenin’s letters from “moderate” Central Committee members, accurately conveyed by Bukharin in his memoirs in 1921: “We all gasped!” As already mentioned, only Stalin proposed discussing Lenin’s letters in the party, but he was in the minority. The "moderate" majority rejected Lenin's proposals.

It will take a long time to see the path from resistance to Lenin’s course of armed uprising in 1917 to rejection of Stalin’s policy of building socialism in the USSR, without waiting for the proletarian revolution in Europe. But this path existed and was followed by people who were part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, but who secretly gravitated toward opportunism (Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others). Vladlen Loginov’s book helps to see this path, to see what inconsistent Bolshevism, or more precisely, non-Bolshevism, leads to.

The author of the book, in our opinion, masterfully highlighted what made Lenin the leader of the Bolshevik party, the people's leader. Lenin was one not only because of his genius in the development of Marxism in the era of imperialism. This is so obvious that it does not require proof.

V. Loginov convincingly shows how Lenin unswervingly followed the postulate he formulated: Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action.

People's leader

Lenin was a Bolshevik and people's leader - and this can be seen throughout Vladlen Loginov's book - due to his, Lenin's, organic connection with the lower ranks of the people. He, in Loginov’s description, is no less often than in the party environment (and perhaps more often) among workers, peasants and soldiers. They are imbued with the social mood that is dominant at the moment. The book, as they say, clearly shows how Lenin becomes infected and charged with the social and revolutionary creativity of the masses: “Only he will win and retain power who believes in the people, who plunges into the spring of living folk creativity.”

What V. Loginov managed (and this is a rare success) was to accurately convey Lenin’s thought, adhering to Lenin’s journalistic style, on the main issue for the people - the state and the new structure of state power in the form of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. Lenin considered the Soviets a brilliant work of folk art. He contrasted them with the old, exploitative type of state power. Revealing the class nature of the old state, Loginov skillfully uses the means of Leninist political sarcasm: “The class essence of the state has always been carefully masked by reasoning about state interests - higher than the interests of individual classes, social groups, corporations and clans. In Russia in 1917, when the old state was collapsing literally before our eyes, this flair of statehood was exploited with all its might. And the land cannot be given to the peasants, because this is contrary to the interests of the state. And workers need to tighten their belts, and not demand higher wages - in the name of state interests.” How it is said in Lenin’s way and for today.

But, perhaps, V. Loginov was most successful in conveying the moral content of Lenin’s thought, to which the most venerable researchers of the theoretical heritage of V.I. Lenin received little or no attention. Namely, it was the people's ethics contained in Lenin's word that made him a people's leader. First of all, this was expressed in Lenin’s propaganda of the idea of ​​justice, for which the Russian people have fought in all centuries. For Lenin, justice is both a social and moral category. This was brilliantly shown by V. Loginov in his book. “For his commitment to this idea,” he writes, “Lenin got it at the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903, when he defended the need to transfer land to the peasants. Then his opponents accused him of abandoning the position of economic materialism, taking up “correction of some historical injustice” and generally taking an “ethical point of view.”

And again, in 1917, the “priests of the Marxist parish” again accused him of using such “empty” and “meaningless” concepts as “justice” when analyzing Russian socio-political reality, where one should operate only with purely rational scientific categories. "

For Lenin - and this permeates the entire content of Loginov’s book - the class interests of workers and peasants, the vast working majority, are inseparable from the moral norms and ideals suffered by the people - the ideals of justice, honor, dignity, duty to the Motherland. The following lines of Login’s book are consonant with this Leninist, morally charged, class approach: “In all centuries, it (the class struggle - Yu.B.) has been a completely conscious struggle for justice. And not because, as we write today, they envied the rich. But because they considered their wealth unjust. Profited from the labor of others. And they were right. Political economy has proven this idea to be a scientific fact."

In Vladlen Loginov’s book, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin tirelessly proved this to the workers, peasants and honest intelligentsia. And he proved that there is no other way to overcome injustice in Russia other than its breakthrough to socialism. He proved it, guided by the rule he himself established: “Maximum Marxism = maximum popularity and simplicity.”

“We convinced Russia,” said Lenin. This meant, first of all, that the view of Russian reality from a class point of view, which he propagated among the masses, entered the consciousness of not only proletarians, but also peasants and became their approach to assessing what was happening. V. Loginov illustrates this well by referring to an apt psychological sketch by the American journalist John Reed. In his book “Ten Days That Shook the World,” which Lenin “would like to see... translated into all languages,” there is a scene of an argument between a student, either a Socialist Revolutionary, or a Menshevik, with two peasant soldiers. Jumping up to one of them, the student said with arrogant vehemence:

“...Did you know that Lenin was sent from Germany in a sealed carriage? Do you know that Lenin receives money from the Germans?”

“Well, I don’t know that,” the soldier answered stubbornly. “But it seems to me that Lenin is saying the very thing that I would like to hear.” And all the common people say so. After all, there are two classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat..."

“And,” the soldier concludes, “whoever is not for one class is, therefore, for another...”

“And since the authority of the workers was recognized by both soldiers and peasants,” concludes V. Loginov, “then they all begin to self-identify as the “proletariat” opposed to the bourgeoisie.” Let us add on our own behalf: they all become Leninists in relation to the bourgeois power and the power of the workers and peasants - the Soviet. Isn’t this what Lenin’s recognition as a people’s leader meant?!

At one time, the famous Soviet film playwright Kapler said about the great Russian Soviet actor Shchukin, the first creator of the artistic image of Lenin: “He didn’t just play the role of Lenin, he was him.” One can say about the author of the book “Unknown Lenin”: he not only wrote beautifully about Lenin in 1917, he lived with him all that year.

Yuri Belov

Vladimir Lenin is the great leader of the working people of the whole world, who is considered the most outstanding politician in world history, who created the first socialist state.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin

The Russian communist philosopher-theorist, who continued the work and whose activities were widely developed at the beginning of the 20th century, is still of interest to the public today, since his historical role is of significant significance not only for Russia, but for the whole world. Lenin's activities have both positive and negative assessments, which does not prevent the founder of the USSR from remaining a leading revolutionary in world history.

