Hungarian crisis. Suez crisis (1956) French political crisis 1956

Introduction

After the Palestine war of 1948-1949, the situation in Asia Minor continued to be tense. A wave of coups and political assassinations swept through the defeated Arab countries. In December 1949, Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha was assassinated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which accused him of being responsible for the defeat. On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk and established a republic in Egypt. At first, Egypt was headed by Muhammad Naguib, but he was soon replaced by another member of the organization, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Regardless of the internal situation in the Arab countries, their positions towards Israel and towards the Arabs remained invariably hostile. The borders established in Palestine did not suit anyone. In 1950, Israel, contrary to the decision of the UN, declared Jerusalem its capital. The implementation of the decision on the return of refugees was frustrated by Israel: in 1950, only 5.5 thousand refugees were allowed to return. Already in mid-1949, raids by fedayeen (guerrillas) began from the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip into Israel. Israel responded with retaliatory raids on Egyptian and Jordanian territories. 1,300 Israelis were killed and wounded by Arab terrorists between 1949-1956. The Fedayeen were based and trained at bases controlled and located in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.

The situation in the region

In 1953, the ambitious Israeli officer Ariel Sharon created a group of 101 of 40 people to carry out retaliatory raids against the guerrillas. Also in 1953, Sharon and his group "became famous" in an attack on the village of Negba in Jordanian territory, killing 69 civilians. Fedayeen raids became more frequent in 1954-1955. In 1955, 260 Israeli citizens were killed or wounded, and significant material destruction was caused. In response, Israeli forces carried out two punitive actions in the Gaza Strip. Gradually, regular Egyptian and Jordanian troops were drawn into this "small war", which prevented the penetration of Israeli troops into their territory. Artillery and aviation were used. In the second half of 1956, during 4 anti-partisan raids, 100 Israelis and 200 Arabs were killed and wounded. Tensions between countries intensified.

In 1951, Egypt closed the passage for Israeli ships leaving the Gulf of Aqaba to the Indian Ocean. In November of that year, the UN condemned the move. But Egypt, in response, installed coastal artillery at the exit from the Strait of Tiran. Later, Nasser would ban Israeli aircraft from flying over the waters adjacent to Egyptian territory and effectively imposed a blockade on all ships heading to Israel. The passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal was also prohibited.

But Israel felt an even greater threat to their security in September 1955, when Egypt purchased from Czechoslovakia 230 tanks, 100 self-propelled guns, 200 armored personnel carriers, about 500 guns, 200 aircraft (including 128 jets), several destroyers, boats and submarines. . Soviet-made equipment was superior to Western counterparts that were in service with the Israeli armed forces. In addition, Egypt outnumbered Israel in numbers. In October 1955, a joint military command of Syria and Egypt was created. Jordan will join in a year.

These actions provoked a very painful reaction from Israel. In July 1956, Israeli leader David Ben-Gurion concluded that Israel should launch a preemptive strike. He instructed the General Staff to develop and carry out an operation against Egypt in 1956. Fortunately, the international situation created favorable conditions.

Generally speaking, the Western powers have long hatched plans to turn the Near and Middle East into a military foothold in order to pursue an expansionist policy and bring the countries of this region under their influence. As early as the beginning of the 1950s, imperialist circles took steps to put together an aggressive military group. However, putting together such a bloc dragged on and turned out to be much more difficult than they thought in Washington and London.

In 1955, nevertheless, it was possible to create a military-political grouping of five countries in the Near and Middle East. The beginning was laid by the conclusion in February 1955 of a military agreement between Turkey and Iraq. In March of the same year, England joined him, and in the fall, Pakistan and Iran. In November, at a meeting of five prime ministers in Baghdad, the creation of the so-called Baghdad Pact was officially proclaimed.

The creation of a new military bloc under the auspices of the Western powers caused general discontent in the Arab countries, including Iraq. In Cairo, the announcement of a military alliance was greeted with caution. President of the United Arab Republic Gamal Abdel Nasser called the Baghdad Pact "the latest form of imperialist prison". Exposing the assertions of the bourgeois press about the supposedly "defensive" nature of the Baghdad Pact, Nasser said: "The defense of the Middle East can only come from the population of the Middle East. This defense must be completely independent... without any connection to foreign powers. The participation of Western countries in organizing the defense of the Middle East would be seen as a manifestation of colonialism. One of the objectives of the Baghdad Pact was to serve the Western powers as a new modern means of enslaving peoples.

The United States did not formally participate in the Baghdad bloc, and for the first time after its creation, they showed certain concern that this bloc would be created under British leadership. However, later they took a direct part in it. American representatives in participated as observers in the work of its various bodies.

The United States of America, striving to consolidate and strengthen its positions in this area and prevent the victory of the national liberation movement, put pressure on the Arab countries. After a trip in the spring In 1953, US Secretary of State Dulles for the Middle and Near East, American diplomacy managed to conclude a number of agreements with some of them. Many Arab countries did not want to conclude enslaving agreements.

So the peoples learned from their own experience that the United States does not give a single dollar without any conditions of a political or military nature. It is no coincidence that even Dulles, who sought agreements, admitted in 1954 that the countries liberated from colonialism were afraid to accept "aid" from the states of the West, because "they fear that this means the revival of Western colonialism."

In their aggressive policy, the Western powers have repeatedly used Israel. Completely disregarding the interests of the Jewish people, the imperialist circles of the West relied on the reactionary forces of Israel in their policy in the Middle East. The United States, for example, from the beginning of the existence of the Jewish state began to provide its ruling circles with all kinds of support. They provided Israel with loans, technical, economic and military assistance. The USA, Britain, France and other capitalist countries supplied modern weapons, including tanks and aircraft. But the colonial powers were playing a double game. They deftly used the Arab-Israeli contradictions for their own purposes. Strongly pushing Israel to take action against Egypt, Syria and other Arab states, Britain offered the Arab states to satisfy some of their territorial demands on Israel. British Prime Minister A. Eden spoke about this in one of his speeches in November 1955. Thus, the British ruling circles hoped to draw the Arab countries, in particular Jordan and Lebanon, into the Baghdad bloc.

This policy of the United States, England and France significantly aggravated the situation in the Arab East, which was. fraught with dangerous consequences. Nevertheless, the Western powers were not able to check the growth of the national liberation movement and the desire of the already free countries to pursue an independent and independent policy. Nor did they succeed in hindering the successful development of Soviet-Arab relations.

The preparation of the imperialist powers for the creation of a military alliance in the Near and Middle East caused great anxiety among the peace-loving forces not only in that region, but also far beyond its borders. On April 17, 1955, the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the situation in the Near and Middle East was published.

The Soviet government pointed out that the policy of the imperialist states, striving for colonial enslavement of the countries of the Near and Middle East, had aggravated the situation in that region of the globe. American circles who are trying to establish their dominance in the area. They are also needed by those British circles who, through these blocs, are trying to maintain and restore their shattered positions, contrary to the vital interests of the peoples of the Near and Middle East, who have embarked on the path of independent national development.

Pointing to the responsibility of the United States and England for the consequences of their policy, the USSR Foreign Ministry declared that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the situation developing in this region of the world, “since the formation of these blocs and the creation of foreign military bases on the territory of the Near and Middle East are directly related to the security of the USSR, whose borders are in close proximity to countries drawn by the United States and Britain into military blocs. The Statement also said that if the policy of threats against the countries of the Near and Middle East continues, then this issue should become a subject of discussion in the United Nations. "The Soviet government, upholding the cause of peace, will defend freedom, independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of the Near and Middle East."

The statement emphasized that the Soviet Union was ready to develop cooperation with the countries of the Near and Middle East on the basis of strict adherence to the principle of non-interference of some states in the internal affairs of others and respect for the sovereignty and national independence of countries, both large and small.

The French bourgeois publicist A. Fontaine, in a series of articles published in June 1967 in the newspaper Le Monde, wrote that the Soviet Union had warned the Western powers back in 1955 that the region of the Near and Middle East "is no longer theirs" reserve." “The USSR,” Fontaine emphasized further, “warned them that the continuation of the policy of recruiting Arab states to participate in the anti-Soviet crusade would provoke retaliatory measures on its part.”

It was noted above that in order to put pressure on Egypt, the colonial powers significantly reduced their purchases of cotton. If we take into account the operations carried out by the imperialist powers in the world cotton market, which inflicted on Egypt in the period from the beginning of the revolution to 1956 more than 250 million dollars in damage, it becomes clear what danger hung over the Egyptian economy at that time. But the disaster did not happen. The socialist countries came to the rescue and became the main buyers of Egyptian cotton. The total volume of trade between the socialist states and Egypt increased by 70% in 1954/55 alone.

The Bandung Conference, held in April 1955, was of great importance for consolidating the forces fighting against colonialism. It was marked by the solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces of Asia and Africa. In the communiqué on the results of the Bandung Conference, its participants, in particular, wrote that they considered "colonialism in all its manifestations" "a matter that must be quickly stopped", that "subjugation of peoples to foreign enslavement, domination and exploitation is a denial of fundamental human rights, which is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the promotion of international peace and cooperation.”

The development of events in the Arab East was increasingly influenced by Egypt. The fifties were marked for this country, which was for a long time in a position dependent on the British colonialists, with great events. In 1952 A revolution took place in the country, King Farouk was overthrown. In 1953 Egypt was proclaimed a republic. The next one, 1954. the Egyptian people, after a difficult and long struggle, won a very important victory. We are talking about the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of October 19, 1954. about the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone.

The British based their calculation on the fact that, as long as it came to practical steps, they would be able to force the Egyptian government to agree to the signing of a new military agreement. Britain's ruling circles hoped to use the consent to the withdrawal of troops for demagogic purposes as well. “Withdrawal from Suez (in accordance with the above-mentioned agreement concluded in 1954.- L.P.),- wrote the English author Goodson, - was (from England.-L. P.) a game designed to improve relations with Egypt.”

In the same 1954, the British government began to take steps to conclude a new military agreement for a period of 25 years. But the British colonialists miscalculated. “The East was no longer the preserve of the West, in which the Western countries could dictate their terms ... The Soviet Union offers a choice that, without resorting to war, intervention and occupation, the Arabs cannot be forbidden,” wrote an official of the Council for Foreign Policy Planning U.S. Department of State, Arab expert William Polk.

This is exactly what the Arab countries did, setting a course for the development of friendly economic and cultural ties with the USSR and other socialist states.

Having met the firm position of the Egyptian government and realizing that in the new international situation they will have to comply with the agreement of 1954. about the withdrawal of troops from Suez, the British in the fall of 1955. increased pressure on Egypt. They still hoped that they would be able to keep their troops in Suez and force Egypt to capitulate in the end. As the Englishman Goodson wrote, "the English government believed that nothing threatened their interests as long as the Egyptian troops were under English control."

