Reasons for the US invasion of Iraq. Chronicle of the US military operation, losses in Iraq. Iraq War

The war in Iraq became one of the largest armed conflicts of the early 21st century. At the same time, the prerequisites and vicissitudes of this war in many respects still remain a mystery. Let's try to unwind the tangle of those events. So, let's find out what the reason for the US invasion of Iraq was and how this military operation took place.

Background

First, let's delve a little into the background of this conflict.

Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq in 1979, although he actually concentrated the threads of governing the country in his hands long before that. His powers were equal to those of a dictator. No important question in the country could not be decided without the consent of the president. Hussein used repression and torture against the opposition and periodically rebelling Kurds, which he even publicly admitted to. In addition, Hussein's personality cult began to develop in Iraq.

Already in 1980, the Iraqi army launched an invasion of the Iranian province of Khuzestan, thus unleashing. It is noteworthy that in this war both the USA and the USSR supported Hussein. But in the end, the war ended in nothing in 1988, since, according to the terms of the peace treaty, both countries maintained the status quo.

Saddam Hussein started a new adventure in 1990, when he occupied Kuwait and annexed it to Iraq as a province. This time, both the USA and the USSR condemned the actions of the Iraqi president. Moreover, the United States, with the support of the UN, formed an international military coalition that opposed Hussein. Thus began the first War in Iraq, or, as it is otherwise called, the Coalition from the first days of the confrontation had a significant advantage due to the fact that it used modern aviation.

It was a brilliant Allied operation led by the United States. Coalition casualties in Iraq amounted to less than 500 people, while the death toll among Iraqi forces reached several tens of thousands. As a result, Hussein was defeated and was forced to liberate Kuwait and significantly reduce the army. In addition, a number of other sanctions were imposed on the country, which were supposed to weaken the Iraqi armed forces.

Almost throughout the 90s of the 20th century, the hidden confrontation between Iraq and the United States grew. The Americans constantly accused Hussein of using repression against the opposition, as well as possessing prohibited weapons. The situation became especially aggravated after Hussein expelled UN observers in 1998, who were supposed to ensure that Iraq did not acquire weapons of mass destruction. The world was on the verge of a new war.

Background and causes of the war

Now let's take a closer look at what was the reason for the US invasion of Iraq.

The main reason for the American invasion of Iraq was the US desire to ensure its dominance in the region. However, it is quite likely that the ruling circles feared that Hussein was actually developing something that could also be directed against the United States, although they had no real evidence of this. However, some experts on the list possible reasons The beginning of the US operation against Iraq is also called the personal hatred of American President George W. Bush towards Saddam Hussein.

The formal reason for the invasion was the evidence demonstrated in February 2003 by the US Secretary of State at the UN Security Council that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out later, most of the evidence presented was falsified.

Attracting Allies

The United States failed to obtain permission from the Security Council to use force in Iraq. Nevertheless, the American ruling circles ignored this and began to prepare for the invasion.

They also asked their NATO allies for help. But France and Germany refused to support the American invasion of Iraq without UN sanctions. But Great Britain, Poland and Australia expressed their readiness to support the United States with military force.

After the overthrow of the Hussein regime, other countries joined the coalition: Italy, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Spain, Georgia. Türkiye took part in the conflict as a separate force in 2007-2008.

The total number of troops of the international coalition contingent was about 309 thousand people, of which 250 thousand were US military personnel.

Beginning of the invasion

The US military operation in Iraq began on March 20, 2003. Unlike Desert Storm, this time the coalition conducted a large-scale ground operation. Even Turkey's refusal to provide its territory for the offensive did not prevent this. The US invaded Iraq from Kuwait. Already in April, coalition troops occupied Baghdad without a fight. Iraqi aviation was not actually used to repel the enemy attack. The active phase of the offensive was completed after the capture of the city of Tikrit in the middle of the same month.

Thus, by the end of the offensive operation, the main key population centers in Iraq were controlled by the US-led coalition. Losses in Iraq of allied forces during this period amounted to 172 soldiers killed and 1,621 wounded. The Iraqis lost almost 10 thousand people killed during the Allied offensive operation. The casualties among civilians were slightly lower.

At the first stage of the war, US troops in Iraq won a landslide victory. However, it was necessary not only to seize territory, but also to be able to hold it until a government loyal to the Americans was formed in Iraq, which could keep the situation in the country under control.