Childhood and youth

Ulyanov Vladimir Ilyich was born on April 22, 1870 in the Simbirsk province Russian Empire in the family of school inspector Ilya Nikolaevich and school teacher Maria Alexandrovna Ulyanov. He became the third child of parents who invested their whole souls in their children - his mother completely abandoned work and devoted herself to raising Alexander, Anna and Volodya, after whom she gave birth to Maria and Dmitry.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin as a child

As a child, Vladimir Ulyanov was a mischievous and very smart boy - at the age of 5 he had already learned to read and by the time he entered the Simbirsk gymnasium he had become a “walking encyclopedia”. IN school years He also proved himself to be a diligent, zealous, gifted and careful student, for which he was repeatedly awarded certificates of commendation. Lenin's classmates said that the future world leader of the working people enjoyed enormous respect and authority in the class, since every student felt his mental superiority.

In 1887, Vladimir Ilyich graduated from high school with a gold medal and entered the law faculty of Kazan University. In the same year, a terrible tragedy happened in the Ulyanov family - Lenin’s older brother Alexander was executed for participating in organizing an assassination attempt on the Tsar.

This grief aroused in the future founder of the USSR a spirit of protest against national oppression and the tsarist system, so already in his first year of university he created a student revolutionary movement, for which he was expelled from the university and sent into exile to the small village of Kukushkino, located in the Kazan province.

Embed from Getty Images Family of Vladimir Lenin

From that moment on, the biography of Vladimir Lenin was continuously connected with the struggle against capitalism and autocracy, the main goal of which was the liberation of workers from exploitation and oppression. After exile, in 1888, Ulyanov returned to Kazan, where he immediately joined one of the Marxist circles.

During the same period, Lenin's mother acquired an almost 100-hectare estate in the Simbirsk province and convinced Vladimir Ilyich to manage it. This did not prevent him from continuing to maintain connections with local “professional” revolutionaries, who helped him find Narodnaya Volya members and create an organized movement of Protestants of the imperial power.

Revolutionary activities

In 1891, Vladimir Lenin managed to pass exams as an external student at the Imperial St. Petersburg University at the Faculty of Law. After that, he worked as an assistant to a sworn lawyer from Samara, engaged in the “official defense” of criminals.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin in his youth

In 1893, the revolutionary moved to St. Petersburg and, in addition to legal practice, began writing historical works on Marxist political economy, the creation of the Russian liberation movement, and the capitalist evolution of post-reform villages and industry. Then he began to create a program for the Social Democratic Party.

In 1895, Lenin made his first trip abroad and made the so-called tour of Switzerland, Germany and France, where he met his idol Georgy Plekhanov, as well as Wilhelm Liebknecht and Paul Lafargue, who were leaders of the international labor movement.

Upon returning to St. Petersburg, Vladimir Ilyich managed to unite all the scattered Marxist circles into the “Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class,” at the head of which he began to prepare a plan to overthrow the autocracy. For active propaganda of his idea, Lenin and his allies were taken into custody, and after a year in prison he was exiled to the Shushenskoye village of the Elysee province.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin in 1897 with members of the Bolshevik organization

During his exile, he established contacts with the Social Democrats of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Nizhny Novgorod, and in 1900, after the end of his exile, he traveled to all Russian cities and personally established contact with numerous organizations. In 1900, the leader created the newspaper Iskra, under the articles of which he first signed the pseudonym “Lenin”.

During the same period, he initiated the congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, which subsequently split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The revolutionary led the Bolshevik ideological and political party and launched an active struggle against Menshevism.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin

In the period from 1905 to 1907, Lenin lived in exile in Switzerland, where he was preparing an armed uprising. There he was caught by the First Russian Revolution, in the victory of which he was interested, since it opened the way to the socialist revolution.

Then Vladimir Ilyich returned illegally to St. Petersburg and began to act actively. He tried at any cost to win the peasants over to his side, forcing them into an armed uprising against the autocracy. The revolutionary called on people to arm themselves with whatever was at hand and carry out attacks on government officials.

October Revolution

After the defeat in the First Russian Revolution, all Bolshevik forces came together, and Lenin, having analyzed the mistakes, began to revive the revolutionary upsurge. Then he created his own legal Bolshevik party, which published the newspaper Pravda, of which he was the editor-in-chief. At that time, Vladimir Ilyich lived in Austria-Hungary, where he was caught World War.

Embed from Getty Images Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Lenin

Having been imprisoned on suspicion of spying for Russia, Lenin spent two years preparing his theses on the war, and after his release he went to Switzerland, where he came up with the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.

In 1917, Lenin and his comrades were allowed to leave Switzerland through Germany to Russia, where a ceremonial meeting was organized for him. Vladimir Ilyich’s first speech to the people began with a call for a “social revolution,” which caused discontent even among Bolshevik circles. At that moment, Lenin’s theses were supported by Joseph Stalin, who also believed that power in the country should belong to the Bolsheviks.

On October 20, 1917, Lenin arrived in Smolny and began to lead the uprising, which was organized by the head of the Petrograd Soviet. Vladimir Ilyich proposed to act quickly, firmly and clearly - from October 25 to 26, the Provisional Government was arrested, and on November 7, at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin’s decrees on peace and land were adopted, and the Council of People’s Commissars was organized, the head of which was Vladimir Ilyich.

Embed from Getty Images Leon Trotsky and Vladimir Lenin

This was followed by the 124-day “Smolny period,” during which Lenin carried out active work in the Kremlin. He signed a decree on the creation of the Red Army, concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with Germany, and also began developing a program for the formation of a socialist society. At that moment, the Russian capital was moved from Petrograd to Moscow, and the Congress of Soviets of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers became the supreme body of power in Russia.

After carrying out the main reforms, which consisted of withdrawing from the World War and transferring the lands of the landowners to the peasants, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) was formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the rulers of which were communists led by Vladimir Lenin.

Head of the RSFSR

When Lenin came to power, according to many historians, he ordered the execution of the former Russian Emperor together with his entire family, and in July 1918 approved the Constitution of the RSFSR. Two years later, Lenin eliminated the supreme ruler of Russia, Admiral, who was his strong opponent.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Then the head of the RSFSR implemented the “Red Terror” policy, created to strengthen the new government in the context of thriving anti-Bolshevik activity. At the same time, the decree on the death penalty was reinstated, which could apply to anyone who did not agree with Lenin’s policies.