To aggravate tension in this region of the globe, the reactionary forces once again used the government of Israel. Pushing it to provocations against the Arab states, the ruling circles of the colonial powers hoped that in a difficult situation it would be easier for them to intervene in the affairs of the countries of the Near and Middle East and draw the Arab countries into a military bloc. On November 2, Israeli troops attacked an Egyptian post in the Al-Auja area in the Sinai Peninsula. The next day, the Israeli Parliament ex post approved the attack. The Egyptian delegation to the UN immediately sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, stressing that the entire responsibility for the incident in the demilitarized zone lies with the Israeli government.

Despite this, the command of the Israeli armed forces has concentrated its troops on the Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese borders. On November 1 and 2, in the region of Lake Tiberias, Israeli troops fired at the Syrian border post of Al-Hasa, located at the mouth of the river. Jordan. These provocations, which were a gross violation of the UN Charter, complicated the international situation in the Middle East. The anxiety of the peace-loving forces was intensified by the fact that the prime minister of the government of Israel announced in parliament on November 3 that his government intended to seek a military alliance with the United States.

In mid-December 1955, Israeli troops again attacked Syrian territory in the area of Lake Tiberias. While considering this issue in the Security Council, the representatives of the United States, Britain And France made an attempt to bail out their ally. To this end, on January 11, 1956, they introduced a draft resolution in which, formally expressing alarm about the situation in the Arab East, they tried to present Syria as the culprit of the events.

These attempts were exposed by the Soviet representative in the Security Council A. A. Sobolev. He pointed out that Israel was responsible for the attack and suggested that the Security Council condemn these actions dangerous for peace in the region of Lake Tiberias and call on Israel to prevent such incidents in the future.

The colonial powers provided Israel with moral support, material and military assistance. Responding to a question in Parliament, Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson stated in January 1956 that, with the consent of the United States and Britain, in 1954 and 1955 Canada sold arms to Israel. The Western powers refused to sell weapons to the Arab countries.

Simultaneously with Israel's military actions, imperialist circles stepped up pressure on Egypt, Jordan and other countries to force them to join the Baghdad Pact. Washington and London put pressure on these countries directly and through Turkey and Iraq. Considering that the popular masses of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria have a negative attitude towards joining military blocs, the British ruling circles, in order to somehow connect the Arab countries with the Baghdad Pact, sought to conclude bilateral economic agreements between countries both participants and non-participants of the pact. . Such an agreement was signed in December 1955 between Iraq and Jordan. Further efforts to force Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact provoked a backlash from the country's population. In the second half of December, a general strike began in Jordan, which marked the beginning of great events and later led to the victory of the democratic forces in the country.

Rough pressure on the states of the Arab East and the desire to aggravate the situation in this region led to completely different results than the colonial powers had expected. The threat of imperialist expansion, contrary to the calculations of Washington, London and Paris, rallied the countries of the Arab East even more.

In an environment of growing danger from the colonial powers, the governments of a number of Arab states took steps to strengthen their defense capabilities. The governments of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia have taken steps to unite the Arabs against the imperialists. In these troubled days for Jordan, three governments offered economic assistance to the Jordanian people. Support from the Arab countries allowed Jordan to refuse the assistance offered to her by England on unfavorable economic and difficult political conditions.

The Soviet Union came out in defense of the peoples of the Arab states, for the elimination of the danger in the Near and Middle East, and for the establishment and development of friendly relations with the countries of this region. In 1955, a number of agreements were concluded between the USSR and the Arab countries.

economic, cultural and political agreements.

On October 31, a treaty of friendship between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yemen was signed in Cairo. According to this agreement, the parties undertook to resolve the differences arising between them exclusively by peaceful means; they have committed themselves to facilitating trade exchanges in accordance with recognized international rules; establish diplomatic relations in accordance with generally accepted principles and the principle of reciprocity.

In the middle of the following month, a Soviet-Syrian trade and payment agreement was signed in Damascus. Syria agreed to supply cotton, dry fruits, legumes, oilseeds and other goods to the USSR. The Soviet Union undertook to supply machinery, industrial plants, cars and trucks, chemical and some other goods.

Suez Crisis

The fact is that by mid-1956 Egypt's relations with Western countries had deteriorated sharply. Even before that, Egypt spoiled relations with France because of the support of the Algerian guerrillas. As a result, by the way, France began to actively sell weapons to Israel. In 1954-1956, the positions of the Western countries in the Middle East were shaken, when the attempts of the United States and England to draw Jordan and Egypt into the anti-communist Baghdad Pact failed. In Jordan, as mentioned above, there were unrest, and in Egypt, the question of who would own the Suez Canal became more and more acute. Back in the summer of 1952, Nasser organized a series of attacks on British bases in the Suez Canal area and demanded the evacuation of British troops from Egypt. The commander of the British troops, General Eskin, suggested that the government intervene and restore King Farouk to the throne for one thing, but London limited itself to freezing 10 million pounds belonging to Egypt in banks. And then the number of British troops in the canal area was reduced from 80 to 10 thousand people. Nasser continued to press and on October 19, 1954, an agreement was signed in Cairo on the complete withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone within 20 months.

Finally, Nasser spoiled relations with the United States. In 1953, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Cairo. His goal was to draw Egypt into the Baghdad Pact. Nasser, for his part, asked for a loan for the construction of the Aswan Dam and weapons. But, fearing to displease Israel, which was a staunch US ally in the region, Dulles refused to supply weapons. When Nasser in September 1955 purchased a large consignment of weapons from the countries of the Eastern Bloc, the United States suspended the issuance of loans to Egypt. Moreover, Dulles demanded the immediate annulment of the agreement on the supply of Soviet weapons and threatened to blockade Egypt from the sea in order to prevent the arrival of ships with weapons.

The last straw for the Egyptian leader was Dulles' statement on July 19, 1956, that the United States was refusing to provide Egypt with a promised $270 million loan. The example of the Americans was followed by Great Britain and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. And already on July 26, at a rally in Alexandria, President Gamal Nasser said: “Americans, choke with rage! The annual income of the Suez Canal Company is $100 million. Why don't we get that money ourselves?" Egyptian troops occupied the canal zone without delay.

In a statement on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser noted: “The Suez Canal Company has always been an Egyptian company, which, like all other Egyptian companies, could be nationalized. This nationalization in no way and in no way affects the international obligations of Egypt. We, as always, are determined to fulfill all our international obligations, and both the convention of 1888 and its guarantee contained in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 are and will be fully preserved. The freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal is not infringed or affected in any way. And to no extent ... ".

Thus, the Egyptian government recognized the old agreements and claimed that it guaranteed freedom of navigation, Considering that, according to article 1 of the Nationalization Decree of July 26, Egypt guaranteed shareholders and holders of constituent shares "reimbursement for their shares at their quoted value on the Paris stock exchange on the day prior to the coming into force of this law", it will be clear that the Egyptian government has shown understanding of the interests of both the states using the canal and individual citizens of Western countries owning shares of the Suez Canal Company.

Immediately, as soon as it became known about the decision of the Egyptian government to nationalize the channel, British and French diplomats and the military developed a flurry of activity.

As noted above, the Egyptian government's nationalization of the Suez Canal was used by British and French colonial circles as a pretext for military aggression against Egypt. “The policy of the British and French governments,” wrote the English weekly Observer at the height of the tripartite aggression, “from the very beginning of the Suez crisis, pursued the goal of destroying the Egyptian regime and imposing by force an Anglo-French solution to the Suez question” .

It was the overthrow of the Egyptian government that was the main goal of the ruling circles of England, France and the United States of America supporting them. They hoped that, by striking at Egypt, they would not only stop further retreat, but also restore the positions lost after the Second World War in the Near and Middle East.

At first glance, it may seem that the United States took a more reserved position than England and France. The caution of the US ruling circles in the Suez issue was not at all explained by the desire to support the legitimate measures of Egypt, but by the desire to take advantage of the situation that had arisen in the Arab East and at the same time try to acquire political capital, which the US Republican Party so needed in connection with the upcoming presidential elections. This position of the US ruling circles also found a response in the American press. Some newspapers, such as the New York Herald Tribune, wrote that with the arrival of Dulles in London, "the most important task is to find a peaceful international solution to the problem of Suez." Other equally influential ones, like The New York Times, claimed that Dulles found it impossible to leave the channel under "the unrestricted control of any Egyptian government."

The question is logical: what was the position of the United Nations and why did the parties not resort to its help?

The Egyptian Government has informed the United Nations, through its Secretary-General, of the steps taken to nationalize the canal. Subsequently, the Egyptian government proposed "to convene in Geneva, within the framework of the UN, a conference of states whose ships pass through the Suez Canal. However, this proposal was rejected by Britain and France.

By rejecting Egypt's reasonable proposal to convene a representative international conference in Geneva under the auspices of the UN, the British and French ruling circles showed that they were not interested in a just settlement of the Suez crisis that they themselves had created. The monopoly circles of England and France aspired to only one thing - to impose their conditions on Egypt by any means. That is why the governments of Guy-Mollet and Eden stubbornly adhered to the "position of strength" policy.

As for Egypt's policy on the Suez issue, its goals, as stated in Nasser's letter, still remain: a) freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and its reliable use without discrimination; b) the development of the Suez Canal so that it meets the future requirements of navigation; c) the establishment of fair duties and charges; and d) the technical efficiency of the Suez Canal.

On September 10, the Egyptian government sent a note to the Soviet government informing it of the results of negotiations with the Menzies mission in Cairo. In this note, the Government of Egypt, expressing its conviction that "a solution can be found", proposed that negotiations be held on the Suez problem "in within the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations”. The Soviet government "expressed its readiness to take part in the negotiations proposed by the Egyptian side."

By September 15, 20 states approved the proposal of the Egyptian government to convene a conference at which the various points of view of the states using the Suez Canal would be heard and questions about guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the canal would be discussed. But the ruling circles of England and France did not even want to hear about the search for new ways for a just solution of the Suez question. They continued the policy of pressure and threats. "While Australian Prime Minister Menzies was urging President Nasser in Cairo to accept the proposals of the 18 Maritime Nations Conference, the French and Israeli staff officers were plotting to seize the Suez Canal with Israeli military forces." This is how the course of the event was described ten years later by the British Minister A. Nuttling.

Immediately after the failure of the Menzies mission, the British and French governments stepped up pressure on Egypt.

On September 12, British Prime Minister Eden and French Prime Minister Guy-Mollet, and the next day US Secretary of State Dulles, in their speeches, put forward a new plan for solving the Suez problem through the creation of the so-called “Channel Users Association”.

