While the population of developing countries is exposed to diseases from chronic malnutrition, the population of industrialized developed countries suffers from diseases also related to nutrition, but in a different sense. The population of developed countries is threatened by diseases resulting from overeating and excessive consumption of high-calorie foods. Part of the world's population dies prematurely from the fact that they can never eat enough, and the other part, figuratively speaking, “eats to death.”
In developed countries, the daily ration per capita exceeds 3100 kcal, and in developing countries it does not even reach 2200 kcal. At the same time, for example, in 1969 - 1971. per capita protein consumption in developed countries was 96 g per day, and in developing countries - 58. The calorie content and amount of animal proteins in the daily diet of the population of some areas of the world are shown in Fig. 2. Consumption of high-calorie foods in developed countries, especially foods rich in carbohydrates and saturated fats, with a sedentary lifestyle of a significant part of the population often leads to obesity. The main diseases of the population of developed countries associated with excess nutrition are diabetes, hypertension, and diseases of the cardiovascular system. It is these diseases that lead to deterioration in health and increased mortality among the population of industrialized countries. In other regions of the world, one of the main reasons high level population mortality - famine.
The global food crisis is essentially nothing more than an insufficient supply of food to the population of developing countries. Obviously, developing countries that overcome difficult problems cannot be blamed for being underdeveloped in economically. The main blame for this lies with the industrially developed capitalist states, which until recently built their prosperity to a large extent on the merciless exploitation of the colonies.
When considering the issue of the global food crisis, it is necessary, first of all, to understand what happened in 1972. What reasons caused the food crisis, although not the deepest, but still the most significant in the history of mankind? Natural disasters? Extremely unfavorable weather conditions? Universal economic crisis? Political and economic machinations? Wrong socio-economic policies of the respective states? Or the growth of the earth's population, which has reached its maximum limit? These questions, different in content, could be answered with different content and, to some extent, correct answers, however the search for the roots of these problems, both in essence and in logical and historical terms, should begin with a consideration of the essence of colonialism and the international division of labor in the world capitalist economy.
Developing countries began independent national development in conditions when their economies were focused on achieving one goal - serving the mother country. Therefore, upon gaining independence, they immediately encountered the neocolonialist aspirations of the capitalist world, the merciless laws of the capitalist
market economy, with the predatory policies of multinational corporations, with the deterioration of international exchange relations. The leadership of developing countries simultaneously faced problems of internal food supply, a number of social and other problems. It cannot be argued that other subjective or objective circumstances did not contribute to the difficult situation in developing countries. But one thing is certain - with a detailed and in-depth examination of individual particular phenomena, we invariably return to the colonial legacy as the main reason that determined all the difficulties.
In addition to the main causes, aggravating factors such as unfavorable weather conditions, in particular drought in large areas of Africa, also played a certain role in the emergence of the global food crisis. In a special FAO study on the development of agricultural production in the period 1952-1972. there are no direct indications of a global negative impact of weather conditions. At the same time, the analysis emphasizes that such positive and negative factors affecting agricultural production, such as the expansion of irrigated areas, the involvement of less fertile lands in production, the improvement of equipment and technology for cultivating crops, epidemics of farm animals, natural disasters, vagaries of weather, etc., in the period under review globally balanced each other. The vagaries of weather within 1 - 2 years, in principle, cannot cause sustainable hunger on a global scale.
In the world food problem, 1972 was a turning point. The simultaneous reduction in agricultural production in a number of countries around the world led to a sharp rise in prices and worsening inflation, which had a catastrophic impact on the food situation in the world. Over the previous two decades, there was an absolute decline in global food production for the first time. Cereal production, including wheat and other cereals, as well as rice, fell by 33 million tons compared to the previous year. The loss of this amount of grain caused considerable difficulties, since worldwide grain production is expected to increase annually by about 25 million tons, to meet the food needs of 80 million people making up the world's growing population.
Due to an unexpected reduction in grain production in 1972, a significant food shortage arose, precisely at a time when North American states, and especially the United States, were still pursuing a policy of limiting agricultural production. For the first time in a decade, a number of major grain-producing countries experienced unfavorable weather conditions at the same time. As a result, grain reserves in the most important wheat exporting countries decreased from 49 million tons in 1971 - 1972. up to 29 million . t in 1972 - 1973 The world's rice supplies were almost exhausted. All this was enough to create a catastrophic situation in the world. This is not difficult to understand even without a detailed consideration of the problem of using grain reserves.
Based on materials from the book "The World Food Problem", 1979.