After this, Vladimir Lenin began the defeat Orthodox Church. From that period, believers became the main enemies of the Soviet regime. During that period, Christians who tried to protect the holy relics were persecuted and executed. Special concentration camps were also created for the “re-education” of the Russian people, where people were charged in particularly harsh ways that they were obliged to work for free in the name of communism. This led to a massive famine that killed millions of people and a terrible crisis.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin and Kliment Voroshilov at the Congress of the Communist Party

This result forced the leader to retreat from his intended plan and create a new economic policy, during which people, under the “supervision” of the commissars, restored industry, revived construction sites and industrialized the country. In 1921, Lenin abolished “war communism”, replaced food appropriation with a food tax, allowed private trade, which allowed the broad mass of the population to independently seek means of survival.

In 1922, according to Lenin’s recommendations, the USSR was created, after which the revolutionary had to step down from power due to his rapidly deteriorating health. After an intense political struggle in the country in pursuit of power, Joseph Stalin became the sole leader of the Soviet Union.

Personal life

The personal life of Vladimir Lenin, like that of most professional revolutionaries, was shrouded in secrecy for conspiracy purposes. He met his future wife in 1894 during the organization of the Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class.

She blindly followed her lover and participated in all of Lenin’s actions, which was the reason for their separate first exile. In order not to be separated, Lenin and Krupskaya got married in a church - they invited Shushensky peasants as best men, and their ally made their wedding rings from copper nickels.

Embed from Getty Images Vladimir Lenin and Nadezhda Krupskaya

The sacrament of the wedding of Lenin and Krupskaya took place on July 22, 1898 in the village of Shushenskoye, after which Nadezhda became the faithful life partner of the great leader, whom she bowed to, despite his harshness and humiliating treatment of herself. Having become a real communist, Krupskaya suppressed her feelings of ownership and jealousy, which allowed her to remain the only wife of Lenin, in whose life there were many women.

The question “did Lenin have children?” still attracts interest all over the world. There are several historical theories regarding the paternity of the communist leader - some claim that Lenin was infertile, while others call him the father of many illegitimate children. At the same time, many sources claim that Vladimir Ilyich had a son, Alexander Steffen, from his lover, with whom the revolutionary’s affair lasted about 5 years.

Death

The death of Vladimir Lenin occurred on January 21, 1924 in the Gorki estate in the Moscow province. According to official data, the leader of the Bolsheviks died from atherosclerosis caused by severe overload at work. Two days after his death, Lenin’s body was transported to Moscow and placed in the Hall of Columns of the House of Unions, where farewell to the founder of the USSR was held for 5 days.

Embed from Getty Images Funeral of Vladimir Lenin

On January 27, 1924, Lenin’s body was embalmed and placed in a Mausoleum specially built for this purpose, located on the capital’s Red Square. The ideologist of the creation of Lenin’s relics was his successor Joseph Stalin, who wanted to make Vladimir Ilyich a “god” in the eyes of the people.

After the collapse of the USSR, the issue of Lenin’s reburial was repeatedly raised in the State Duma. True, it remained at the discussion stage back in 2000, when the one who came to power during his first presidential term put an end to this issue. He said that he does not see the desire of the overwhelming majority of the population to rebury the body of the world leader, and until it appears, this topic will no longer be discussed in modern Russia.

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ORTHODOX ST. PETER'S SCHOOL

The role of V.I. Lenin in the October Revolution of 1917

RUSSIAN HISTORY

11th grade students

Struchenko Tatyana Alekseevna

Pirogov D.V.

Moscow, 2014

Table of contents

• Introduction
• October Revolution
• Conclusion

Introduction

Behind every large-scale historical event always worth it certain person(or a group of people), without whose actions this event would not have occurred or would have taken a different path. Such people decided the fate of the entire country in a certain period of time, and an entire nation depended on their choice. Not all of these figures can be called positive; very often they are tyrants and egoists. That, however, does not prevent them from becoming geniuses of their era. Such people are united by their fortitude, energy, will - qualities necessary to write history.

IN AND. Lenin can easily be classified as one of this kind of people. His role in history is undoubtedly great. All his activities had a huge impact on the development of the country at the beginning of the 20th century. He stood at the origins of the revolution and was its engine. He turned the Russian state upside down and changed the mentality of people. He was a legend for millions of Soviet citizens. Undoubtedly, Lenin influenced history and changed its course, in particular, the coup in October 1917.

Before moving directly to a detailed analysis of the influence Lenin had on the October events, we must recall the historical characteristics of the era in which the revolution took place.

Causes of the February Revolution

By the beginning of the twentieth century. Russia was a tangle of unresolved problems and contradictions. These problems were very large-scale. Unfortunately, it was impossible to solve these problems without changing the political regime.

The first and most important problem was the economy, which looked dismal. The Russian economy has not developed fast enough for such a large country. Modernization was superficial or non-existent. The country, despite attempts to develop industry, remained agricultural; Russia exported mainly agricultural products. Russia was economically very far behind all the advanced countries of Europe. Naturally, society began to think about the reasons for failures in the economy. It was logical to blame the current government for this.

At the same time, there were signs that Russia was trying to industrialize. From 1900 to 1914 the number of production doubled. However, the entire industry was concentrated in several “foci”: the center of the country, the northwest, the south, and the Urals. The high concentration of factories in some places led to stagnation where they were absent. An abyss arose between the center and the outskirts.

IN Russian economy the share of foreign capital invested in production was very high. So it's quite most of Russian income went abroad, and this money could be used to speed up the modernization and development of the country as a whole, which would lead to an improvement in living standards. All this was very convenient for socialist propaganda to use, accusing domestic entrepreneurs of inaction and disregard for the people.

Due to the high concentration of production and funds, many large monopolies emerged, uniting both banks and factories. They belonged either to large industrialists or (and this is more often) to the state. So-called “state-owned factories” appeared, with which smaller private industries simply could not compete. This reduced competition in the market, and this, in turn, reduced the level of product quality and allowed the state to dictate its prices. Of course, the population did not really like this.