Although the leaders of the British and French governments were the first to outline this plan, nevertheless, the idea of creating the Association belongs to American diplomacy, personally to Dulles. The fact is that the United States did not want to act as the initiators of the creation of the Association. Therefore, they continued to play tricks, pretending that they did not share, or at any rate did not fully share, the position of England and France on this issue.

It was declared in London and Paris that if Egypt rejected this new plan, then England and France would consider themselves free to take such action as they saw fit, both within the UN and outside it.

At the same time, it was announced that if Cairo did not accept their conditions, they would recall the pilots "serving the Suez Canal. And indeed, on the night of September 14, 1956, pilots from England, France, Holland, Norway, Italy and other countries who worked on the canal, at the insistence of the governments of these countries, refused to fulfill their duties.Meanwhile, more and more ships approached the Suez Canal from two sides.On September 14, 50 ships accumulated in Port Said and Suez.The colonial powers decided to disorganize the work of the Suez Canal and thereby It was hoped in London and Paris that the recall of the pilots might permanently suspend the operation of the canal.

New cadres of pilots from among the Egyptians and experienced sailors who arrived in Suez from the USSR, India, Yugoslavia and other countries were urgently trained. Vessels that had accumulated at the entrance to and exit from the Suez Canal were escorted through and the traffic jam was cleared. By the end of September 1956, the movement of ships along the canal was carried out quite normally. The "Battle of the Pilots", in the words of Western journalists, was lost by England and France.

Simultaneously with actions of a purely diplomatic nature, the British and French ruling circles stepped up their military preparations. A few days after the nationalization of the canal, commanders of the interventionist troops were appointed both in London and Paris. At the end of July, the concentration of the English fleet in the Mediterranean began. In France, by August 25, a military squadron was ready to sail to the coast of Egypt. A decision was also made on secret arms deliveries to Israel 7 .

Between Paris and Tel Aviv, a strong and permanent connection was established along all lines. For negotiations on the supply of weapons during the preparation of the tripartite aggression in Egypt, the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense flew to Paris 16 times.

The US position was of great importance for Paris and London. They knew about it, of course, in Washington. Throughout the Suez conflict, the leaders of the American state avoided public statements of open support for the policy of the aggressive circles of France and England.

And indeed, if the US ruling circles wanted to prevent aggression, they could declare it openly and unambiguously warn London and Paris. However, there were no such warnings. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the US encouraged its NATO allies to move against Egypt. "If it becomes impossible to avoid military measures," Dulles told Eden in one of his conversations, "the President (USA - AP) will need the consent of the Congress to any US action." To do this, according to the American Secretary of State, it was necessary that "the legal basis of our general meetings should be impeccable." It is quite understandable that such a statement by Dulles was interpreted in the two European capitals as an endorsement of a policy aimed at preparing military intervention.

The British Prime Minister Eden was also convinced of the favorable position of the United States. In his memoirs, he writes that Eisenhower and his officials “made it clear to us that the United States would not hesitate to use force if all peaceful means of settlement were exhausted. In addition, they (USA - L.P.) from time to time approved of the adoption by us (England and France. - A. / 7.) of military precautions.

All this gave the British and French a reason not to attach much importance to some of President Eisenhower's public statements. Thus, they believed, not without reason, that President Eisenhower's response to journalists' questions that the United States would never join the aggressors was propagandistic. London and Paris were even more convinced of this by an interview on television made by Dulles in the second half of September, in which he said that "it is impossible to always count on states not to use force if there is no other alternative."

Fundamentally different from American policy was the policy of the Soviet Union, whose government frankly and directly declared its full support for the Egyptian people in their just struggle against the claims of Britain and France.
With the end of the second London conference of 18 countries, the first and very important period in the development of the Suez crisis ended. This period showed:

firstly, that the British and French ruling circles did not want to put up with the loss of their privileges and were ready to achieve their goals at any cost, up to military intervention;

secondly, that the talks held in August - September 1956 were needed by England and France only in order to show the world community their "peacefulness" and desire to resolve the issue of the canal by peaceful means, on the one hand, and in order to to use the time of negotiations for the preparation of troops for the invasion of Egypt, on the other;

thirdly, that all progressive and peace-loving forces, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, were on the side of the Egyptian people, who were defending their legitimate rights.

THE SUJEC QUESTION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

On the eve of the discussion at the UN. The idea of addressing the UN on the Suez question was not new for England and France. It did not arise suddenly and was the logical conclusion of their diplomatic and political activities in August-September. Western newspapers began to write about the intention of England and France to use the UN for their own purposes long before these powers applied to the international forum. However, neither French nor British diplomacy was in a hurry, fearing to meet at the UN with great difficulties. That is why they rejected the proposals of the Egyptian government to convene in Geneva an international conference within the framework of the UN with the participation of states whose ships pass through the Suez Canal.

But in September things changed. The pressure on Egypt, as one would expect, did not produce results. The ruling circles of England and France understood that with the help of the UN they would not be able to achieve their goals; nevertheless, they wanted to take advantage of the last resort to create the best conditions for the start of aggression. The French newspaper France-Noire wrote on September 9 that the British government intended to apply to the Security Council and, with the help of this step, try to "achieve unanimity" of public opinion in England and other Western powers in pursuing a "firm policy".

Thus, England and France wanted to use the United Nations to show the intractability of Egypt, and at the same time to demonstrate their "peacefulness". The real intentions, however, were to try to use the debate at the UN for the final military preparations for the invasion of Egypt. “Let no one be deceived. Applying to the UN is a procedure, not a course of policy,” wrote the British newspaper Daily Express.

Anglo-French diplomacy also counted on discussing the Suez question in the Security Council to at least partially rehabilitate its policy in the eyes of the world community after the failure of the separate conference in London.

And finally, it should be noted that England's appeal to the UN to a certain extent corresponded to the mood of the ruling circles of a number of countries of the Commonwealth of Nations. For example, Canada insisted on the consideration of the Suez issue in the UN. Other Commonwealth countries also took this view.

But, turning to the UN, England and France did not abandon the policy that they had pursued before.

In the last days of September, the Soviet government again drew the attention of Britain to the fact that the fears of the Soviet Union expressed earlier regarding the development of the Suez crisis were confirmed by facts indicating that the British government, together with the governments of France and the USA, continued to pursue a policy of pressure and threats against Egypt.

The Soviet government warned the Western powers that "the policy of military threats and attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt creates a threat to peace in the Near and Middle East and is fraught with dangerous consequences."

Nor could the governments of the countries of this region of the world remain indifferent to the situation in the Arab East. The governments of the Arab countries, primarily Egypt, continued to strengthen the defense capability of their states.

On September 23, the governments of Britain and France officially demanded that the question of Egypt's "unilateral actions" that put an end to the system of international administration of the Suez Canal be put on the agenda of the Security Council. With the transfer of the Suez question to the UN for London and Paris, the last diplomatic and political stage in the preparation of aggression against Egypt began.

On September 24, Egypt also appealed to the United Nations and demanded that the Security Council consider the actions of Britain and France, which pose a serious threat to world peace and international security and are a flagrant violation of the UN Charter.

What did the parties in the UN go with and what did they want from the Security Council?

In an appeal to the UN, the Egyptian government reiterated that the creation of the "Suez Canal Users Association" would be an attack on the dignity and sovereignty of Egypt. It proposed the creation of a negotiating body, which, in addition to Egypt, would include representatives of other countries that use the Suez Canal and hold different points of view on the Suez problem. Thus, the Egyptian government, rejecting the policy of diktat, offered a real way to resolve the Suez issue peacefully within the framework of the UN.

The statement of the Soviet Peace Committee, published after the submission of the Suez question to the Security Council, said: “On behalf of all Soviet peace advocates, the Soviet Peace Committee calls on the United Nations, when considering the question of the Suez Canal, not to deviate from the principles that underlie in its creation, and to insist on decisions that ensure both the respect for the sovereign rights of Egypt and the freedom of passage through the channel of the courts of all states.

The results of the discussion of the Suez question in the Security Council testified to the success of the peace-loving forces; this was recognized by an active participant in the events of those years, the former Prime Minister of England Eden. In his memoirs we read: “I soon (after the closing of the meeting of the Security Council, - L. Ya.) learned that the Soviet government regards the results of the discussion in the UN as a victory for Egypt and the Soviet Union itself. In this it was undoubtedly right.

It seemed that an agreement was close and the severity of the crisis would soon subside. But that was only the outward impression. The representatives of England and France treated the negotiations formally. They used them, as it became clear after a few days, as a disguise for the last preparations for aggression.

Dragging out the negotiations, Britain and France remained in their former positions: to seek unilateral concessions from Egypt by any means.

England and France needed this in order to prevent negotiations before the start of the intervention. The British and French ruling circles decided that the diplomats had done their job, and on October 29 the guns began to speak. Thus ended another stage of the Suez crisis, a new one, the most dramatic in terms of events, began.

THE FAILURE OF THE ANGLO-FRANCO-ISRAEL AGGRESSION IN EGYPT

The events of the second half of October 1956, following the end of the work of the Security Council on the Suez question, developed with amazing rapidity. On October 14, foreign ministers who took part in the work of the Council began to leave New York, and the next day London and Paris were literally in a fever from the vigorous activity of representatives of the diplomatic and military departments. Both of them were in a hurry.

In the office of the Prime Minister of England, General Schall approached a map of the Middle East and placed both hands on it; one to the Sinai Peninsula, where, according to the plan, the positions of the Israeli troops should be, the other to the Nile Valley, where the fortifications of the Egyptian army are located. English and French troops, the French general explained, would be landed in the canal zone.

Good idea, said Eden.

From 22 to 26 October, the French naval forces intended to participate in the aggression left the base at Toulon.

In the last days of October, a French squadron consisting of warships Kersan, Surkuf, Bouvet approached the coast of Israel. Its task was to cover the coast of Israel from the sea during the latter's attack on Egypt.

However, the United States of America was in no hurry to take measures to prevent the aggression. The United States did nothing to stop the aggression even later, when the Israeli government, in collusion with the British and French, began military preparations, announcing mobilization.

Regarding Eisenhower's message to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion about the announced mobilization, Watt writes that the US President "expressed grave concern and warned Israel not to start hostilities," and later demanded immediate ... tripartite negotiations. It is clear that such a statement by Eisenhower did not and could not play an important role in maintaining peace in the Arab East: that is what it was designed for. President Eisenhower's appeal to Ben-Gurion "not to do anything that might disturb the peace" was not taken seriously, as the West German author Bretholz noted, not without reason.

And the United States could do a lot at this critical moment. It is known that both the British and French governments carefully studied the position of the government of that country. Moreover, the British and French hoped that at the decisive moment, if the Soviet Union and other socialist countries came out in defense of Egypt, the United States would support its allies. Even earlier, Eden and Pino had told Dulles that if the United States did not allow England and France to achieve their goals, including by force of arms, then the fate of the Atlantic Alliance would be at stake.