- Source-
Sharkan P. World food problem: Abbr. lane from Hungarian/Scientific Ed. V.V. Miloserdov.- M.: Economics, 1982.- 216 p.
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Causes of the Civil War and military intervention in Russia and their results
The civil war that unfolded in the territory of the former Russian Empire Almost immediately after the October armed uprising in Petrograd, complicated by foreign military intervention, it represented a fierce armed struggle for power between representatives of various social strata and groups of divided Russian society, led by numerous political parties and associations, often standing on opposing platforms.
A feature of the civil war in Russia, the chronological framework of which remains the subject of scientific discussion, was, first of all, the large-scale participation of foreign powers, which had both direct and significant indirect influence on the course of the armed struggle of the opposing forces within the country. The armed support of the Entente countries for the Russian White movement was essential for unleashing and prolonging the bloody events of this tragic period in the history of our Fatherland. The most important reason for foreign intervention in Russia was the inability to find consensus in the positions and programs of diverse political organizations, primarily on the issue of the political structure of the country and the forms of organization of state power.
Of considerable importance in the radicalization of the opposing forces in the country was the violent usurpation of power by the Bolshevik Party during the October armed coup, and then the active resistance of a significant part of the country's population to the policies pursued by the Bolsheviks. The uncompromising struggle of national political organizations had a huge impact on the expansion of the civil war. This struggle led to the actual collapse of the once unified state-political system of the Russian state. The disintegration of state power and administration during the civil war reached an unprecedented level.
One of the first acts of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets was the Decree on Peace, adopted on October 26, 1917. All warring peoples and their governments were asked to immediately begin negotiations on a just democratic peace and conclude a truce for a period of no less than three months. The solution to this problem was entrusted to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was headed by L.D. Trotsky. At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army, General N.N. Dukhonin was instructed to appeal to “the command of the enemy armies with a proposal to immediately suspend hostilities in order to open peace negotiations.”
On November 21, 1917, an agreement on a temporary cessation of hostilities was signed between the command of the Austro-German troops and the Russian Western Front, and on December 2, Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (Bulgaria, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey) concluded an armistice agreement.
The governments of the Entente powers, refusing to recognize the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government Soviet Russia, began to establish connections with those republics that did not support the Bolsheviks. At a conference in Paris on December 9, 1917, representatives of the Entente agreed to establish contacts with the democratic governments of the Caucasus, Siberia, Ukraine and Cossack regions. Great Britain and France signed an agreement called "The terms of the convention agreed upon at Paris on December 23, 1917." It provided for the inclusion of Ukraine, Bessarabia and Crimea in the French zone of action, and the Caucasus and Cossack regions in the English zone. In the Far East, Japan, in order to protect its subjects, on January 1, 1918, brought its warships into the port of Vladivostok. On January 8, US President William Wilson sent a message to Congress (“Wilson’s 14 Points”). It provided for the need to evacuate German troops from Russian territory, recognize the de facto existing governments of Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Ukraine, and convene national assemblies in these republics. The message noted that it was necessary to “provide for Great Russia the possibility of a federal unification with them.”
February 28, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk resumed peace talks. On March 3, the Russian delegation, headed by the Bolshevik G.Ya. Sokolnikov, signed a peace treaty with the Quadruple Alliance. “The congress recognizes it as necessary,” said the resolution of the 7th emergency congress of the Bolshevik Party, “to approve the most difficult, humiliating peace treaty with Germany signed by the Soviet government.” At the IV Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets on March 15, the treaty was ratified by an absolute majority of votes. According to the treaty, Russia had to clear the provinces of Eastern Anatolia, the districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum, Estland, Livonia, the Åland Islands and Ukraine from its troops, demobilize the army, make peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the treaty it had signed with the powers of the Quadruple Alliance.
In Ukraine, the demarcation line was not defined. Germany, taking advantage of this, as well as the agreement with the Ukrainian People's Republic, continued its offensive. In April, German troops, together with Ukrainian units, occupied Crimea, and in early May - Rostov-on-Don.
The heads of government of Great Britain, France and Italy, having discussed the situation in Russia in March 1918 in London, decided to begin an allied intervention with the involvement of Japan and the United States in order to help Eastern Russia. Murmansk Council, which was headed by A.M. Yuriev (Alekseev), fearing a possible offensive by German and Finnish troops, with the consent of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Trotsky, on March 2 signed a “verbal agreement” with the allied missions on joint actions of the British, French and Russians in the defense of the Murmansk region. In accordance with this document, the Allied troops landed in Murmansk at the beginning of March. The British government announced its agreement to support G.M. Semenov. At the beginning of April, Japanese and British landing forces appeared in Vladivostok with the goal of “ensuring the lives and property of foreign nationals.” These actions of the Entente powers became the first steps towards the deployment of military intervention in Russia.