Let's consider Agriculture, a direction that has always been important for Russia due to its large area. The land was divided between landowners and peasants, and the peasants owned a smaller part, and were also forced to cultivate the landowner's land. All this inflamed the age-old feud between landowners and peasants. The latter looked with envy at the vast lands of the landowners and remembered their tiny plots, which were not always enough to simply feed the family. In addition, the community sowed enmity between the peasants themselves and prevented the emergence of wealthy peasants who would develop trade, bringing city and countryside closer together. P.A. tried to correct this situation. Stolypin, carrying out a number of reforms, but without much success. According to his idea, peasants began to be resettled in free lands: Siberia, Kazakhstan, etc. Most of the displaced were unable to get used to the new conditions and returned, joining the ranks of the unemployed. As a result, social tension increased both in the village and in the city.

The second global problem of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. - its social composition.

The entire population of Russia can be divided into four large, very different social classes:

1. High ranks, large and medium-sized entrepreneurs, landowners, bishops of the Orthodox Church, academicians, professors, doctors, etc. - 3%

2. Small entrepreneurs, townspeople, artisans, teachers, officers, priests, minor officials, etc. - 8%

3. Peasantry - 69%

Including: wealthy - 19%; average - 25%; poor - 25%.

4. Proletarian poor population, beggars, vagabonds - 20%

It can be seen that more than half of the society were poor (peasants and proletarians) who were dissatisfied with their situation. Considering the socialist propaganda that the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks did not skimp on, it becomes clear that these people were ready to rebel at any moment.

In addition to these problems, there was one more circumstance that aggravated the situation: the First World War. It can be considered as a "mighty accelerator" of the revolution. Defeats in the war led to a decline in the authority of the tsarist regime. The war drained Russia of its last reserves of money and manpower; put the economy on a war footing, which led to a sharp deterioration in the living conditions of civilians.

Due to the war, the army increased and the importance of its position increased. The Bolsheviks quickly managed to get most of the soldiers on their side, given the high mortality rate, disgusting conditions, and lack of weapons and equipment in the Russian troops.

Social confrontation increased. The number of lumpen people has increased. The population was increasingly susceptible to the influence of rumors and cleverly spread propaganda. The authority of the authorities was completely undermined. The last barriers holding back the revolution have collapsed.

From February to October.

In February 1917, the revolution finally took place. Despite the huge number of obvious preconditions, it came as a surprise to the ruling elite. The result of the revolution was: the abdication of the Tsar, the destruction of the monarchy, the transition to a republic, the formation of such bodies as the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet (or simply Soviets). The presence of these two bodies subsequently led to dual power.

The Provisional Government set a course for continuing the war, which caused discontent among the people. And although reforms were carried out that should have significantly improved the lives of ordinary people, the situation only worsened. Democracy was only an illusion; global problems were not solved. The February Revolution deepened contradictions and awakened destructive forces.

The economy continued to deteriorate, prices rose, and crime increased. The population continued to live in poverty. Chaos and disorder increased. The Provisional Government chose to lie low and wait for the revelry to calm down. There was instability in the air, and society was inclined to continue the political struggle, in which the Bolsheviks supporting the Soviets were in the lead. Throughout the period from February to October, the Bolsheviks were engaged in active campaigning, thanks to which their party became the largest and most influential in the country.

The reasons for the failure of the Provisional Government are very simple:

1) A course to continue the war, from which the country is tired;

2) Failures of the economy, which could only be corrected by radical reforms, which the VP was afraid to do;

3) Inability to cope with difficulties and making decisions that cause criticism from all levels of society. The consequence of this was the crises of the Provisional Government;

4) Growing influence of the Bolsheviks.

April 3, 1917 V.I. Lenin arrived in Petrograd in a “sealed carriage.” A whole crowd came to meet him. In their welcoming speech, the Soviets expressed hope that the revolution would rally around Lenin. He responded directly to the people: “Long live the world socialist revolution!” An enthusiastic crowd lifted their idol onto an armored car.

The next day, Lenin published his famous April Theses. With them, Vladimir Ilyich began the transition to a new, socialist tactic of revolution, which consisted of relying on the workers and the poor peasantry. Lenin proposed radical measures: the destruction of the VP, the immediate end of the war, the transfer of land to the peasants, and control of factories to the workers, equal division of property. The majority of Bolsheviks supported Lenin at the next party congress.

These new slogans were enthusiastically accepted by the people. The influence of the Bolsheviks grew every day. In June and July, the Bolsheviks carried out demonstrations and even armed uprisings against the Provisional Government with the involvement of the popular masses.

By the fall of 1917, the Provisional Government, weakened by constant crises and rebellions, surrendered under the pressure of the Bolsheviks and on September 1, 1917, proclaimed Russia a republic. On September 14, the Democratic Conference opened, a government body created by the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which was supposed to include all parties. Lenin, like almost all Bolsheviks, wanted to boycott the Democratic Conference and continue to engage in the Bolshevization of the Soviets, since it was obvious that this new body (the Democratic Conference) did not play a key role and would not make important decisions.

Meanwhile, the country was on the verge of disaster. Lands rich in grain were lost during the war. Factories collapsed due to striking workers. Peasant uprisings were raging in the villages. The number of unemployed has increased; prices rose sharply. All this clearly showed the inability of the Provisional Government to govern the state.

By October, the Bolsheviks, led by L.D. Trotsky firmly set a course for an armed uprising, the overthrow of the VP and the transfer of all power to the Soviets. They finally broke off relations with other parties, leaving the Democratic Conference on October 7, after reading out their declaration. Meanwhile, Lenin returned illegally to Petrograd. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on October 10, 1917, Lenin and Trotsky decided to directly prepare for the uprising.

October Revolution

Under the Petrograd Soviet, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) was created, which was engaged in arming workers and creating Red Guard detachments. These units were responsible for the capture of key objects in the city. Having learned about the actions of the Military Revolutionary Committee, the Provisional Government tried to stop the Bolsheviks, but it did not have support and forces in Petrograd to rely on. Realizing this, on the morning of October 25, Kerensky left the city for loyal troops.

On the night of October 25, by order of the Military Revolutionary Committee, stations, bridges, telephones and telegraphs were occupied. At 10 a.m., the Military Revolutionary Committee announced the overthrow of the Provisional Government and that all power was passing to the Soviets. On the night of October 25-26, the Winter Palace and the Main Headquarters of the Provisional Government were taken. The ministers who were there were arrested and sent to the Peter and Paul Fortress.