Initially, it was supposed to launch a tripartite aggression on November 6, the day of the US presidential election. Then it was decided to postpone the start of the performance to an earlier date.

Undoubtedly, the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary, raised with the help and support of international imperialist circles, was one of the main reasons for changing the date for the beginning of the action against Egypt.

Although some leaders of British and French diplomacy, as already noted, underestimated the role of the Soviet Union in international life, nevertheless, both London and Paris were far from indifferent to what help the Soviet Union could provide to the Egyptian people in the struggle against armed intervention. The colonial circles of France and England were well aware of the plans of the international reaction to prepare an insurrection, which was of great importance for choosing the day for the start of aggression.

In addition to the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary, there were other reasons that forced Britain and France to hurry. These include, first of all, the growth of resistance to the aggressors in the Arab East. Faced with the threat of joint action by the two colonial powers, the Arab countries intensified their struggle for independence. Elections in Jordan on October 21 ended with the victory of patriotic, democratic forces. Held in the conditions of the rise of the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial movement, the elections showed , that the Jordanian people stand for an independent, independent policy. The new government of Suleiman Nabulsi advocated an alliance with Egypt and Syria.

On the fourth day after the elections, Egypt, Syria and Jordan created a unified command. This forced the Anglo-French command to hurry: the prospect of having the armed forces of three Arab countries instead of one as opponents clearly did not suit the aggressors.

Thus, many factors influenced the decision of the British and French colonialists to act faster. This is, firstly, the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary; secondly, strengthening the defense capability of Egypt and other Arab countries; thirdly, international contradictions, in this case between England and France, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other; fourth, the US presidential election on November 6th.

October 30 radio reported that on the evening of October 29 - Israel intervened against Egypt. The attack was well prepared. Israeli troops, in accordance with the plan developed by England, France and Israel, launched an offensive in the Sinai Peninsula. One colonel in the Egyptian army spoke of Israel's attack on Egypt: “Don't think that it was only Israeli troops. We were bombed by Israeli aircraft, and planes with NATO markings, and planes without markings.”

French aviation took part in the attack on Egypt on the side of the Israeli army, covering ground troops and shelling Egyptian units in the Sinai Peninsula from the air.

Events developed according to a plan predetermined by England, France and Israel; the diplomacy of these countries, covering up the actions of the military departments, pretended that it did not know anything. The actions of British diplomacy can serve as an example of hypocrisy. British Ambassador to Tel Aviv made a presentation to the Israeli government on October 27 in connection with the provocations perpetrated by Israeli troops on the borders of Arab countries. The ambassador said that an Israeli attack on Jordan would automatically result in Britain taking the side of Jordan. In fact, England, as we know, acted together with Israel against the Arab states, including Jordan.

On the evening of October 29, the British ambassador in Tel Aviv, in accordance with all the rules of diplomatic practice, informed his government that Israeli troops had crossed the Egyptian border and were advancing deep into the Sinai Peninsula. On the same day, Dulles met twice with the charge d'affaires of England and France in Washington.

This is where the American government, if it really wanted a peaceful settlement of the issue, as it has stated more than once, should finally unambiguously declare its position. But it didn't. Dulles told the two countries that the United States would refer the issue of Israel's attack on Egypt to the Security Council the next day. There is only one conclusion from this: the US did not want to either prevent aggression or stop its NATO allies.

Washington knew perfectly well what they were doing. Even before the Israeli attack on Egypt, the US government ordered the immediate evacuation of US citizens from Egypt. American citizens were urgently evacuated from Syria and Jordan. The Americans also left the Suez Canal zone, including 16 pilots who worked on the canal.

Declaring in words that they are against armed intervention, the American ruling circles never once for three months (August-September) warned London and Paris that the United States would not allow the Suez crisis to be resolved by force of arms. As shown above, the United States actually pushed Britain and France to aggression against Egypt.

The United States at the UN, although with reservations, came out very cautiously in favor of ending the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression. This served as the basis for attempts to present the United States as a fighter for peace, as a defender of the interests of the Egyptian people.

As evidenced by the facts, even at the moment of the aggression itself, American diplomacy continued to play a complicated game, defending the interests of the US monopoly circles, which were striving to take the place of England and France in the Near and Middle East. The policy of the United States in this area, like that of Britain and France, was imperialist. The difference in position was explained only by the fact that the interests of two groups clashed in this area, each of which sought to secure a dominant position for itself. The efforts of American diplomacy were by no means aimed at protecting the Egyptian people and their interests, but at weakening the positions of competitors in the colonial struggle. This, in addition to demagogy, explains the US speech at the UN for an end to the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention in Egypt.

US Vice President Nixon's statement that the United States of America allegedly during the intervention in Egypt "for the first time in history showed that their policy differs from the Anglo-French policy towards Asia and Africa" caused surprise and irritation in the ruling circles of England. It is no coincidence that Eden quotes Nixon's words in his memoirs with undisguised condemnation. And who, if not him, an active participant in the events of those years, was best aware of the true policy of the US ruling circles.

The Soviet Union, from the moment the Suez crisis arose until the liquidation of its consequences, pursued a firm and consistent policy that fully met the national interests of the Egyptian people. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did not hide its intentions and goals. The Soviet government has repeatedly stated that if aggression is unleashed, Egypt will not be left alone. And it is not the fault of the Soviet Union that London and Paris did not heed these words. The USSR took decisive measures to stop the aggression against Egypt. These measures finally had the necessary effect on the aggressors.

In an effort to buy time after the Israeli attack on Egypt, Britain and France hampered the actions of the Security Council and did not give them the opportunity to take measures to curb the aggression. To prevent the UN from receiving information, the Israeli authorities expelled UN observers from the demilitarized zone and mined it.

Meanwhile, London and Paris continued to carry out the plan of aggression against Egypt. At the beginning of the afternoon meeting of the Security Council on October 30, British representative Dixon spoke and read out the ultimatum 61 presented by Britain and France a few hours earlier to Egypt and Israel.

But what was sought in Paris and London was not simply the occupation of the Suez Canal. There, a pretext was sought for open war against Egypt. That is why the Anglo-French ultimatum was deliberately drafted in such a way as to exclude its acceptance by the Egyptian side.

The ultimatum contained the following demands: the cessation of hostilities on land, sea and in the air; the withdrawal of troops for a ten-mile strip from the Suez Canal; consent to the occupation by Anglo-French troops of key positions in the canal zone - Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. In case of refusal to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum, London and Paris threatened armed intervention under the pretext of "separating" the belligerents. Under the terms of the ultimatum, British and French armed forces must be brought into the Suez Canal zone in any case, regardless of whether the ultimatum is accepted or rejected. According to the French newspaper Comba, the text of the ultimatum was drafted in such a way that the British and French troops "occupy the strategic positions of the Suez Canal with or without the permission of Nasser." Formally, such demands were also presented to Israel, although other goals of such a measure are quite obvious.

It is clear that no government that values the sovereignty of its country could accept such an ultimatum. Naturally, the Egyptian government did not accept it either. “Egypt rejected the ultimatum,” Gabbay wrote. “He was not an aggressor, and therefore he could not be required to withdraw troops or cease fire.” One cannot but agree with these words.

Dixon, joined by the French representative, tried to prove that the Security Council could not take any practical measures either to stop hostilities or to ensure the passage of ships through the Suez Canal. With this statement, England and France, as it were, challenged the whole world. London and Paris agreed to this, hoping to quickly break the resistance of Egypt and, before anyone comes to the aid of the Egyptian people, to present the UN and the whole world with a fait accompli.

The Soviet representative in the Security Council, A. A. Sobolev, did not enter into a discussion with the British representative Dixon. “The Soviet delegation could say a lot about the statement of Mr. Dixon, which we have just heard, regarding the ultimatum presented to Egypt by the governments of England and France,” said A. A. Sobolev. “... Events are currently developing so quickly that this is not the time for long speeches in the Council. The Council must act, and act quickly.” And the Soviet delegation showed an example of promptness. When the British and French delegations rejected the US draft resolution, the Soviet representatives introduced their own draft, which retained the preamble and the first paragraph of the American draft, which provided for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the line established by the truce.

The Security Council resumed its meeting at 9 pm New York time on 30 October. After a number of delegates spoke, the Soviet draft was put to a vote. Seven delegations, that is, the majority of the Council, voted in favor of its adoption, and only two delegations, England and France, voted against it. Although the proposals taken from the American one were included in the Soviet draft, the representatives of the United States, followed by Belgium, abstained from voting. Thus, Britain and France once again paralyzed the activities of the main body of the UN for the maintenance of peace and international security.

In view of the fact that the Security Council was paralyzed by the actions of Britain and France, it became necessary to convene an Extraordinary Session of the UN General Assembly. The representative of Yugoslavia made a formal proposal to the Security Council on 30 October to convene an Extraordinary Session.

And on October 31, having begun aerial bombardment and shelling of Egyptian territory from the sea, the British and French armed forces, following Israel, undertook aggression against Egypt.

On the same day, the Soviet government issued a Statement on armed aggression against Egypt, condemned the aggressors, called on the UN Security Council to take measures to stop the aggressive actions of England, France and Israel against Egypt and to immediately withdraw interventionist troops from Egyptian territory.

Representatives of Britain and France also spoke at this meeting, who, contrary to common sense, tried to assert that the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt was allegedly undertaken "in the interests of peace and order."

On November 1, 1950, the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly opened. The session began work in a difficult environment. England and France continued their aggression against Egypt. Anglo-French aircraft bombed peaceful Egyptian cities and towns continuously. Israeli troops, having received support from England and France, increased pressure on the Snai Peninsula.

There was one question on the agenda of the Extraordinary Session of the UN General Assembly: the serious situation in the Near and Middle East as a result of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt.

Britain's representative Dixon, just as in the Security Council, justified the aggression against Egypt in every possible way, calling it a temporary action. He expressed the hope that the General Assembly would consider the action of England, France and Israel against Egypt "justified",

At the same time, Dixon could not resist attacking the Soviet Union, accusing it of interfering in the affairs of the Middle East.

US Secretary of State Dulles spoke on behalf of the American delegation at the session. While condemning the actions of England, France and Israel against Egypt, he never once called them aggression. According to Dulles, this is just a "serious mistake" that runs counter to the goals of the UN. The Secretary of State introduced a draft resolution which, while not condemning the aggressors, nevertheless called for an immediate cessation of hostilities against Egypt.

On the night of November 2, the session proceeded to vote by roll call on the draft resolution introduced by the US delegation. The American project had a number of shortcomings: it did not condemn the aggressors, did not provide for specific measures to stop hostilities, etc. The draft resolution was adopted by the votes of 64 delegations. Five countries voted against: England, France, Australia, New Zealand, Israel.