In a fierce armed struggle that lasted five years, the Bolsheviks managed to retain power in their hands. All state formations that arose after the collapse of the Russian Empire were liquidated, with the exception of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. The Bolshevik Party, having proclaimed the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in reality established its own dictatorship. The leadership of the Bolshevik Party decided everything critical issues state, economic, military and cultural life. Having formally proclaimed democracy (proletarian), the Bolsheviks waged an irreconcilable struggle with their ideological opponents, carried out radical nationalization of industry and banks, banned trade, introduced surplus appropriation and labor conscription. All this was accompanied by gross arbitrariness and violence on the ground, which caused discontent and resistance from part of the population, including armed resistance. The Entente countries sided with the opponents of the Bolsheviks, who preached the ideas of world revolution, which was one of the reasons for the prolongation of the war. It was characterized by uncompromisingness and bitterness of the fighting parties. The total amount of damage to Russia amounted to 50 billion gold rubles.
In accordance with the annexes to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and the additional treaty of August 27, 1918, the countries of the Quadruple Alliance had the right to export from Russia raw and cut timber, one quarter of the oil produced in the Baku region, as well as coal from the Donbass. However, Germany and its allies took advantage not only of this right, but also of agreements with other republics. By the fall of 1918, about 2 million pounds of sugar, 9,132 wagons of bread, 22,148 wagons of food, and more than 200 thousand horses and cattle were exported to Austria-Hungary and Germany. From the Far East, the interventionists exported more than three million valuable fur skins, from Georgia - 26 million pounds of manganese, from Azerbaijan - about 30 million pounds of oil, from the Crimea - three million pounds, grain, 120 thousand pounds of flax, 63 thousand pounds of wool, from the North - timber worth more than 1 million pounds sterling, about 2 million pounds of flax, 98 thousand pounds of manganese ore. The human casualties were also great. In total, taking into account those who died from hunger and epidemics, they amounted to more than 13 million people.
Chapter 9. 1914-1917: Food crisisWe know about the food crisis that broke out during the First World War in Russia mainly as about interruptions in the supply of bread in large cities, mainly in the capital, in February 1917. Did similar problems exist before and did they persist later? If little attention is simply paid to the further efforts of the Provisional Government to supply cities with essential products, then works devoted to the emergence and development of the food crisis in Tsarist Russia can be counted on one hand.
The logical result of such a haphazard approach is the idea of sudden interruptions in February 1917 and a complete collapse of supplies and devastation after October revolution as different, unrelated phenomena. Which, of course, leaves wide space for the most extreme, sometimes completely conspiratorial interpretations. The author had occasion to read a number of works where it was proven that the “bread riot” in Petrograd in the winter of 1917 was the result of a conspiracy, the deliberate creation of a shortage in order to cause popular unrest.
In fact, the food crisis, caused by a number of both objective and subjective reasons, manifested itself in the Russian Empire already in the first year of the war. A fundamental study of the food market of this period was left to us by a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party N.D. Kondratiev, who dealt with food supply issues in the Provisional Government. His work “The Bread Market and Its Regulation during War and Revolution” was published in 1922 in a circulation of 2 thousand copies and quickly became a bibliographic rarity. It was republished only in 1991, and today, thanks to the array of data presented by Kondratiev, we can get an impression of the processes that took place in the empire in the period from 1914 to 1917.
The materials of the survey conducted by the “Special Meeting” on food provide a picture of the origin and development of the supply crisis. Thus, according to the results of a survey of local authorities of 659 cities of the empire, conducted on October 1, 1915, 500 cities (75.8%) reported a shortage of food products, 348 (52.8%) reported a shortage of rye and rye flour, and a shortage of wheat. and wheat flour - 334 (50.7%), about a lack of cereals - 322 (48.8%).
The survey materials indicate the total number of cities in the country - 784. Thus, the data from the “Special Meeting” can be considered the most complete snapshot of the problem for the Russian Empire in 1915. They indicate that at least three-quarters of cities are in need of food products in the second year of the war.
A more extensive study, also dating back to October 1915, gives us data for 435 counties in the country. Of these, 361, or 82%, report a shortage of wheat and wheat flour, and 209, or 48% of counties, report a shortage of rye or rye flour.