When the entire city was already in the hands of the Bolsheviks, on October 25 at 22:40 the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opened. 670 delegates were elected to the congress, representing about 17 million voters: 338 delegates (that is, more than half) were Bolsheviks, another 100 were their main allies - the Left Social Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries withdrew from the Congress without recognizing its authority. Later they announced the creation of the “Committee for the Salvation of the Motherland and the Revolution.”

The Congress adopted the Decree on Peace. A Decree on Land was also adopted, drawn up on the basis of the orders of the peasants themselves and their ideas about agrarian reform. The decree abolished private ownership of land. It was transferred to the jurisdiction of land committees (peasant organizations).

At the next meeting, on October 26, the congress elected the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK). It included 62 Bolsheviks and 29 Left Socialist Revolutionaries. A new government was approved - the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), consisting only of Bolsheviks. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

The Anglo-American historian Robert Payne believes that Lenin did not play a fundamental role in the October Revolution of 1917, and the main ones were the decisions of the Military Revolutionary Committee and Trotsky, who led it.

Even before the start of the uprising itself, Lenin went underground, hiding, as he was declared an outlaw. This led to the fact that on the eve of the uprising, Lenin did not have established contact with his party, and he was generally not fully brought up to date. And here's proof of that. "The appeal of Zinoviev and Kamenev was published in the morning edition of the newspaper on October 31. Lenin had no idea about the existence of this document until someone read the printed text to him on the morning of the same day. "Paine R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=100

Lenin, of course, was greatly offended by this. Lenin wanted to feel like the leader of the revolution, to make a decision on the date of the uprising. Therefore, he tried to influence the Bolshevik Party, made statements, wrote appeals. However, the decision was made not by him, but by the Military Revolutionary Committee, which is emphasized by R. Payne. “But the word was not Lenin’s. The Military Revolutionary Committee, headed by Trotsky, had been meeting for several days now. They were making a decision. Six days later the signal to speak was given. “Paine R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=100

Narrating further about the events of October 1917, Robert Payne makes it clear that the uprising was organized and carried out by Trotsky, not Lenin. At the Smolny Institute, which had long belonged to the Bolshevik Party, work was underway to organize an uprising. “Here in Smolny, for two weeks, Trotsky, together with his like-minded people, developed a plan for an armed uprising.” Payne R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=102

On the night of November 5, Kerensky finally decided to act, realizing that an uprising was being prepared. He gave the order for an armed detachment to move from Tsarskoe Selo to the capital, and at the same time artillery was pulled in from Pavlovsk. The cruiser "Aurora" received orders to go to sea. The engineers were ordered to interrupt telephone communications with Smolny, and in addition, they decided to close the Bolshevik newspaper.

“At half past five in the morning, armed detachments under the command of an officer who had a search warrant signed by the head of the Petrograd Military District burst into the editorial office, scattered the type and burned eight thousand copies of the printed issue, after which, having seized all the documents found in the editorial office, they sealed the premises and posted their guards around the building. Around the same time, the telephone wires leading to Smolny were cut."Payne R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=103

These were the first measures to combat the Bolsheviks.

On the morning of November 6, Trotsky learned that the Bolsheviks had lost their newspaper and telephones. A detachment of motorcyclists was immediately organized and tasked with establishing contact with those plants and factories where workers supported the Bolsheviks. The problem of the arrest of the printing house was also resolved. Trotsky, through several maneuvers (issued a decree prohibiting the closure of the printing houses of Bolshevik newspapers, sent a detachment to guard the printing house) managed to create the appearance that the uprising was an act of self-defense, a forced measure directed against the insidious government. The point of all this was so that the Bolsheviks could justify the military actions they had begun, which were necessary, as it were, for reasons of revolutionary morality and self-defense.

According to R. Payne, this was an exceptionally clever move by Trotsky, as a result of which the legitimate government of Russia overnight turned into a bunch of counter-revolutionary conspirators. “The decision to send an armed detachment to guard the building where the editorial office and printing house of the Bolshevik newspaper were located brought the Military Revolutionary Committee to new stage struggle. "Payne R. Lenin. Life and Death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=103 Before this, no one thought to post armed guards around Smolny. And now the institute has turned into a fortress, armed with cannons and rifles The adjacent streets were patrolled by the Bolsheviks. All these decisions were made by the Military Revolutionary Committee (Trotsky), V.I. Lenin did not take any part in them.

In the morning, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party took place. Lenin, of course, was still underground. The role of chairman was performed by Sverdlov, and all decisions were made by Trotsky, and he also distributed responsibilities among the members of the Central Committee.

But the Provisional Government stubbornly continued to issue orders. But as soon as the next order became known, the Military Revolutionary Committee issued its own counter order, which contradicted the order of the Provisional Government. “Trotsky started this game, and we must give him credit, he played it with great imagination and audacity.” Payne R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=105

Meanwhile, Lenin continued to languish in complete ignorance. He was burning with impatience, so he wanted to know what was going on in the city. The owner of the apartment told him that almost all the bridges were raised. Then he asked which bridges were still in operation, and immediately sent her for accurate information. For Lenin, the issue of bridges was very important. He realized that if Kerensky managed to open all the bridges, he would be able to keep the central part of the city in his hands. As a result, the uprising would have resulted in a battle for the bridges, and the advantage would have been on the side of the government. Now, he assumed, everything depended on whether the workers would be able to capture the city center. Lenin did not know that that evening all the bridges leading from the working-class districts to the center of Petrograd had already been quietly, without a fight, captured by the rebels.

In the absence of his hostess, Lenin sat down to write a letter calling for an immediate armed uprising. Little did he know that the uprising had already begun. The landlady who came in the evening told Lenin that all the bridges were in the hands of the revolutionaries. But for some reason there was still no news from the Military Revolutionary Committee.

Lenin understood that the uprising was about to begin, and that he had to take part in them at all costs. “For a whole month before this, he tried to convince the Military Revolutionary Committee of the need to act immediately, immediately, wherever possible - until the Provisional Government pulled together its forces and while the workers and soldiers were eager to rush into battle. And now his hour had come. act. It is necessary to "push history" at all costs. What's the point of sitting and waiting when they come for him and lead him out to the people with honors, and all of Petrograd will already be in the hands of the revolutionaries? He must get to Smolny at any cost. "Paine R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=105

It is quite natural that Lenin decided to walk to the institute (no transport was working). Together with his faithful companion, Eino Rahja, Lenin reached Smolny, risking his life.