Further course of hostilities

After the defeat of government troops, a partisan movement began to organize in the country. It united not only military men loyal to Hussein, but also representatives of various Islamist groups, including those close to al-Qaeda. Partisan detachments were most densely concentrated in the so-called “Sunni triangle,” which was located northwest of the Iraqi capital.

Partisan detachments destroyed infrastructure, carried out terrorist attacks, and attacked individual units of the coalition led by the United States. Losses in Iraq of allied forces increased during this period. The bulk of the dead and wounded were soldiers who were blown up by improvised explosive devices.

Meanwhile, at the end of 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured in one of the villages in Iraq. He was put on trial, following which the former dictator was publicly executed in 2006.

Civil War

Meanwhile, elections were finally held in Iraq in 2005. After they were carried out, the Shiites came to power. This caused an increase in protests among the Sunni population of the country, which soon developed into a phenomenon that can be called civil war.

In addition, various crimes committed by individual US military personnel or even entire units of the US Army added fuel to the fire. Losses in Iraq, both among the military and among the civilian population, grew more and more, and the civil war flared up with renewed vigor.

This caused displeasure not only in Iraq, but also within American society. Many US citizens began to compare the protracted Iraq operation with the Increasing losses of the US Army in Iraq led to the fact that the Republicans failed in the congressional elections, losing their majority in both houses.

Strengthening of Islamist organizations

Meanwhile, if initially the resistance in Iraq to the occupying forces of the coalition was of a more or less neutral religious nature, then by 2008 it was led by partisan movement became various Islamist organizations, often of a terrorist nature.

Immediately after the invasion of Iraq by American troops, the activities of the terrorist organization “Monotheism and Jihad” under the leadership of al-Zarqawi were transferred to the territory of this country. After a certain time, most of the other Islamist paramilitary organizations in Iraq united around this cell. In 2004, the leader of Monotheism and Jihad swore an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and the organization itself was renamed Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

In 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike. But before his death, he further united the Islamist groups in Iraq. On the initiative of al-Zarqawi, the Consultative Assembly of the Mujahideen in Iraq was created, in addition to “Monotheism and Jihad,” which included a number of other organizations. After the death of al-Zarqawi, in the same 2006, it was reorganized into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Moreover, this was done without the consent of the central leadership of al-Qaeda. It was this organization that in the future, after spreading its influence to part of Syria, degenerated into ISIS, and then into

As mentioned above, during the presence of the American occupation contingent in Iraq, the Islamists acquired their greatest strength in 2008. They controlled Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, and their capital was Ba'qubah.

Completion of the American operation in Iraq

Considerable US losses in Iraq over the 10 years during which the war continued, as well as the relative stabilization of the situation in the country, made us think about the possibility of withdrawing the international contingent from the territory of the state.

In 2010, the new US President Barack Obama signed a decree on the withdrawal of the main American forces from Iraq. Thus, 200 thousand people were withdrawn that year. The remaining 50 thousand military personnel were supposed to help the troops of the new Iraqi government control the situation in the country. But they also remained in Iraq for a relatively short time. In December 2011, the remaining 50 thousand soldiers were withdrawn from the country. There are only 200 military consultants left in Iraq who represented the United States.

American Army casualties

Now let's find out how much American troops lost in manpower and military equipment during the operation in Iraq, which lasted almost a decade.

The international coalition forces lost a total of 4,804 people killed, of which 4,423 were from the US Army. In addition, 31,942 Americans were injured of varying degrees of severity. These statistics take into account both combat and non-combat losses.

For comparison: during the war, Saddam Hussein's regular army lost tens of thousands of soldiers killed. It is generally impossible to count the losses of various partisan, terrorist and other organizations that fought against the coalition.

Now let's calculate the losses of US equipment in Iraq. During the war, the Americans lost 80 Abrams tanks. US air losses in Iraq were also significant. 20 American planes were shot down. The most damaged vehicles were the F-16 and F/A-18. In addition, 86 American helicopters were shot down.

The situation after the withdrawal of American troops

After the withdrawal of American troops in Iraq, the situation worsened sharply. Many extremist and terrorist organizations have raised their heads. The most influential of them was the ISIS group, which then changed its name to the “Islamic State”, claiming supremacy throughout the Muslim world. It brought significant territories in Iraq under its control, and after that it extended its influence to this state.