While diplomats were active in New York, the military was active in the Suez region. The Anglo-French command, faced with the resistance of the Egyptian people, brought new forces into battle in order to achieve their goals as soon as possible.

Anglo-French-Israeli aggression stirred up all the countries of the Middle and Near East. In November, uprisings broke out in Iran, on the Bahrain Islands. In Iraq, despite the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the adoption of repressive measures, powerful demonstrations took place in a number of cities (Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, etc.).

Many Arab countries have declared support for Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Syria withdrew their ambassadors from England and France. In Syria, the formation of a people's militia began. The member governments of the Arab League declared that they would come to the aid of the Egyptian people.

In Egypt, every day an increasing number of citizens stood up for the defense of their homeland. The Egyptian people were inspired by the fact that they were not alone, they were supported by the Arabs of other countries, honest people all over the world. Together with him, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries came out in an active struggle in defense of the country's independence.

In such a situation, the command of the French and British interventionist troops showed nervousness and haste, and in New York the representatives of England and France sought to drag out the discussion. The French delegation, for example, was instructed by their government to win a few days. According to the French government, every day won is equal to victory.

Initially, it was assumed that the landing would be thrown out on November 6, but the development of events made it necessary to hurry. It was reported from New York that the Israeli representative was ready to accept the UN proposal for a ceasefire. An order was immediately transmitted from London to Nicosia to postpone the start of landing operations a day earlier. At military air bases in the Mediterranean Sea, aircraft were urgently prepared, which on the morning of November 5 delivered an airborne assault to the Port Said area. The French paratroopers were commanded by Colonel Chateau-Jaubert.

But landing operations could not bring success to England and France. If the paratroopers managed to capture Port Fuad relatively easily, then in Port Said they met fierce resistance. The city, together with the troops, was defended by almost the entire population.

In this situation, on the eve of the landing in Port Said, at the request of the Government of Egypt, a meeting of the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly was again convened. Two draft US resolutions introduced at the meeting (on the resumption of navigation through the Suez Canal and on the solution of the Palestinian problem) showed that the US was striving to shield England and France: these resolutions did not condemn the refusal of England, France and Israel to comply with the decision of the General Assembly. The question of ensuring freedom of navigation and the Palestinian question in essence could not be discussed or resolved until the aggressor troops completely left the territory of Egypt. The US feared, as the New York Times correspondent from Washington noted, that "the Assembly would adopt a stronger resolution than the United States wanted."

The question is natural: why did the United States, which declared its desire to stop aggression as soon as possible, showed softness towards Britain, France and Israel and slowness in discussing the issue of aggression in the Security Council and at the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly?

The United States did this for many reasons: and because they were afraid to destroy NATO; and because they sought to weaken their allies in a protracted war; and finally because they wanted the interventionist troops of Britain, France and Israel to pave the way for the strengthening of the influence of American monopoly capital in this area. In other words, the United States counted on the hands of its allies to rake in the heat in the Middle East.

Of great importance in the struggle of peace-loving forces against Anglo-French-Israeli aggression were the Statement of the Soviet government on armed aggression against Egypt (October 31) and the messages of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR D. Eisenhower, A. Eden, Guy Mollet and Ben-Turion (November 5) . In these documents of historical importance, the Soviet Union, calling on Britain, France and Israel to immediately stop the bloodshed in Egypt, warned them of the danger that continued aggression could lead to. The Soviet government appealed to the United States of America to unite its efforts in the UN to take decisive action against the aggressors. It proposed that the United States and the USSR, by decision of the UN, use their forces to stop aggression against the Egyptian people, against the countries of the Arab East.

On November 5, the Soviet Union called on the Security Council to propose to the governments of Britain, France and Israel that they immediately cease hostilities against Egypt and withdraw troops from Egyptian territory within three days. The USSR also recommended to the Security Council that it be necessary for all UN members, primarily the USSR and the USA, as permanent members of the Security Council with large armed forces, to provide assistance to Egypt by sending armed forces, if Britain, France and Israel do not stop hostilities and disobey the decisions of the UN.

The news that the USSR had proposed to the United States the use of armed forces to jointly repulse aggression in Egypt produced the impression of a bombshell among the ruling circles of Britain and France. It is no coincidence that some researchers and publicists call the Statement of the Soviet Union of November 5 "the Soviet bomb".

Having received a note from the USSR, London and Paris became worried. As Benoît-Méchain writes, Eden was inclined to think that this was a "bluff". Guy-Mollet believed that the Russians were too preoccupied with events in Hungary to take effective action in the Middle East. Nevertheless, French and British diplomacy devoted the whole night of November 6 and the morning of November 6 to clarifying the measures being taken by the USSR, as well as the position of the United States of America in the event of the unilateral intervention of the Soviet Union in the conflict in Egypt.

And the position of the United States was as follows: the White House refused the Soviet proposal on the joint use of armed forces in order to put an end to aggression. The official reason for the refusal was the reference to the fact that the introduction of troops would be a violation of the UN Charter and would aggravate the situation in the region. This again revealed the ambivalent position that the United States had maintained throughout the crisis. Wanting the defeat of England and France, and consequently, the weakening of their positions as competitors in the Arab East, the United States at the same time did not want to break off relations with these countries - the main partners in NATO.

The ruling circles of Britain and France hoped that if the Soviet Union came out on the side of Egypt, the United States would help them. But the US European allies in NATO did not get the answer they wanted from Washington. The November 5 warning played its part. On the night of November 7, 1956, hostilities in Egypt were stopped. Aggression failed.

The consent of England, France and Israel to a ceasefire did not, however, mean the end of the tripartite intervention against Egypt. On Egyptian territory were British, French and Israeli troops. The ruling circles of these countries were not going to abandon their expansionist plans either.

With the cease-fire, the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory arose. This was no less complicated and no less difficult task than the cessation of hostilities, for the colonial circles of England and France hoped to win concessions from Egypt with the help of the occupying troops.

Israel did not lag behind its partners, the ruling circles of which sought to seize a number of regions from Egyptian territory (the city of Gaza and the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba). At the UN, representatives of the three countries said that they refuse to withdraw troops from Egypt until the government of that country accepts the obligations they insisted on.

The question of the withdrawal of troops also acquired particular urgency in connection with the fact that Britain, France and Israel sought to use their troops in order to put new pressure on Egypt. British, French and Israeli representatives to the UN put forward various pretexts to justify the delay in the withdrawal of troops, and agreement to the withdrawal was subject to various conditions. Such a position of the aggressor countries caused the legitimate condemnation of the representatives of many countries.

Speaking on November 7 at a meeting of the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly, Soviet representative V. B. Kuznetsov stated that the USSR, insisting on the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops that invaded Egypt, believes that only this will create conditions for the restoration of calm in the Middle East.

On November 10, a TASS statement was published. In it, the cessation of hostilities against Egypt was noted as a positive fact. At the same time, fear was expressed that the announcement of England and France on the cessation of hostilities would not be “only a maneuver calculated to gain time, to obtain a respite for an even greater accumulation of forces in the calculation

to resume aggressive war against Egypt and other countries of the Middle East on an even larger scale.

“The leading circles of the USSR declared that if England, France and Israel, contrary to UN decisions, do not withdraw all their troops from the territory of Egypt and, under various pretexts, delay the implementation of these decisions and accumulate forces, creating a threat of resumption of hostilities against Egypt, then the corresponding the organs of the Soviet Union will not prevent the departure of Soviet volunteer citizens who wish to take part in the struggle of the Egyptian people for their independence.

If the Soviet Union's warning of November 5 had a decisive influence on the cessation of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression, then the TASS statement of November 10, 1956 played a decisive role in the withdrawal of British and French troops from Egypt.

After this statement, London and Paris were accommodating and finally agreed with the UN decision.

On December 22, British and French troops left Port Said and other Egyptian territories they had captured. But Israel delayed the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly to withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory. Therefore, the Soviet delegation at the 11th session of the General Assembly continued the struggle for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt. While the troops of Israel remained on Egyptian soil, the threat of aggression hung over Egypt, because the Western powers stood behind Israel.

On March 28, a TASS statement was published, which drew attention to the seriousness of the situation in the Middle And Middle East, created by the Western powers, primarily the United States. The Soviet government warned Israel and the powers behind it about the dangerous consequences of their policy.

In the end, they managed to break the last resistance of the aggressors - in March 1957, Israeli troops were also withdrawn from Egyptian territory.

Thus, even after the cease-fire in Egypt, the Soviet Union did not slack off its efforts to establish genuine peace in the area and to withdraw all foreign troops from Egyptian territory as quickly as possible.

The policy of the Soviet Union found a response and understanding in the Arab countries. As a result, relations between the USSR and the Arab countries improved markedly. The aggression of England, France and Israel against Egypt ended in complete failure.

Bibliography

1. A. S. Protopopov “The Soviet Union and the Suez Crisis of 1956.”

also known asSecond Arab-Israeli War, Anglo-French-Israeli War against Egypt. Operation Kadesh, Operation Musketeer, Hundred Hour War

Introduction

After the Palestine war of 1948-1949, the situation in Asia Minor continued to be tense. A wave of coups and political assassinations swept through the defeated Arab countries.

So, in Syria, General Husni Zaim, who commanded the Syrian troops in the war of 1948-1949, overthrew the government, but two years later in 1951 he was overthrown himself, the country plunged into the abyss of bloody coups.

King Abdullah of Jordan, who stands for a peace treaty with Israel and who initialed a secret document as the basis of this document, was killed in July 1951 on the steps of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem by agents of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. In December 1954, anti-Western unrest took place in Jordan and all British officers were removed from the country.

In December 1949, Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha was assassinated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which accused him of being responsible for the defeat. On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers overthrew King Farouk and established a republic in Egypt. At first, Egypt was headed by Muhammad Naguib, but he was soon replaced by another member of the organization, Gamal Abd el-Nasser.

Regardless of the internal situation in the Arab countries, their positions towards Israel and towards the Arabs remained invariably hostile. The borders established in Palestine did not suit anyone. In 1950, Israel, contrary to the decision of the UN, declared Jerusalem its capital. The implementation of the decision on the return of refugees was frustrated by Israel: in 1950, only 5.5 thousand refugees were allowed to return.

Already in mid-1949, raids by fedayeen (guerrillas) began from the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip into Israel. Israel responded with retaliatory raids on Egyptian and Jordanian territories. 1,300 Israelis were killed and wounded by Arab terrorists between 1949 - 1956. The Fedayeen were based and trained at bases controlled and located in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.

Fedayeen raids into Israel 1949-1956

In 1953, the ambitious Israeli officer Ariael Sharon created a group of 101 of 40 people to carry out retaliatory raids against the guerrillas. In the same 1953, Sharon and his group "became famous" during the attack on the village of Negba in Jordanian territory, killing 69 civilians.