“Lenin walked to Smolny, tormented by a feeling of loneliness and abandonment. Most of all, he was bothered by the question: why did the revolution start without him? They could have at least sent an armored car for him or ordered the Red Guards to deliver him under their cover to Smolny. But they did nothing of the kind "Lenin had a distinct feeling that the most important information was being deliberately hidden from him. Lenin went to Smolny, knowing full well that he had a one in three chance of getting there alive. "Payne R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=104

Having reached Smolny, Lenin immediately found Trotsky, who was in charge of everything that was happening. “Tearing off the bandage, Lenin sat down next to Trotsky. He had a lot to discuss with him. Lenin was presented with plans of military operations, maps on which the enemy’s positions and the direction of attacks of the revolutionary forces were clearly marked. It turned out that there were not many enemy objects, but points the concentration of rebel military forces numbered up to fifty. Lenin listened and endlessly asked questions. He did not really believe in the possibility of a bloodless revolution. But finally Lenin calmed down, pulled himself together and, according to Trotsky, “approved the course that events had long taken.” "Yes," he said, "I think this is exactly what we should do - just take power." But the next minute he again bombarded Trotsky with questions, demanded clarification, became irritated. Even in his wildest dreams he could not imagine that victory will come with such ease. "Paine R. Lenin. Life and Death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=105

Lenin hardly slept that night. He took no part in drawing up the coup plan. Everything down to the smallest detail was thought out and carried out by Trotsky and his people. Lenin found himself in the position of an outsider and at the same time an interested person, dependent on other people's decisions and orders.

By eight o'clock in the morning there was no longer any doubt that Petrograd had been conquered. Only two buildings remained in enemy hands - the Winter Palace overlooking the Neva and the small Mariinsky Palace. They could be taken playfully. By this time, Lenin already had the text of the appeal ready. In it he announced that the revolution had won. At first he wanted to address it “to the entire population,” but changed his mind, deciding that the solemnity of the moment required something else, and wrote: “To the citizens of Russia!”

The morning passed without any noticeable hostilities on the part of the Bolsheviks. The Mariinsky Palace was taken. At about two o'clock in the afternoon the Petrograd Soviet met in the large hall of Smolny. Trotsky rose to the podium.

He announced the fall of the Provisional Government (Kerensky had already fled by that time) and praised the revolution.

Trotsky's speech was met with thunderous applause. Everyone who spoke after him (Lenin, Zinoviev, Lunacharsky) did not excite the audience; Trotsky was the hero and triumphant of the day. The only thing left uncaptured by the Bolsheviks was the Winter Palace, in which the remaining members of the VP sat.

At one o'clock in the morning the palace was taken and the ministers were transferred to the Peter and Paul Fortress.

The 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened in the assembly hall of Smolny. Kamenev was elected chairman of the congress. “There was a monstrous scream in the hall.

It seemed like everyone was screaming at the same time. The moderate socialists were terribly indignant; they believed that the Bolsheviks did not dare to stage a coup d'etat, speculating on the powers of the Petrograd Soviet. Expressing their protest, they perfectly understood that they were no longer able to change anything. The Bolsheviks brazenly went ahead, not wanting to share with anyone the power that they managed to quietly seize in just one day with the help of deft maneuvers. "Paine R. Lenin. Life and Death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=105

And Trotsky and Lenin at that time were lying stretched out on the floor in an uncomfortable gloomy room, where there were no tables, no chairs and no furniture at all. Deadly tired after all the excitement of the past day, they lay awake and could not sleep from tension, both of their nerves began to fail.

“At this time, Dan was speaking in the Assembly Hall. He was blasting the Bolsheviks with all his might. Lenin’s sister ran into the room where Trotsky and Lenin were resting and said that the Bolsheviks were calling Trotsky - Dan must be rebuffed. Pale, in a black silk blouse, with a flowing tie Trotsky rushed into the hall to finish off his agonizing enemy with one blow. "Paine R. Lenin. Life and death. http: //www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877&p=105

He declared that moderate socialists had no place in the revolution, that they had already done their job, and there was nothing more to be expected from them - they were not capable of anything. “Our revolution has won,” Trotsky continued. “And why should we concede victory to you?” And then he flaunted his favorite phrase: “Go to where you belong from now on - in the dustbin of history!”

And strangely enough, they listened to him. Moderate socialists left the hall.

And then Lenin spoke. It was the speech of a man in a state of euphoria; the victory seemed to intoxicate him. He said that the congress, which had diminished in number and now consisted exclusively of deputies supporting the Bolsheviks, assumed full power in Russia and became the state authority. Witnesses describe the Bolsheviks jubilantly celebrating their victory. They gave a continuous ovation, interspersed with the singing of the Internationale. Then they called Lenin again, shouted “Hurray!”, and threw their hats into the air. A funeral march was sung in memory of those killed in the war. And again they burst into applause, shouted, and threw their hats into the air. The entire presidium, led by Lenin, sang while standing.

So, Robert Payne believes that Lenin did not play a major role in the October Revolution of 1917, and the leadership was with the Military Revolutionary Committee and Trotsky.

The director of the film "Lenin in October" Mikhail Romm considers Lenin to be the main ideological inspirer and the engine of the October events.

At the very beginning of the film, the inscription appears on the screen: “So on an autumn night in 1917, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin came to Petrograd from Finland to raise the question of an immediate armed uprising before the Central Committee.” This already speaks to the director’s position - to show Lenin as the man who made the October Revolution.

The film takes place in the fall of 1917.

The main idea of ​​the film is to show that Lenin's role in organizing the Bolshevik uprising was fundamental. In Petrograd, the then capital, there was a very restless atmosphere, conducive to riots and uprisings: there was constant unrest among the workers due to mass dissatisfaction with the current government.