The activity of ISIS has caused concern in many countries around the world. A new coalition led by the United States was created against this organization. Russia has also joined the fight against terrorists, although it is acting independently. The peculiarity of this operation is that the allies are only conducting air strikes in Syria and Iraq, but are not resorting to ground intervention. Thanks to the actions of the allies, the territory controlled by Islamic State militants has been significantly reduced, but the organization continues to pose a serious threat to the world.

At the same time, there are many other opposing forces, the contradictions between which do not allow peace to come to Iraq: Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, etc. Thus, American troops have failed to ensure stable peace in the region. They left without completing one of the main tasks.

Significance and Consequences of the American Invasion in Iraq

There are many conflicting opinions about the justification of the coalition forces' invasion of Iraq. But most experts agree that since the start of the war in Iraq, the region has become much more unstable, and there are no prerequisites for stabilizing the situation. Moreover, many prominent political figures who were involved in the decision to invade Iraq have already said that the war with Hussein was a mistake. In particular, the head of the independent investigative commission, former British Deputy Internal Affairs Officer John Chilcot, said this.

Of course, Saddam Hussein was a typical dictator who suppressed the opposition and used repression. He also repeatedly carried out aggressive military actions against other countries. Nevertheless, most experts came to the conclusion that Hussein’s weapons at the beginning of the 21st century no longer allowed him to carry out large-scale military operations, as evidenced by the relatively rapid defeat of the regular Iraqi army by coalition forces.

And many experts recognize the Hussein regime as the lesser of evils, in comparison with the chaos that began to reign in the region after his overthrow, and with the ever-increasing danger from the Islamic State.

Devon Largio, an employee of the University of Illinois, analyzed statements made by 10 key US leaders responsible for making the decision to start the war in Iraq, and identified 21 reasons why this war was started.

Largio took into account speeches made between September 2001 and October 2002 from George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Democratic leader in the US Senate Tom Dashle (now retired from politics), and influential senators Joseph Lieberman ( Democrat) and John McCainJohn McCain (Republican), Richard PerleRichard Perle (at that time the head of the Defense Policy Review Board, one of the most famous neoconservatives and the “gray eminence” of US foreign policy), Secretary of State Colin Powell (now not a member of civil service), US Presidential National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (now head of the State Department), Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz (now head of the World Bank).

Reason: To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. According to Largio, it was voiced by: Bush, Cheney, Daschle, Lieberman, McCain, Pearl, Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.

The stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stored in Iraq before the 1991 war would have been enough to destroy the entire population of the Earth several times over. Before the 2003 war, it was assumed that Iraq’s arsenals could contain up to 26 thousand liters of anthrax pathogens, up to 38 thousand liters of botulinum toxin, several hundred tons of chemical weapons, as well as the raw materials necessary for their production. It was believed that Iraq could retain the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction - hundreds of bombs, thousands of artillery shells and missiles, several Scud ballistic missiles - and was also able to convert old combat aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering biological or chemical weapons.

It has now been established that Iraq has stopped developing programs to create nuclear weapons after 1991 and at the same time destroyed its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Although Saddam Hussein hoped to rebuild Iraq's WMD arsenals, he did not have a specific strategy in this direction. Iraq maintained an infrastructure that could allow it to quickly create chemical and biological weapons.

Reason: The need to change the ruling regime. The same people were talking about her.

Saddam Hussein was constantly included in the informal “hit parades” of the most brutal dictators of our time. He started two wars. The Iran-Iraq War claimed the lives of 100 thousand Iraqis. and 250 thousand Iranians. The Iraqi army's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Operation Desert Storm led to the death of 50 thousand Iraqis. Hussein also destroyed 20-30 thousand Kurdish and Shiite rebels, including using chemical weapons against civilians. There were no civil liberties in Iraq. Hussein destroyed political opponents, and torture was widely used in Iraqi prisons.

Reason: To combat international terrorism. The same, except for Daschle.

Iraq has provided training facilities and political support to numerous terrorist groups, including the Mujahideen Khalq, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization. Iraq also provided political asylum to terrorists.

Reason: Iraq has violated numerous UN resolutions. The same, except for Daschle.