Fedayeen raids became more frequent in 1954-1955. In 1955, 260 Israeli citizens were killed or wounded, and significant material destruction was caused. In response, Israeli forces carried out two punitive actions in the Gaza Strip.

Gradually, regular Egyptian and Jordanian troops were drawn into this "small war", which prevented the penetration of Israeli troops into their territory. Artillery and aviation were used. In the second half of 1956, during 4 anti-partisan raids, 100 Israelis and 200 Arabs were killed and wounded.

Tensions between countries intensified.

In 1951, Egypt closed the passage for Israeli ships leaving the Gulf of Aqaba to the Indian Ocean. In November of that year, the UN condemned the move. But Egypt, in response, installed coastal artillery at the exit from the Strait of Tiran. Later, Nasser would ban the passage of Israeli aircraft in the waters adjacent to Egyptian territory and effectively imposed a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba for all ships heading to Israel. The passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal was also prohibited.

In October 1955, a joint military command of Syria and Egypt was created. Jordan will join him a year later.

Suez Crisis

Back in the summer of 1952, Nasser organized a series of attacks on British bases in the Suez Canal area and demanded the evacuation of British troops from Egypt. The commander of the British troops, General Eskin, suggested that the government intervene and for one thing restore King Farouk to the throne, but London limited itself to freezing 10 million pounds belonging to Egypt in the banks of the City. And then the number of British troops in the canal area was reduced from 80 to 10 thousand people. Nasser continued to press and on October 19, 1954, an agreement was signed in Cairo on the complete withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone within 20 months.

The last straw for the Egyptian leader was Dulles' statement on July 19, 1956, that the United States was refusing to provide Egypt with a promised $270 million loan. The example of the Americans was followed by Great Britain and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. And already on July 26, at a rally in Alexandria, President Gamal Nasser said: "Americans, choke with rage! The annual income of the Suez Canal Company is $ 100 million. Why don't we get this money ourselves?" Egyptian troops occupied the canal zone without delay.

Great Britain and France imposed economic sanctions against Egypt and began to prepare an intervention in Egypt. The US tried to settle the matter peacefully, but to no avail.

War of 1956 and its significance

The decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was met in England and France with open hostility, but there was no opportunity to use force immediately - this took time. This time was used for diplomatic intervention by the United States, which clearly did not approve of the intentions of England and France.

Israel had intentions to fight with Egypt. There were also reasons: terrorist raids from the Sinai Peninsula became more and more daring, the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, leading to the port of Eilat on the Red Sea, continued, in fact, this Israeli port was inactive. By the end of 1956, a secret tripartite treaty between England, France and Israel was signed.

October 29, 1956 Israel began hostilities against Egypt, counting on the support of England and France. In fact, these countries paralyzed the activities of the Egyptian Navy and Air Force, demanded that Egypt withdraw its troops 16 km from the canal.

By November 2, 1956, the main goals of Israel were achieved: the troops occupied most of the Sinai Peninsula, opened the Strait of Tiran for navigation, defeated the terrorist bases and inflicted a tangible defeat on the Egyptian army. The UN Security Council considered a US-submitted resolution demanding Israel to return to its borders, but Britain and France vetoed it. November 5, 1956 French and British began to land troops in channel zone, but a few days later they stopped the offensive.

The reasons for the sudden cessation of hostilities against Egypt can be debated. The position of the United States, the financial crisis in England, the split in British society, the threats to N.S. Khrushchev to send nuclear missiles to England and France and send volunteers to help Egypt, but the fact remains: the war has been stopped. Israel left the occupied territories, the Sinai Peninsula was demilitarized after the departure of the Israelis, and traffic along the Strait of Tiran was open.

The USSR scored a major propaganda victory and has since openly sided with the Arabs in the conflict. The United States began selling weapons to Israel after it left the occupied territories. The Palestinian problem has entered a new stage.

Confrontation between Arab countries and Israel in the 1960s.

Israel's participation in the military action of England and France in 1956 seemed to confirm the fears of the Arab countries regarding its role in the Middle East. A rapid build-up of Egypt's military potential began. With the help of the USSR, the army was rearmed and retrained; the construction of the Aswan dam was underway, in 1964 its grand opening took place, at which N.S. Khrushchev.

After the 1956 war, Israel managed to maintain calm on its borders for several years. The alliance with France was preserved, ties with the United States were being established. The issue of navigation in the Strait of Tiran was settled: in March 1957, England, France and the United States undertook to guarantee the free passage of ships. Israel withdrew its troops from the area of Sharm el-Sheikh, which dominated the entrance to the strait - UN troops were stationed there. The Israeli port of Eilat prospered, its population increased by 13 times in 10 years.

Soon came to the fore dispute over the distribution of the waters of the Jordan River. The plan, proposed in 1955 by the United States, provided for the division of waters, but was rejected by the Arab countries for political reasons. Israel began to build engineering structures in order to supply water from the North, from the region of Galilee to the south, to the desert of Ne-gev. The amount of water that Israel intended to withdraw from the Jordan was not to exceed the Israeli quota of 1955. When the Israeli water pipeline was completed in 1964, a special meeting of Arab leaders was held in Cairo. They made a decision to divert the waters of the Jordan River in order to prevent their use for the needs of Israel. For this, it was planned to start work in Syria and Lebanon.

In 1964 was created Palestine Liberation Organization(OOP); its creator Ahmed Shukayri belongs to the main slogan of the "Palestinian Charter: "Let's throw the Jews into the sea!". The organization begins to coordinate terrorist actions against Israel, since 1965 terrorist attacks have been carried out in Israel itself.

The largest of the Palestinian organizations is being created - Al Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat. Israel responds with brutal retaliation by conducting open regular air raids on the Jordanian and Lebanese villages from which the raids originated.

The main countermeasures were directed against Jordan, in November 1966, after an Israeli air raid on the village of Es-Sama, 18 Jordanians were killed. In July 1966, there was a major incident on the border with Syria, where Israeli troops began shelling in order to interfere with the work that had begun to divert the waters of the Jordan River. In April 1967, the Israeli Air Force entered into battle with the Syrian Air Force and shot down 6 MiGs.

On May 15, 1967, Egypt began to transfer troops to the Sinai, violating the demilitarized status of the zone. On May 18, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UN troops from the Gaza Strip (where they were in order to prevent direct contact between Egyptian units and Israeli troops) and put forward detachments of Palestinian organizations to the forefront. On May 27, 1967, an Egyptian landing was landed in Sharm ash-Sheikh, control was established over the Strait of Tiran - the blockade of the port of Eilat was again observed,

This clearly indicated the intentions of the Arab countries to use the growth of their military potential and destroy Israel. Israeli government led by Levi Eshkolom appeals to the countries that stood at the origins of the creation of Israel, with a call to protect it, since one gets the impression of a huge military superiority of the Arab countries. All the more so as the relevant allied treaties between Egypt and Iraq and Jordan, as well as with Syria, are being concluded.

June 1, 1967 created in Israel government of national unity(with the participation of the Herut bloc), and June 5 the famous Six Day War. It began with an unexpected attack on Egyptian airfields, where 350 of the latest aircraft were immediately destroyed. Ground actions followed, well planned and coordinated by the famous generals Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin.

In a few days, Israeli troops took control of the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, captured the entire Sinai Peninsula, coming to the shore of the Suez Canal. The Israelis also captured the Golan Heights, a strategically important area in Syria, located 30 km from its capital Damascus.

Defeat of the Arab countries was complete; GA. Nasser even immediately resigned, but then he was "called by the people" and "agreed" to remain in office, executing "specific perpetrators of the defeat" from among his generals.

In August 1967, a meeting of the leaders of the Arab countries took place in Khartoum. It decided to compensate Egypt and Jordan for economic losses and damages, to maintain a tough confrontation with Israel, by no means agreeing to negotiations. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and unequivocally took the side of the Arabs - a decision was made to rearm Egypt and Syria, compensating for all military losses.

War 1967 caused a feeling of frustration among the Palestinians; some of them began to lean towards terrorism. In 1968, there were cases of hijackings of aircraft of the Israeli airline El Al in Algiers and Athens; in response, the Israeli air force bombarded a civilian airfield in Beirut, destroying 13 aircraft there. This was only the beginning, later terror became massive, and the most popular person in the Palestinian refugee camps was the famous terrorist Leila Khaled.

In 1968-1969 A war of attrition was waged on the Suez front. Since the beginning of 1970, Israel began to bomb the suburbs of Cairo, in response, the USSR increased military assistance to Egypt, sending its pilots and missilemen there. After that, both countries - Israel and Syria - were pressured by the US and the USSR, which led to the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement in August 1970.

Long negotiations began with the mediation of the Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jahring. These talks alarmed the Palestinians, who stepped up their terror by hijacking planes from European countries and the United States.

In September 1970, the war broke out in Jordan: King Hussein gave the order to disarm the Palestinian troops. As a result of armed clashes, 30,000 Palestinian fighters were killed, and the remnants of the PLO forces were ousted from Jordanian territory. The consequences of this event were significant.

In Syria, General Jadid was removed as having failed to provide substantial assistance to the Palestinians; He was replaced by Hafez Assad in 1970. Unexpectedly, on September 28, 1970, Egyptian President G.A. dies of a heart attack. Nasser - He was replaced by Vice President Anwar Sadat. Radicalism increased among Palestinian organizations, it was then that the most famous terrorist organizations "Black September", "Hand of the Arab Revolution", etc. were formed. With great difficulty, it was possible to extinguish the conflict between Ya. Jordan Hussein - they signed a formal ceasefire agreement.

The events of sixty years ago around the Suez Canal had a strong influence not only on the balance of power in the Middle East, but also on the entire world politics. The 1950s on a global scale were characterized by a further aggravation of the Cold War between the West and the socialist countries, and in the Middle East and North Africa, not without the influence of the USSR, an unprecedented rise of Arab nationalism took place.

Egypt, the most powerful of the Arab countries, was headed since 1956 by Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the most ambitious Arab politicians of the 20th century. A nationalist and patriot of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, considered one of his most important tasks the nationalization of the Suez Canal, built in 1869 as a Franco-Egyptian project, but then fell under the control of the British. For Britain, as well as for the whole world in general, the Suez Canal was of great strategic importance, since it connected the Mediterranean Sea through the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. If not for the Suez Canal, British ships would have to go to India, skirting the entire African continent.

The idea of nationalizing the Suez Canal was seen by Nasser as an excellent opportunity to rally the Egyptians, and at the same time to strike at the British and French hostile to the Egyptian government. France was dissatisfied with Egypt's open support for the national liberation movement in Algeria, and Great Britain did not want to accept the loss of its influence on the country, which until recently had been a British protectorate.