Thus, we have before us the features of the impending food crisis of 1915-1916, which is all the more dangerous because the survey data falls in the fall - October. From the simplest considerations, it is clear that the maximum amount of grain occurs immediately after harvest - August-September, and the minimum - in the spring and summer of the next year.
Let us consider the process of the emergence of a crisis in dynamics - we will determine the moment of its occurrence and the stages of development. Another survey gives us the results of a survey of cities based on the time of food need.
Regarding rye flour - the basic food product in the Russian Empire - out of 200 cities surveyed, 45, or 22.5%, say that the shortage occurred at the beginning of the war.
14 cities, or 7%, attribute this moment to the end of 1914.
The beginning of 1915 was indicated by 20 cities, or 10% of the total. Then we observe consistently high indicators - in the spring of 1915, problems arose in 41 cities (20.2%), in the summer in 34 (17%), in the fall of 1915 - in 46, or 23% of cities.
Surveys on the shortage of wheat flour give us similar dynamics - 19.8% at the beginning of the war, 8.3% at the end of 1914, 7.9% at the beginning of 1915, 15.8% in the spring, 27.7% in the summer, 22 .5% in the fall of 1915.
Surveys for cereals, oats and barley show similar proportions - the outbreak of war leads to food shortages in about 20 percent of the cities surveyed, as the first hysterical reactions at the beginning of the war they subside, by winter the development of the food crisis also subsides, but by the spring of 1915 there is a sharp surge, steadily increasing further. It is characteristic that we do not see a decrease in dynamics (or we see an extremely slight decrease) by the autumn of 1915 - the time of harvest and the maximum amount of grain in the country.
What do these numbers mean? First of all, they indicate that the food crisis originated in Russia with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and developed in subsequent years. Data from surveys of cities and counties in October 1915 indicate that the crisis spilled over into 1916 and beyond. There is no reason to assume that the February bread crisis in Petrograd was an isolated phenomenon and not a consequence of an ever-developing process.
The unclear correlation between the emergence of need in cities and harvests, or the lack thereof, is interesting. This may not indicate a shortage of grain, but a breakdown in the food distribution system - in this case, the grain market.
Indeed, N.D. Kondratiev notes that grains in the period 1914-1915. there were many in the country. He estimates grain reserves, based on the balance of production and consumption (excluding exports, which practically ceased with the outbreak of the war), as follows (in thousand poods):
1914-1915: + 444,867.0
1915-1916: + 723,669.7
1916-1917: - 30,358.4
1917-1918: - 167,749.9
Thus, there was bread in Russia, there was even more of it than was required, based on the usual consumption standards for the country. The year 1915 turned out to be quite fruitful. The shortage appeared only in 1916 and developed in the 17th and 18th. Of course, a significant portion of the grain was consumed by the mobilized army, but clearly not all of it.
To get more information about the dynamics of the food crisis, let's look at the rise in bread prices over this period. If the average autumn grain prices in European Russia for 1909-1913 are taken as 100 percent, in 1914 we get an increase of 113% for rye and 114% for wheat (data for the Non-Black Earth Region). In 1915, the growth was already 182% for rye and 180% for wheat, in 1916 - 282 and 240 percent, respectively. In 1917 - 1661% and 1826% of prices in 1909-1913.
Prices rose exponentially despite the excesses of 1914 and 1915. We have before us clear evidence of either a speculative rise in prices due to excess product, or a rise in prices under conditions of demand pressure and low supply. This again may indicate the collapse of conventional methods of distribution of goods on the market - for one reason or another. Which we will look at in more detail in the next chapter.
Notes:
N.D. Kondratyev, “The grain market and its regulation during war and revolution.” M.: “Science”, 1991. Pp. 161.
ibid., p. 162.
ibid., p. 161.
ibid., p. 141
ibid., p. 147
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Chapter 10. Causes of the food crisis
The food crisis consisted of a number of factors affecting the country’s economy, both individually and jointly.
First of all, with the outbreak of the First World War, a series of mobilizations took place in Russia, removing many millions of workers from the economy. This had a particularly painful impact on the countryside - the peasants, unlike factory workers, did not have “armor” against being sent to the front.
The scale of this process can be assessed based on the growth in numbers Russian army. If the peacetime army consisted of 1,370,000 people, then in 1914 its number increased to 6,485,000 people, in 1915 - to 11,695,000 people, in 1916 - 14,440,000 people, in 1917 - 15,070,000 people
Supplying such a large army required enormous resources. But at the same time and naturally, the removal of such a large number of workers from the economy could not but affect its productivity.