Over two decades, Iraq has failed to comply with 16 UN Security Council resolutions. On November 8, 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution N1441, which states that Iraq must disarm under threat of "serious consequences." This resolution was a continuation of Resolution N687, adopted in 1991, which committed Iraq to full and complete disclosure of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 km. In 1998, the UN Security Council issued a special Resolution N1205, which condemned Iraq for violating Resolution N687 and other similar Security Council resolutions. However, Iraq is far from the only country in the world that does not comply or does not fully comply with the decisions of the Security Council.

Reason: Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator guilty of killing civilians. The reason was voiced by: Bush, Cheney, McCain, Pearl, Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.

Reason: Because UN inspectors responsible for searching for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction encountered Iraqi opposition and were unable to complete their tasks. Authors of the argument: Bush, Lieberman, McCain, Powell, Rice and Rumsfeld.

UN inspectors operated in Iraq for seven years - from May 1991 to August 1998, when Iraq refused to conduct further inspections. The Iraqi authorities have repeatedly resisted the inspectors. Nevertheless, the inspectors' "hunting trophies" were quite substantial. Long-range missiles and launchers and stockpiles of chemical weapons were destroyed. It took UN inspectors four years to discover Iraq's biological weapons program. Until September 2002, all attempts to return inspectors to the country encountered resistance from the Iraqi leadership, which insisted that the international community must first end the regime of economic sanctions against Iraq. Subsequently, in September 2002, UN inspectors returned to Iraq, but did not find Iraqi WMD.

Reason: Liberation of Iraq. This was stated by Bush, McCain, Pearl, Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz.

Reason: Saddam Hussein's connections to Al Qaeda. The argument was made in speeches by Bush, Cheney, Lieberman, Pearl, Rice and Rumsfeld.

American intelligence reported that the “connector” between Bin Laden and Hussein is a certain Abu Musab Zarqawi, who allegedly underwent treatment in Baghdad in 2002. However, it later turned out that Zarqawi supported one of the extremist movements in Iraqi Kurdistan, which operated outside the control of Saddam Hussein. It was also reported that one of the terrorists who participated in the September 11, 2001 attacks met with an Iraqi intelligence official. A US Congressional commission that investigated the causes of these terrorist attacks found no evidence of this claim.

Reason: Iraq poses a threat to the United States. This was stated by Bush, Pearl, Powell, Rusmfeld and Wolfowitz.

In October 2002, the US Senate and Congress authorized President George W. Bush to use military force against Iraq. The US administration argued that Iraq posed an immediate threat to the US, and therefore the United States had the right to launch a preemptive strike.

In early 2002, the US National Intelligence Council concluded that Iraq would not be able to effectively threaten the US for at least a decade. During the international sanctions regime, Iraq will not be able to test long-range missiles until 2015. However, provided that this regime is relaxed, Iraq will have access to modern technologies, it will be able to quickly improve its missile arsenals and, possibly, create missiles capable of striking the United States. It has now been established that most of Iraq's long-range missiles were destroyed after 1991. However, Iraq tried to develop its missile program, which became especially intensified after the expulsion of UN inspectors (1998). Saddam Hussein intended to create ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction warheads.

Reason: The need to disarm Iraq. Bush, Pearl, Powell, Rusmfeld and Rice.

Reason: To complete what was not done during the 1991 war (then the troops of the anti-Iraqi coalition led by the United States defeated the Iraqi troops that captured Kuwait, but did not enter Iraqi territory). Authors: Lieberman, McCain, Pearl, Powell.

Reason: Saddam Hussein poses a threat to the security of the region. The version was proposed by Bush, Cheney, McCain, Powell and Rumsfeld.

Over the past decades, Iraq has taken part in five wars (three with Israel, one with Iran, one in Kuwait), and has been involved in a huge number of border armed incidents (in particular, with Syria and Turkey). Saddam Hussein's regime carried out large-scale military operations to suppress the uprisings of national and religious minorities - Kurds and Shiites. Moreover, in the years leading up to the US invasion, Iraq repeatedly threatened to use military force against neighboring states. The Iraqi army was once considered the strongest army in the region, but before the start of the last war it was in poor condition.

Reason: International security. Bush, Daschle, Powell and Rumsfeld spoke about this.

Reason: Need to support UN efforts. Bush, Powell and Rice advocated for it.

Reason: The US is capable of an easy victory in Iraq. The authors of the argument are Pearl and Rumsfeld.