The film begins with how Lenin, the current leader of the Bolshevik Party, secretly arrives at the Petrograd station, and is escorted through the cordon by his bodyguard, the worker Vasily. Lenin meets with Stalin, who is shown as his closest ally. Soon, almost immediately after arrival, an underground meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party begins, where an uprising is being prepared. Lenin in the film is shown as a lonely fighter for justice, who has to confront not only ministers and everything To the Internal Government, but also dissatisfied within the party. For example, at the first meeting of the Central Committee, Lenin has to single-handedly defend the “just cause” and convince his fellow party members of the need for an armed uprising. Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev - they are all presented as antagonists to Vladimir Ilyich. “I don’t see the difference between the proposals of Trotsky and Kamenev and Zinoviev. Both proposals mean wait! Well, obviously, we are not on the same road with them. We will not wait until the bourgeoisie strangles the revolution.” Romm M. Lenin in October. 1937 http: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=jrzkK52nbNI

The following shows all the important events in the modern history of the USSR: the preparation of the uprising in the factories and factories of Petrograd (with active agitation by the Bolsheviks), the legendary sensational shot of the Aurora, the storming of the Winter Palace and its ceremonial capture. The “treason” of Kamenev and Zinoviev, which could not thwart the plans of the Bolsheviks, is repeatedly emphasized.

Throughout the film, Lenin is shown as a strong-willed, strong-willed personality. This person is capable of emerging victorious from any situation; he can be called a national hero.

The film ends with the proclamation of the victory of the revolution at the Second Congress of Soviets with Lenin’s words: “Comrades! The workers’ and peasants’ revolution, the need for which the Bolsheviks were always talking about, has been accomplished!” The jubilant crowd applauds.

Conclusion

R. Payne and M. Romm have opposite and contradictory versions of how the events took place in the fall of 1917. Let's start by comparing two completely different images of V.I. Lenin, who is the main actor their works.

In the film, directed by M. Romm, the image of Lenin is idealized. We see him as the true leader of the revolution, strong personality, hero. What can we say, the image of Lenin is made very well, with high quality. All his words, actions, views were carefully thought out by Romm and the scriptwriters, and actor Boris Shchukin perfectly got used to the role. But can this man, whom the authors of the film show us, be called Lenin? No. The director created a beautiful illusion that ordinary Soviet people could believe in. Therefore, Lenin’s personality was cultivated by his followers (including Romm) and by the party. After all, people always need something sacred, inviolable, the main value in life, something to believe in. And now they could believe in Lenin.

And Robert Payne, on the contrary, tries to evaluate events impartially, to give an objective assessment of events. His Lenin is the most ordinary-looking, ordinary person. He also has his own shortcomings and weaknesses. It is possible, by the way, that Payne is trying to deliberately “belittle” Lenin, to show him worse than he really was. But, be that as it may, his image looks more realistic and closer to the truth.

In accordance with their vision of the image of Lenin, each of the authors sees his role in the October Revolution of 1917 in their own way.

Mikhail Romm believes that Lenin is the one who made the revolution and led the people to it. In his film, the emphasis is on how Lenin courageously, single-handedly agitates the workers, how he convinces everyone with his heartfelt speeches that an immediate armed uprising is necessary. Finally, he decides on what day the assault on the Winter Palace will take place, and decides to involve the Aurora. This fully corresponds to the main idea of ​​the film - to make a cult out of Lenin.

In R. Payne's book, Lenin's role in the uprising is described as very insignificant. Throughout the entire narrative, it is repeated over and over again that the uprising is the “brainchild” of Trotsky (well, and also the Military Revolutionary Committee). But Lenin had no merit in the events of the autumn of 1917. Having arrived from Finland, he, of course, supported Trotsky, but he was not the one who made the main decisions. Payne, with some sarcasm, emphasizes that Lenin wanted to consider himself an important character, tried to appeal to the people all the time, wrote some kind of appeals. But in fact, he himself understood (like everyone around him) that he was not the hero of the revolution.

I prefer Robert Payne's position. In my opinion, he conveyed the events much more honestly, and his assessment is indeed more objective. I agree with him that Lenin’s role in the October revolution is not as important as Soviet historians and writers believed, and it is usually overestimated. Lenin did not create the revolution. He was just one of many "leaders" who helped the real leader - Trotsky. His only merit is several masterfully delivered speeches. That’s why I consider Mikhail Romm’s film a lie, skillfully created to deceive the common people.

Lenin October Revolution coup

List of used literature

1. Payne R. Lenin. Life and death. http://www.litmir. me/br/? b=169877

2. Film "Lenin in October" directed by Romm M. http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=jrzkK52nbNI

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The February Revolution found Vladimir Lenin in Switzerland and came as a complete surprise to him. Just a month ago, he spoke to Swiss youth and said that the Russian revolution of 1905 awakened both Europe and Asia from sleep, becoming the prologue to the coming European proletarian revolution.

“We old men may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution,

- he declared. “But I can, I think, express with great confidence the hope that the youth, who work so wonderfully in the socialist movement of Switzerland and the whole world, that they will have the happiness not only to fight, but also to win in the coming proletarian revolution.”

It was not by chance that Lenin ended up in Switzerland. “After Austrian Poland, from where he forcibly managed to run away in 1914, there were few options in Europe - theoretically, it was possible to go to America - there were few,” writer Lev told Gazeta.Ru. — The Central Powers were obviously excluded as a place of residence; in England and France Lenin would have been interned or handed over to Russia for not only anti-war but defeatist agitation.

The choice was, essentially, Switzerland or Sweden, two neutral countries. But Lenin left Poland, obsessed with the idea of ​​reading Hegel, or rather, re-deciphering Hegel’s code (traces of this are in the 29th volume of the Collected Works), and writing a book about imperialism, about the causes of the world war. Sweden was closer to Russia, and there was a Marxist colony there, but in terms of books, Switzerland was better; Lenin didn’t know Swedish, but he was fluent in German. Well, in Switzerland there was a promising local socialist party that could be pushed to the left. Switzerland in those days was not a boring country of bankers and watchmakers; there, in 1918, a real revolution almost happened, with blood and barricades.”

In Switzerland, Lenin continued to study the works of Karl Marx and other authors, writing out the most important provisions. He entitled the notebook containing the notes “Marxism on the State.” He also published articles in the local press and edited the works of the Bolshevik and revolutionary Inessa Armand, his confidant.

The news of the revolution that had taken place in his homeland reached Lenin only on March 2, 1917.