Secondly, a reduction in cultivated areas has begun in Russia. At least at the first stage, it was not directly related to the mobilization of the male population into the army, as we will see below, and should be considered as a separate factor.
The reduction in cultivated areas occurred both due to the occupation of a number of territories and under the influence of internal factors. They need to be separated. So, N.D. Kondratyev notes that “the occupation was determined in more or less complete form by 1916,” which makes it possible to assess the lands that had withdrawn from circulation. The figures are as follows: the total sown area on average for 1909-1913. - 98,454,049.7 des. The total sown area of the provinces occupied by 1916 is 8,588,467.2 dess. Thus, 8.7% of the total sown areas of the empire came under occupation. The number is large, but not lethal.
Another process occurred under the influence of internal political and economic factors. If we take the total sown area (minus the occupied territories) in 1909-1913 as 100%, the dynamics of the sown area in subsequent years will appear to us in the following form:
1914 - 106,0%
1915 - 101,9%
1916 - 93,7%
1917 - 93,3%
“The overall reduction in cultivated area under the influence of political and economic factors is insignificant and by 1917 amounts to only 6.7%,” states the author of the study.
Thus, a reduction in acreage in itself could not yet cause a food crisis. What was the source of the food shortage that arose from 1914 and rapidly developed thereafter?
A look at the reduction of sown areas depending on the type of farms - peasant and privately owned - clarifies the issue a little. The difference between them is that the first were aimed primarily at feeding themselves (within the economy and community), sending only unclaimed surplus to the market. Their closest analogue is a simple family running its own household. The latter were built on the principles of a capitalist enterprise, which, using hired labor, aimed at making a profit from the sale of crops. It does not have to look like a modern American farm - it can be a landowner's latifundia, using peasant labor, or a wealthy peasant household, which has purchased additional land and cultivates it with the help of hired workers. In any case, the harvest from this “surplus” land is intended exclusively for sale - it is simply excessive for the farm, and it is impossible to cultivate these lands themselves with the help of the farm alone.
In Russia as a whole, without taking into account the occupied territories and Turkestan, the dynamics of sown areas by farm type will look as follows: peasant farms in 1914 provide 107.1% of the average for 1909-13, and privately owned farms - 103.3%. By 1915, peasant farms showed an increase in sown areas - 121.2 percent, and privately owned farms - a reduction to 50.3%.
A similar picture remains for almost every part of the country, taken separately - for the black soil zone, for the Non-Black Earth Region, for the Caucasus. And only in Siberia do private farms not reduce their acreage.
"IN highest degree It is important to further emphasize, writes Kondratiev, that the reduction in cultivated area is especially rapid in privately owned farms. And the relative stability of the sown area noted above during the first two years of the war is attributed exclusively to peasant farms.”
That is, the peasants, having lost their hands, but having a good idea of what war is, are tightening their belts and expanding their crops - through the efforts of the whole family, women, children and the elderly. And capitalist farms, having also lost their workers (mobilization also affected the labor market), are cutting them off. In these farms there is no one to tighten their belts; they are simply not adapted to work in such conditions.
But the main problem was (and therefore Kondratiev especially draws attention to the situation that arose) that the marketability of grain from privately owned farms was disproportionately higher than that of the peasants. By 1913, landowners and wealthy farms provided up to 75% of all marketable (going to the market) grain in the country.
The reduction of acreage by these farms resulted in a significant reduction in the supply of grain to the market. Peasant farms to a very large extent fed only themselves.
By the way, an interesting topic for reflection could be the question of what would have happened to Russia if Stolypin’s agrarian reform had succeeded before the war.
Finally, the third factor that had a serious impact on the formation of the food crisis was the transport problem.
In Russia, there has historically been a division of regions into producing and consuming, or, in other terminology, into areas of surplus and areas of deficiency. Thus, the Tauride province, Kuban region, Kherson province, Don region, Samara, Ekaterinoslav provinces, Terek region, Stavropol province and others were surplus in grain.
Insufficient were Petrograd, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Vladimir, Tver provinces, Eastern Siberia, Kostroma, Astrakhan, Kaluga, Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl provinces and others.
Thus, roughly speaking, the most important areas of surplus lay in the southeast of European Russia, areas of deficiency - in the northwest. According to this geography, markets - productive and consumer - were formed in the country, and trade routes were built that distributed the flow of grain cargo.