On July 19, 1956, the United States and Great Britain withdrew their offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam. For Egypt, this was not only an economic blow, but also a great insult. Shortly before the withdrawal of the funding proposal, on June 13, 1956, the withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian territory was completed. Thus, an end was put to the long British political and military presence in that country. The withdrawal of British troops added pluses to the already very high popularity of Gamal Abdel Nasser both in Egypt itself and in the Arab world as a whole. Behind him stuck the glory of a true fighter for the liberation of the Arab countries from Western colonialism. Nasser chose the right time to start nationalizing the canal - British troops had already been withdrawn from the country and could not interfere with his plans, and the British and US refusal to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam needed a serious and impressive response from Egypt.

On July 26, 1956, Nasser made a statement in Alexandria about the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In his speech, he touched on both financial and historical aspects. From an economic point of view, Nasser stressed, nationalization is necessary to ensure the construction of the vital Aswan Dam, and from a historical point of view, it is the restoration of justice, liberation from the traces of British colonialism and a tribute to the memory of those 120,000 Egyptians who died during the construction of the canal in the 19th century. . Nasser's speech caused a real delight in the Arab world. For the first time, the leader of a developing country went directly against the interests of the Western powers.

Naturally, Great Britain and France immediately assessed the actions of Gamal Abdel Nasser as hostile, although Egypt paid compensation to the shareholders of the channel. Of course, the Egyptian president himself also understood that his actions could lead to an escalation of international tension, but did not believe in the possibility of an invasion of Anglo-French and, especially, Israeli troops into Egyptian territory. Moreover, in early October 1956, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that confirmed Egypt's right to control the Suez Canal. But, as it turned out, Nasser was wrong - Great Britain, France and Israel concluded a secret agreement in Sevres on the preparation of a military intervention. Moreover, Israel was attracted to participate in the coalition only later - at the initiative of France, since the UK had very tense relations with Israel, caused by the fact that back in 1947 Israel occupied the territories that London planned to give to Jordan.

It is likely that the initiative of Great Britain, France and Israel would have been crowned with success if not for the position of the United States. Washington was very dissatisfied with the excessive independence of the European powers, which, instead of focusing on confronting the Soviet Union in connection with the events in Hungary, were preparing an adventure against Egypt. In addition, the actions of Great Britain and France in alliance with Israel violated the US plans to create an anti-Soviet coalition of Arab states in the Arab world.

After the invasion of the Anglo-French-Israeli troops into Egypt, even the most hostile to the USSR Arab countries would never have supported the pro-Western coalition. The adventure of London and Paris would turn the entire Arab world against the West and push it into the arms of the socialist camp. However, both Great Britain and France decided to act independently in this situation, without looking back at Washington, since their own accounts for the Egyptian leadership and its policy were too serious.

The military circles of Great Britain and France faced a difficult task - not only to ensure the restoration of control over the Suez Canal by armed means, but also to achieve dominance in the Egyptian airspace, and, most importantly, to organize the overthrow of President Nasser, with whom they agreed, as they considered in London, Paris and Tel Aviv, it was impossible. As part of Operation Musketeer, as the plan for the invasion of Egypt was called, the joint forces were to neutralize strategic targets through massive air strikes on Egyptian territory, and then introduce ground units into the Suez Canal zone.

In this operation, the role of "aggressor" was assigned to Israel. The British leadership proposed that Israeli troops be the first to invade Egypt, occupy the Sinai Peninsula, and then British and French troops, under the guise of a "peacekeeping operation", would undertake the destruction of Egyptian military facilities and establish control over the Suez Canal zone. Israel, which had turned the entire Arab world against itself, did not need the image of an aggressor, so Tel Aviv in return demanded that Britain consolidate its territorial acquisitions in Jordan and Lebanon and recognize Israeli jurisdiction over the Gulf of Aqaba. But in London, the Israeli demands were refused, which, however, did not have a significant impact on the behavior of Tel Aviv - the flywheel of military preparations was already launched.

To divert attention, Israel conducted a raid on the West Bank of the Jordan River, after which all the Arab countries decided that it was there that some aggressive actions from Tel Aviv should be expected. Iraq sent an army division to Jordan in case of possible hostilities against Israel.

The French Navy brought their ships to the Israeli coast, and units of the French ground forces began to land on Israeli airfields. In Israel itself, the mobilization of reservists began, and, as a distraction, it was explained by the need to increase the country's combat readiness in connection with the entry of an Iraqi division into neighboring Jordan. In Egypt, the meaning of Israel's military preparations was not understood and they did not believe in the imminent outbreak of war.

When on October 29, 1956, the Israeli army attacked the positions of the Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula, the Chief of the General Staff of the Egyptian army, General Abdel Hakim Amer, at the head of an entire military delegation, was on an official visit to Jordan and Syria. On the night of October 28, Israel shot down an Egyptian plane returning from Syria, on which, as expected, Amer was supposed to fly. But the general returned to Egypt later, so only 18 senior officers of the Egyptian army were killed on the downed plane. After the start of the Israeli invasion, the US proposed a resolution calling for an end to the aggression against Egypt, but Britain and France, using their rights as members of the UN Security Council, vetoed the US resolution.

The balance of forces on the eve of hostilities was not at all in favor of Egypt. The Israeli army, not to mention the armed forces of France and Great Britain, was much better armed, the level of combat training of personnel differed significantly, but in addition there was a significant numerical superiority. Units with a total number of about 30 thousand Egyptian military personnel were stationed on the Sinai Peninsula, but only 10 thousand of them served in the regular army, the remaining 20 thousand people were paramilitary and militia units that did not have either the proper level of training or weapons. On October 31, British and French air forces began bombarding the Egyptian military infrastructure.

The allies, having begun to strike at the command posts and communication centers of the Egyptian armed forces, instantly disabled the entire control system of the Egyptian army, after which the latter was in a state of chaos. In the shortest possible time, the Egyptian air force was practically paralyzed, which could not lift most of its aircraft into the air. From the sea, the actions of British and French aviation and the Israeli ground forces supported British and French ships. Already on October 31, the Egyptian frigate "Dumyat" ("Damietta") was sunk, and the Egyptian destroyer "Ibrahim el-Aval" was captured in the Haifa area. On November 5, 1956, a British airborne brigade landed in Port Said and quickly established control over it, and French paratroopers captured Port Fuad. On the night of November 6, amphibious assault began on the captured bridgeheads. At the same time, Israeli units captured Sharm el-Sheikh, thereby establishing control over most of the Sinai Peninsula.

The fighting in Egypt caused an instant increase in international tension. In this situation, the Soviet Union was especially active. Nikita Khrushchev began to threaten Britain, France and Israel with military intervention, up to and including nuclear strikes on their military facilities. The United States of America also demanded an end to the aggression, which was also extremely annoyed by the Anglo-French initiative. The UN General Assembly decided to deploy peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone, having secured the quick consent of the Egyptian leadership. Already on November 6, the opponents of the conflict managed to force Britain, France and Israel to conclude a truce with Egypt. The conflict was extinguished, and by December 1956, Great Britain and France withdrew their troops from the captured bridgeheads on Egyptian territory. In March 1957, under US pressure, units of the Israeli army were also withdrawn. On January 1, 1957, a decree was issued annulling the Suez Canal agreement, that is, Nasser's goal was achieved.

"Quick War" caused heavy losses for Egypt. About 3 thousand Egyptian soldiers and about 3 thousand Egyptian civilians were killed, half of the armored vehicles of the Egyptian army were destroyed, despite the fact that the allies lost only five aircraft, about 200 soldiers of the Israeli army and about 320 British and French soldiers who died. Egypt's main "hot spots" were identified in terms of command and control, training of troops and weapons, which forced Nasser to embark on a large-scale modernization of the armed forces with the help of the Soviet Union, which became for a long time the main supplier of military equipment and instructors for the Egyptian army.

As for the significance of the Suez crisis for international politics, it symbolized to a large extent the end of the era of colonialism. The two largest and most powerful colonial powers - Great Britain and France - were actually forced to give up their interests, unable to withstand the pressure of the world community. It turned out that London and Paris can no longer dictate their will to third countries, including such states as Egypt. Moreover, the reckless actions of the European powers brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war, which did not happen only thanks to the political will of the Soviet and American leaders, since both the USSR and the USA then took the most reasonable position.

In addition to Egypt, which, with the support of the USSR and the anti-war position of the United States, managed to achieve its goal and force Great Britain and France to abandon their plans of conquest, Israel also turned out to be the winner in the Suez crisis. He not only checked and showed the Arab world the true combat capability of his army, but also achieved the removal of the blockade from the Gulf of Aqaba and tangibly frightened the neighboring Arab states, emphasizing their readiness for decisive and tough actions.

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Discord Channel: What Triggered the Suez Crisis in October 1956
How one of the most characteristic military-political conflicts of the Cold War era arose and developed / History of the Suez Crisis

October 29 this year marks 59 years since the start of the war, which went down in history in the second half of the 20th century under several names: the Second Arab-Israeli War, the Anglo-French-Israeli War against Egypt, Operation Kadesh, Operation Musketeer and Hundred Hours war. On this topic:

Destroyed Egyptian tank in Sinai

But this little war did not exist on its own, but was part of the events that went down in history under the name "Suez Crisis". And it is no coincidence: after all, it was the Suez Canal, one of the world's most important transport arteries, that was the stumbling block, that small piece of rock that caused a real collapse in world politics.
The hostilities of all parties involved in the Suez Crisis were short-lived: they began on October 29, 1956 and actually ended on November 6, when the armistice agreement was signed. But against this background, the preface to the Hundred Hour War looks all the more protracted: in fact, it all started in 1952, when the organizer of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Free Officers movement, one of the leaders of the July Revolution of 1952, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt .

But the appearance of President Abdel Nasser was only a catalyst for events, not their cause - there were many such reasons. In fact, the foundations of the Suez crisis that erupted in October 1956 can be summarized in five groups. First of all, there were purely internal Egyptian reasons, which, in turn, were more or less tied to the confrontation of Egypt with England and France and its confrontation with America. The fourth group - but perhaps the first in importance! - relations between Egypt and Israel were tense to the limit. And, of course, we should not discount the fifth group of reasons: the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Gamal Abdel Nasser

Egypt takes the lead

The internal Egyptian causes have a common name that has not lost its relevance to this day: nationalism. Despite the fact that in 1922 Egypt, which managed to be a colony of France, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain, received nominal independence, and in 1936 real independence, the degree of influence of the largest European powers on the country's policy remained colossal. Which is not surprising, given the strategic position that Egypt occupied and occupies on the world map.