“From the very first minutes, as soon as the news of the February Revolution arrived, Ilyich began to rush to Russia,” recalled his wife Nadezhda Krupskaya.

“The first thing he did when he learned about February in Russia was to go not to church, not to a liquor store, but to the nearest mountain, or hill by Swiss standards - Zurichberg - and there he spent several hours alone, thinking, what to do,” Danilkin said. “This kind of workload always turned out to be very fruitful for him both as a politician and as a philosopher. Well, then he rushed around Switzerland in search of an opportunity to get into Russia - legally, illegally, obviously, secretly, with an English passport, on an airplane, with documents in the name of a deaf-mute Swede, etc.

Then, when I decided to travel through Germany, I collected letters of support that I could wave in Russia - such an informal, but still a sanction for travel. And if before then he communicated rather with a close circle of Swiss young socialists, more left-wing than their older, moderate comrades (Fritz Platten was precisely one of these young people, who took on mediation functions in the “sealed carriage”), now he had to mobilize your communication skills and revive old contacts - both with the Mensheviks and with the Vperyodists. And more often than in the cantonal library, he could be seen in the neighboring Eintracht workers' club, where it was convenient to negotiate. Well, he wrote, voraciously, political analytics about the Russian Revolution, although only from newspapers at that time, from hearsay. From his “damned far away,” as he himself put it.”

In the first days of March, looking for ways to leave Switzerland, Lenin sent a letter to his assistant Jakub Ganetsky, who was at that time in Stockholm. He wrote: “We can’t wait any longer, all hopes for a legal arrival are in vain. It is necessary to immediately get to Russia at any cost, and the only plan is the following:

find a Swede like me. But I don't know Swedish, so the Swede must be deaf and dumb. I’m sending you my photograph just in case.”

While waiting for the opportunity to get out to Russia, Lenin was busy drawing up theses on the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution. He noted the need to organize Soviets, arm the workers, and transfer proletarian organizations to the army and villages. When asked by a revolutionary who was in Stockholm at that time, to provide instructions for the Bolsheviks, he replied: “Raise new layers! Arouse new initiative, new organizations in all layers and prove to them that peace will only be given by an armed Council of Workers’ Deputies if it takes power.”

Before leaving, Lenin collected all possible information about the accomplished revolution that could be obtained from local newspapers. Having learned about the amnesty announced by the Provisional Government for political and religious matters, he turned to Armand with a request that if she left for Russia, “in England, find out quietly and surely” whether she could return. He admonished the Bolsheviks leaving Switzerland for Russia: “Our tactics: complete distrust, no support for the new government; Kerensky is especially suspected; arming the proletariat is the only guarantee; immediate elections to the Petrograd Duma; no rapprochement with other parties. Telegraph this to Petrograd."

Hoping to get out of Switzerland through England, Lenin turned to the revolutionary Vyacheslav Karpinsky, who was in Geneva. He planned to travel illegally using his documents. “I can wear a wig. The photograph will be taken of me already wearing a wig...” Lenin suggested. He was sure that if he went under his own name, he would be detained or arrested.

In emigrant circles, the idea arose to go to Russia through Germany.

They planned to obtain permission to travel in exchange for Germans and Austrians interned in Russia. Success in negotiations with the German authorities was facilitated by Lenin's friend, the Swiss Friedrich Platten, who took personal responsibility for the move. In addition, the Germans believed that transporting Lenin to Russia would help them win the First World War. German General Max Hoffmann later recalled: “We naturally sought to strengthen the disintegration introduced into the Russian army by the revolution by means of propaganda. In the rear, someone who maintained relations with Russians living in exile in Switzerland came up with the idea of ​​​​using some of these Russians in order to even more quickly destroy the spirit of the Russian army and poison it with poison.”

Among the conditions put forward by Platten were the requirement that persons be allowed to travel, regardless of their political views, the absence of interruptions in train movement unless technically necessary, and the absence of document checks when entering and leaving Germany.

The Swiss Bolsheviks, at Lenin's request, informed the emigrants that the opportunity had arisen to go to Russia. Within a few days, a group of 32 people gathered.

They proceeded through warring Germany, Sweden, and Finland.

He wrote about Lenin’s appearance in Petrograd: “It is necessary to pay the closest attention to the vile idea of ​​the German military leadership, which it has already implemented. That it used its most terrible weapons against Russia is awe-inspiring. It transported Lenin in a sealed carriage from Switzerland to Russia like a plague bacillus.”

The statement about the sealed carriage is, of course, exaggerated - only three of the four doors were sealed.

The fourth door was used for communication with the outside world, for example, buying milk for the children in the carriage or receiving newspapers. As the author of the monograph “Lenin on a Train,” Katherine Merridale, notes, this myth arose due to Lenin’s demand to give his train the status of extraterritoriality so that it would have nothing to do with Germany. On Lenin’s initiative, a chalk line was drawn in the carriage, dividing it into two parts: in one there were revolutionaries, in the other - German officers.

“Subsequently, Karl Radek, who was a passenger on the train, and other passengers denied that the train doors were sealed,” says Merridale. “One of the four doors did not close at all, and the Swiss socialist Fritz Platten, through whom Lenin and his companions communicated with the guards, could freely get off at all stops, buy newspapers, milk for two children on the train and other products.”

Another demand of Lenin was that the passengers pay for the tickets from their own funds: this is how he showed that they were not going to accept German money. The emigrants took with them a supply of food, but at the Swiss-German border customs officers confiscated the provisions - bringing food into the warring countries was prohibited.

Lenin and his companions traveled second and third class. Lenin himself and his wife traveled in a separate compartment.

On the way home, the revolutionaries encountered an unpleasant problem - there was only one toilet available to them in the carriage, the second was in the “German” part of the carriage.

In addition, Lenin banned smoking in the carriage, so passengers went to the toilet to smoke. As a result, this led to a constant crush and noise near Lenin’s compartment. He solved the problem by issuing tickets for visiting the toilet in two classes: the first - for those who needed to relieve themselves, and the second - for smokers.

The trip took eight days. Arriving in Petrograd, Lenin immediately came up with the “April Theses” - a program of action for the Russian Bolsheviks, which implied the struggle for the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one. Preparations for the October Revolution began.