The main means of transport serving the food market in Russia was railway. Water transport, playing only an auxiliary role, could not compete with railway transport either due to development or due to geographical localization.
With the outbreak of the First World War, it was precisely the share railway transport accounted for the vast majority of transportation - both huge masses of people for mobilization, and titanic volumes of food, ammunition, and uniforms to supply them. Water transport could not help in the western direction due to natural geographical reasons - water arteries connecting the east and west of Russia simply do not exist.
With the beginning of mobilization, the railways of the western region - almost 33% of the entire railway network - were allocated to the Military Field Directorate almost exclusively for military needs. For the same needs, a significant part of the rolling stock was transferred to the western region. The administration of the railways was thus divided between military and civil authorities.
Never and nowhere has multi-power brought any good. Not only did the eastern region bear the entire burden of supplying the western mobilized region. Rolling stock stopped returning from the western region. Perhaps he was much more necessary in the front line - even for sure. But these kinds of issues required a single decision-making center, with a sober assessment of all the pros and cons. In our case, by the summer of 1915, the debt of the western region to the eastern region reached 34,900 cars.
One of the most important reasons for the food crisis is revealed to us - the railways, providing huge scale military supplies and experiencing an acute shortage of rolling stock, could not cope with the needs of civilian traffic.
In reality, due to confusion, the lack of unified leadership, changes in the entire traffic schedule and the mobilization of part of the rolling stock, transportation in the country as a whole fell. If we take the average number of transportations for 1911-1913 as 100 percent, then already in the second half of 1914 their volume amounted to 88.5% of the pre-war level, and special grain transportations - only 60.5%
"Such significant demands of war on railways, - states Kondratyev, - led to the fact that the main railway arteries of the country, connecting the main areas of surplus food products with consuming centers within the country, turned out to be by the end of the first year of the war either completely inaccessible for private commercial cargo... or this access was extremely difficult."
The food market in Russia has collapsed. This is the reason for the shortage of food products from the first year of the war with a surplus of grain, this is the reason for the avalanche-like rise in prices. Here lies one of the reasons for the reduction in acreage - if there is no market, there is no point in growing.
Similar problems arose in industry - the private and, by and large, general supply of raw materials and fuel collapsed. If defense factories in this situation still had a chance to stay afloat (it disappeared in 1916, as discussed below), then for other enterprises without a general militarization of the economy, the prospects looked extremely bleak.
At the same time, behind one big problem there was hidden an equally, if not larger, one. Trying to somehow compensate for the shortage of wagons and locomotives, as well as all the falling freight traffic, railway workers significantly increased the use of available rolling stock above the standards.
As often happens during operation complex systems, in critical circumstances, there is a great temptation to put them in excess of standard operating modes, squeeze them to the maximum, accelerate them to the limit, achieving temporary compensation for the losses that have arisen. But the system, having reached a certain threshold of capabilities, inevitably and irrevocably goes wrong.
Something similar happened with railway transport in the Russian Empire. “The average daily mileage of an available freight car and locomotive is increasing... The number of loaded and accepted cars and their total mileage are increasing..,” writes Kondratiev. “The increase in work continues until the fifth half of the war, until June-December 1916, when the turning point to deterioration."
Notes:
N.D. Kondratyev, “The grain market and its regulation during war and revolution.” M.: “Science”, 1991. Pp. 158
ibid., p. 121
ibid., p. 121
ibid., p. 122
TSB, article "Agriculture"
N.D. Kondratyev, “The grain market and its regulation during war and revolution.” M.: “Science”, 1991. Pp. 96
ibid., p. 136
ibid., p. 137
ibid., p. 136
ibid., p. 137
ibid., p. 138
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In November 1917 Lenin demanded the establishment of workers' control over factories. As a sign of protest, entrepreneurs began to close their businesses. The authorities responded harshly to this: the expropriation of private plants and factories began. Soon this process became widespread and mandatory.
By mid-1918 All large enterprises passed into the hands of the state the most important industries industry. Railways, river and sea transport, and foreign trade were nationalized. Almost the entire economy of the country became state-owned. It began to be managed by a new economic body - the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh).
Private banks were liquidated. There is only one bank left in the country - the People's Bank, subordinate to the state.
In the spring of 1918 The situation with bread worsened sharply. The main reason is that the peasants did not want to sell grain to the state at low prices. Another reason is the peace treaty with Germany, according to which the rich grain-producing regions of the country were torn away from Russia.