One of the most important objects on the territory of Egypt was and remains the Suez Canal - the most important transport artery connecting the Old World with Hindustan and the countries of Southeast Asia. It is no coincidence that he became the object of fierce military clashes in both the First and Second World Wars. And just as not by chance, after May 8, 1945, Great Britain continued to keep its troops there. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty in force at the beginning of the 1950s provided that the British military would remain in the canal zone until the end of 1956, and this period could even be extended.

Of course, for a country that by that time had become one of the informal leaders of the anti-colonial movement on the Black Continent and one of the symbols of the liberation movement, the presence of foreign troops on its soil seemed unacceptable. In addition, it was clear that the Suez Canal brings its owners enormous income, which would come in very handy for the newborn Egyptian republic. Finally, the long history of existence as a colony literally pushed the radical political forces of Egypt - and they were the most influential grouping on the political map of the country - to the most decisive action.

British soldiers bathe in the Suez Canal

Paris and London vs. Cairo

The desire of Abdel Nasser himself and the radical political forces that supported him to oust the traditionally most influential players from the Middle East - England and France - from the very beginning doomed the countries to an escalation of tension. The French were the first to show discontent. The new Egyptian government rather frankly provided political patronage and direct support to the rebels in the French colonies - primarily in Algeria, as well as Morocco and Tunisia.

In addition, it was Paris at that time that was one of the most faithful and consistent allies of Tel Aviv, relations with which Cairo deteriorated at a catastrophic rate. Suffice it to say that in 1954, France and Israel signed a secret agreement to supply the Israelis with the latest French weapons. The arrival of this military equipment quickly became known to Egyptian intelligence, which added fuel to the fire of confrontation between Cairo and Paris.

Finally, France and Great Britain were the monopoly owners of the General Suez Canal Maritime Company. The French owned a controlling stake - 53%, the British (after the scandalous scam to buy shares from the Egyptians, turned in 1875 by British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli) - 47%. They were not going to tolerate such a state of affairs in the new revolutionary Cairo.

And in London they understood this very well. And not only did they understand: the British soberly assessed the reasons for the sharp deterioration in the crime situation around the canal and the British contingent associated with it. The increased incidence of attacks by Egyptian radicals on British military units and individual servicemen, the abduction of military and technical specialists - all this was clearly one of the components of the growing pressure from Cairo on London, the ultimate goal of which was to push Britain out of the control of the canal. And when, on July 26, 1956, President Nasser announced that the Egyptian government was starting to nationalize the Suez Canal, war in October of that year became inevitable.

British and French ships and helicopters off Port Said

American recipe: incite and stop

It should be noted that the United States, which played the role of the main peacemaker in the final of the Suez crisis, to a large extent had a hand in its emergence. It can be said that the war in October 1956 in the Sinai Peninsula and its completion became one of those traditional operations for America in the future to create a crisis beneficial to it and receive political and economic dividends on its resolution. In fact, it was the position of America that played the role of a detonator in the development of the situation with the idea of nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt.

Their interest in the new Egypt, which was built by Colonel Nasser, and their desire to take this process under the control of the United States showed as early as 1953, when US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Cairo. The most important purpose of this high visit was the need to convince Egypt to join the Baghdad Pact - an alliance of Great Britain, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Formally, the British initiated the creation of the pact, and the Americans were not even de jure participants in it, but it was Washington that most actively promoted the idea of this union and de facto was a member of all its main committees.

It was to this union, which consisted of a third of NATO member states, that US emissaries tried to persuade Egypt to join. But President Nasser set aside a possible entry into the Baghdad Pact with a number of conditions that were essential for his country. First, he insisted on providing financial assistance to the Egyptians in the construction of the Aswan Dam - a structure that was supposed to allow Egypt to solve the most important energy, climate and agricultural problems at once, strengthening its independence. Secondly, Cairo, which constantly felt insecure next to the growing strength of Tel Aviv, demanded that America supply weapons.

Washington reluctantly agreed with the first condition. Not with the second: relations with a strategic partner - Israel - turned out to be more important for the US than relations with Egypt. The Egyptians also did not have to rely on the purchase of weapons from England and France, and they went the only way that remained free: to the countries of the Warsaw Pact. To say that this move caused outrage in Washington is to say nothing. Entirely drawn into an armed confrontation with the USSR and its allies, the United States could not forgive Cairo for such an act. And as a result, at first they suspended the issuance of loans for the construction of the Aswan Dam, and on July 19 they were completely refused to issue them. And a week later, at a rally in Alexandria, President Abdel Nasser uttered the words that became the immediate reason for the outbreak of war: “Americans, choke with rage! The annual income of the Suez Canal Company is $100 million. Why don't we get the money ourselves?" On the same day, Egyptian troops occupied the canal zone. And three days later, on October 29, Israel went on the attack.

What was Israel afraid of?

However, Israel did not have much of a choice. From the very moment of its creation, the Jewish state in the Middle East caused categorical rejection on the part of Muslim neighbors, and especially Egypt. Cairo was one of the leaders of the Middle East coalition of Arab countries with which Tel Aviv had to wage a war of independence in 1948 - the first in a long line of Arab-Israeli wars. And Cairo, with might and main, supported and directed the activities of the fidai terrorists, who had been causing a lot of problems for the Israelis since 1955.

In addition, despite the repeated demands of England, France and the UN to give Israeli ships the right of passage through the Suez Canal, Egypt has never responded to these calls. In fact, this meant a blockade of Israel's shipping in its coastal waters, which could not but have a negative impact on the economic situation in the country.

Another step by Cairo, which caused a virtual panic in Israel, was the decision to buy weapons from the Eastern Bloc. By this time, Israeli-Soviet relations were in a deep crisis, Tel Aviv was increasingly cooperating with members of the NATO bloc, and such a move by its closest neighbor could not but frighten the Israelis. In addition, it was clear (and soon documented by Mossad intelligence reports) that the Egyptian army from the Warsaw Pact countries would receive the most modern models of military equipment, clearly superior to those that Israel has. And accordingly, after some time, which will take the Egyptian army to master these samples, it will become much stronger than the Israeli one. And this circumstance called into question not only the preservation of Israel's presence in those territories of the Palestinian state that it managed to seize during the 1948 war, but also the very existence of the Jewish state.

English divers pull out weapons made in the USSR

Moscow goes for broke

And these fears of Israel were not in vain. By the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union was already making significant efforts to significantly strengthen its influence, as well as its political and military presence in the Middle East. Having failed in its attempt to bring Israel under its influence, Moscow has switched to more accommodating Muslim countries that are in full swing in the process of decolonization. Firstly, it completely fit into the concept of exporting socialism, which was followed by the Soviet regime. Secondly, the expansion of the number of satellite countries in the Middle East allowed Moscow to maintain parity with America, which was preoccupied with creating its own system of allies in the same region and relied on Israel. Finally, an active presence in the region provided the Soviet Union with a permanent market for the sale of weapons, and hence long-term contracts for their maintenance, as well as a unique testing ground for testing new types of equipment in real combat conditions.

In practice, it looked like this. In 1955, after America, followed by Great Britain and France, refused to supply Egypt with weapons, Cairo turned to Moscow and its allies for help. The Egyptians were met halfway and by the end of the same year, through the mediation of Czechoslovakia (de jure it was she who sold this equipment), a significant amount of weapons and military equipment was sent to North Africa. In total, Egypt received arms worth $250 million. The extensive list included 230 T-34-85 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 100 Su-100 self-propelled guns, about 500 field artillery pieces, 200 fighters, bombers and transport aircraft - primarily modern jet MiG-15bis and Il-28, as well as destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines.

Under such conditions, Tel Aviv had no choice but to prepare for a preemptive strike and look for allies in the West. And the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Egypt and neighboring Muslim countries only accelerated and simplified this process, which inevitably led to the start of a new war.

Hundred Hour War

This war broke out on the evening of October 29, 1956, starting with a daring operation by Israeli paratroopers: almost 400 soldiers of the 890th battalion of the 202nd airborne brigade landed near the Mitla Pass under the command of Rafael Eitan. The very next day, the Israelis entered into a military clash with the Egyptians, and by November 5, Israel managed to capture the entire Sinai Peninsula. On October 31, Anglo-British bombardments began, and on November 6, Allied landings landed in the Suez Canal area without meeting resistance.

Burning fuel plants on the Suez Canal after the bombing

These military operations were preceded by several rounds of top-secret negotiations between Britain, Israel and France, during which the allies worked out detailed plans for a war with Egypt. Its goal was to return Franco-British control of the Suez Canal and change the government in Cairo: Colonel Nasser was to be replaced by a person much more loyal to the West.

But the successful development of the military operation of the British, Israeli and French troops was prevented by the joint efforts of two irreconcilable enemies - the United States and Russia. The Americans acted primarily by diplomatic methods, organizing pressure on the participants in the conflict through the United Nations and its General Assembly. It was during the active phase of the Suez crisis that the UN first voiced and almost immediately implemented the idea of using the Peacekeeping Forces, which already on November 15, 1956 - that is, nine days after the signing of the ceasefire agreement - began to deploy in the Suez Canal zone.

Moscow, in turn, relied on military pressure, realizing that after the suppression of the rebellion in Hungary (in which the UN also tried to intervene, but failed), it cannot count on the success of diplomacy. On November 5, Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitry Shepilov sent a telegram to the Secretary of the UN Security Council, in which, under the threat of providing direct military assistance to Egypt, he demanded a cessation of hostilities within 12 hours and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory within three days. The telegram noted that the USSR was ready to immediately send to the aid of the “victim of aggression” units of the naval and air forces, ground military units, as well as volunteers, instructors and military equipment. On the same day in the evening, special messages were received by the heads of government of England, France and Israel, whom the USSR officially warned of its readiness to crush the aggressor and restore peace in the Middle East by force, including using “rocket technology” and atomic weapons.

The actions of Moscow and Washington had a result. By December 1956, all the British and French military had left the conflict zone, and by March 1957, the Israelis had left the occupied lands in the Sinai. The geopolitical situation in the region has not changed, none of the parties to the conflict has received any new territorial acquisitions, except that Israel has achieved freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran. The political situation has changed dramatically. On the one hand, both the United States and the USSR proved the validity of their claims to political influence in the region, and since then they have been steadily strengthening it. On the other hand, the UN proved its political weight, and the practice of using peacekeeping forces has since become constant.

On the third hand, Egypt and its President Nasser became political heavyweights, which strengthened the anti-colonial tendencies in Africa and the East - and at the same time buried the idea of a peaceful settlement in the regions for a long time. After ten years of constant small-scale clashes between Egypt and Israel, the Six-Day War broke out, which turned into a war of attrition, after another six - the Doomsday War. And this is not to mention the wars for independence that blazed on the Black Continent for another ten years and led to the appearance on its map of several points of constant military-political tension and endless conflicts. However, each of them has its own separate history and its own prerequisites, which are no longer directly related to the causes of the Suez crisis.