The food crisis threatened to develop into a political crisis, which could undermine the authority of the Bolsheviks. And the authorities began to take decisive action. It was decided to take grain from the peasants by force. The authorities established a standard for bread consumption, and all “surpluses” were subject to forcible confiscation. And those who hid the bread were declared enemies of the people. A food dictatorship has been established in the country. But the Bolsheviks feared that these harsh measures could turn against them. Therefore, they relied on splitting the village, pitting the poor against the rest of the peasants.
10. Causes of the food crisis
The food crisis consisted of a number of factors affecting the country’s economy, both individually and jointly.
First of all, with the outbreak of the First World War, a series of mobilizations took place in Russia, removing many millions of workers from the economy. This had a particularly painful impact on the countryside - the peasants, unlike factory workers, did not have “armor” against being sent to the front.
The scale of this process can be assessed based on the growth in the size of the Russian army. If the peacetime army consisted of 1,370,000 people, then in 1914 its number increased to 6,485,000 people, in 1915 - to 11,695,000 people, in 1916 - 14,440,000 people, in 1917 - 15,070,000 people
Supplying such a large army required enormous resources. But at the same time and naturally, the removal of such a large number of workers from the economy could not but affect its productivity.
Secondly, a reduction in cultivated areas has begun in Russia. At least at the first stage, it was not directly related to the mobilization of the male population into the army, as we will see below, and should be considered as a separate factor.
The reduction in cultivated areas occurred both due to the occupation of a number of territories and under the influence of internal factors. They need to be separated. So, N.D. Kondratyev notes that “the occupation was determined in more or less complete form by 1916,” which makes it possible to assess the lands that had withdrawn from circulation. The figures are as follows: the total sown area on average for 1909-1913. – 98,454,049.7 des. The total sown area of the provinces occupied by 1916 is 8,588,467.2 dess. Thus, 8.7% of the total sown areas of the empire came under occupation. The number is large, but not lethal.
Another process occurred under the influence of internal political and economic factors. If we take the total sown area (minus the occupied territories) in 1909-1913 as 100%, the dynamics of the sown area in subsequent years will appear to us in the following form:
“The overall reduction in cultivated area under the influence of political and economic factors is insignificant and by 1917 amounts to only 6.7%,” states the author of the study.
Thus, a reduction in acreage in itself could not yet cause a food crisis. What was the source of the food shortage that arose from 1914 and rapidly developed thereafter?
A look at the reduction of sown areas depending on the type of farms - peasant and privately owned - clarifies the issue a little. The difference between them is that the first were aimed primarily at feeding themselves (within the economy and community), sending only unclaimed surplus to the market. Their closest analogue is a simple family running its own household. The latter were built on the principles of a capitalist enterprise, which, using hired labor, aimed at making a profit from the sale of crops. It does not have to look like a modern American farm - it can be a landowner's latifundia, using peasant labor, or a wealthy peasant household, which has purchased additional land and cultivates it with the help of hired workers. In any case, the harvest from this “surplus” land is intended exclusively for sale - it is simply excessive for the farm, and it is impossible to cultivate these lands themselves with the help of the farm alone.
In Russia as a whole, without taking into account the occupied territories and Turkestan, the dynamics of sown areas by farm type will look as follows: peasant farms in 1914 provide 107.1% of the average for 1909-13, and privately owned farms - 103.3%. By 1915, peasant farms showed an increase in sown areas - 121.2 percent, and privately owned farms - a reduction to 50.3%.
A similar picture remains for almost every part of the country, taken separately - for the black soil zone, for the Non-Black Earth Region, for the Caucasus. And only in Siberia do private farms not reduce their acreage.
“It is extremely important to further emphasize,” writes Kondratyev, “that the reduction in cultivated area is especially rapid on privately owned farms. And the relative stability of the sown area noted above during the first two years of the war is attributed exclusively to peasant farms.”
That is, the peasants, having lost their hands, but having a good idea of what war is, are tightening their belts and expanding their crops - through the efforts of the whole family, women, children and the elderly. And capitalist farms, having also lost their workers (mobilization also affected the labor market), are cutting them off. In these farms there is no one to tighten their belts; they are simply not adapted to work in such conditions.
But the main problem was (and therefore Kondratiev especially draws attention to the situation that arose) that the marketability of grain on privately owned farms was disproportionately higher than that of the peasants. By 1913, landowners and wealthy farms provided up to 75% of all marketable (going to the market) grain in the country.
The reduction of acreage by these farms resulted in a significant reduction in the supply of grain to the market. Peasant farms to a very large extent fed only themselves.
By the way, an interesting topic for reflection could be the question of what would have happened to Russia if Stolypin’s agrarian reform had succeeded before the war.
Finally, the third factor that had a serious impact on the formation of the food crisis was the transport problem.
In Russia, there has historically been a division of regions into producing and consuming, or, in other terminology, into areas of surplus and areas of deficiency. Thus, the Tauride province, Kuban region, Kherson province, Don region, Samara, Ekaterinoslav provinces, Terek region, Stavropol province and others were surplus in grain.
Insufficient were Petrograd, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Vladimir, Tver provinces, Eastern Siberia, Kostroma, Astrakhan, Kaluga, Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl provinces and others.
Thus, roughly speaking, the most important areas of surplus lay in the southeast of European Russia, areas of deficiency - in the northwest. According to this geography, markets - productive and consumer - were formed in the country, and trade routes were built that distributed the flow of grain cargo.
The main means of transport serving the food market in Russia was railway. Water transport, playing only an auxiliary role, could not compete with railway transport either due to development or due to geographical localization.
With the outbreak of the First World War, it was railway transport that accounted for the vast majority of transportation - both huge masses of people for mobilization, and titanic volumes of food, ammunition, and uniforms to supply them. Water transport could not help in the western direction due to natural geographical reasons - water arteries connecting the east and west of Russia simply do not exist.
With the beginning of mobilization, the railways of the western region - almost 33% of the entire railway network - were allocated to the Military Field Directorate almost exclusively for military needs. For the same needs, a significant part of the rolling stock was transferred to the western region. The administration of the railways was thus divided between military and civil authorities.
Never and nowhere has multi-power brought any good. Not only did the eastern region bear the entire burden of supplying the western mobilized region. Rolling stock stopped returning from the western region. Perhaps he was much more necessary in the front line - even for sure. But these kinds of issues required a single decision-making center, with a sober assessment of all the pros and cons. In our case, by the summer of 1915, the debt of the western region to the eastern region reached 34,900 cars.
One of the most important reasons for the food crisis is revealed to us - the railways, providing huge scale military supplies and experiencing an acute shortage of rolling stock, could not cope with the needs of civilian traffic.
In reality, due to confusion, the lack of unified leadership, changes in the entire traffic schedule and the mobilization of part of the rolling stock, transportation in the country as a whole fell. If we take the average number of transportations for 1911-1913 as 100 percent, then already in the second half of 1914 their volume amounted to 88.5% of the pre-war level, and special grain transportations - only 60.5%
“Such significant demands of the war on the railways,” states Kondratyev, “led to the fact that the main railway arteries of the country, connecting the main areas of surplus food products with consuming centers within the country, turned out to be by the end of the first year of the war or completely inaccessible for private commercial cargo .., or this access was extremely difficult."
The food market in Russia has collapsed. This is the reason for the shortage of food products from the first year of the war with a surplus of grain, this is the reason for the avalanche-like rise in prices. Here lies one of the reasons for the reduction in acreage - if there is no market, there is no point in growing.
Similar problems arose in industry - the private and, by and large, general supply of raw materials and fuel collapsed. If defense factories in this situation still had a chance to stay afloat (it disappeared in 1916, as discussed below), then for other enterprises without a general militarization of the economy, the prospects looked extremely bleak.
At the same time, behind one big problem there was hidden an equally, if not larger, one. Trying to somehow compensate for the shortage of wagons and locomotives, as well as all the falling freight traffic, railway workers significantly increased the use of available rolling stock above the standards.
As often happens when operating complex systems, in critical circumstances there is a great temptation to put them in excess of standard operating modes, push them to the maximum, accelerate them to the limit, achieving temporary compensation for the losses that have arisen. But the system, having reached a certain threshold of capabilities, inevitably and irrevocably goes wrong.
Something similar happened with railway transport in the Russian Empire. “The average daily mileage of an available freight car and locomotive is increasing... The number of loaded and accepted cars and their total mileage are increasing..,” writes Kondratiev. “The increase in work continues until the fifth half of the war, until June-December 1916, when the turning point to deterioration."
Notes:
N.D. Kondratyev, “The grain market and its regulation during war and revolution.” M.: “Science”, 1991. Pp. 158
Ibid., page 121
Ibid., page 121
Ibid., page 122
TSB, article "Agriculture"
N.D. Kondratyev, “The grain market and its regulation during war and revolution.” M.: “Science”, 1991. Pp. 96
Ibid., page 136
Ibid., page 137
Ibid., page 136
Ibid., page 137
Ibid., page 138
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