The 2003 Iraqi army, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, was 50-70% less combat-ready than the 1991 army. During the 1991 Gulf War, approximately 40% of the Iraqi armed forces were destroyed. Hussein was unable to restore the combat effectiveness of his army. International sanctions did not give him the opportunity to obtain modern weapons, economic crisis in the country led to the fact that the size of the Iraqi army - once one of the largest armies in the Middle East - was reduced by approximately 50%. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimates that 70% more money was spent on a 1991-model Iraqi soldier than on a 2003-model Iraqi soldier. The results are known: if in 1991 the war lasted 43 days, then in 2003 the end active period military action was declared 26 days later. During the battles with the regular Iraqi army, 114 soldiers and officers of the anti-Iraqi coalition were killed. The losses of the Iraqi armed forces amounted, according to various estimates, to 4.9 - 11 thousand killed.

Reason: To protect world peace. George Bush.

Reason: Iraq poses a unique threat. Donald Rumsfeld.

Reason: The need to transform the entire Middle East. Richard Perl.

American neoconservatives, including Pearl, believe that the states and peoples of the Middle East feel like outsiders, losing the competition with the West. These peoples look at the rich West with hatred and envy. However, according to neoconservatives, this situation was the result of the underdevelopment of democratic institutions in these states - the pressure of religious fundamentalists, the dominance of dictators, the unfreedom of the press, the virtual absence of civil society, etc., which hinder the normal development of the economy, culture, etc. Therefore, according to neoconservatives, the United States and the West should bring the “seeds of democracy” to the Middle East. The creation of a truly democratic Iraqi state could cause " chain reaction"and completely change the entire region.

Reason: The need to influence states that support terrorists or are trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Richard Perl.

This argument has been confirmed in practice. After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi agreed to destroy and partially transfer to the United States his stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and completely stop work on WMD programs.

Reason: Saddam Hussein hates the US and will try to translate his hatred into something concrete. Joseph Lieberman.

Saddam Hussein repeatedly made anti-American statements; anti-Americanism in Iraq was the state ideology. including using an “oil weapon” - he suspended the export of Iraqi oil in order to “punish” the United States. In 1993, Iraqi intelligence services organized a failed assassination attempt on former US President George H. W. Bush, who led the United States during the 1991 war. It is now believed that Saddam Hussein was most interested in strengthening his reputation in the Middle East and containing Iraq's longtime enemy, Iran.

Reason: History itself calls on the US to do this. Author of the statement: US President George W. Bush.03 November 2005 Washington ProFile


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One of the previous articles was devoted to issues of tactics during the wars in Iraq in 1991 and 2003. Below I present to the public an overview of the war in Iraq in 2003 from the point of view of operational art.

BEFORE THE BATTLE

The final version of the operation plan, codenamed “Iraqi Freedom,” was finalized only on March 18, 2003. The invasion of ground forces and the amphibious landing were supposed to take place on the morning of March 21.

In the direction of the main attack was the “South” group of troops, whose main task was to defeat Iraqi troops on defensive lines along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, reach Baghdad and block it. The attack on the capital was planned simultaneously along two operational directions: the north-east (Kuwait-Iraq border - Basra - Amara - Baghdad) and the north-west (Kuwait-Iraq border - Nasiriyah - Hilla - Baghdad). The operational formation of troops provided for the creation of a second echelon in the northwestern direction and the allocation of a general reserve from the airborne and amphibious landing formations, which were intended to solve further tasks of capturing the capital and other large cities.

In other areas, limited operations were envisaged by special forces units. In addition, in the northeastern operational direction, part of the forces of the “South” group was allocated to solve the problem of taking control of the oil-bearing areas on the Faw Peninsula by conducting an amphibious landing operation.

The order to create a unified group of troops (forces) was given by the Secretary of Defense through the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces on December 24, 2002. By the beginning of hostilities, the deployment of the Navy and Air Force groups was completed.

The naval group was deployed in three main directions: in the Persian and Oman Gulfs - 81 warships, including three aircraft carriers of the US Navy and one of the British Navy, 9 surface ships(NK) and 8 nuclear submarines (SNB) - carriers of the Tomahawk SLCM; in the northern part of the Red Sea - 13 SLCM carriers (7 NK and 6 SSN); in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea - 7 warships, including two aircraft carriers and four SLCM carriers. In total, there are 6 aircraft carriers carrying 278 strike aircraft and 36 SLCM carriers with ammunition of up to 1,100 missiles. At the same time, about 900 missiles were located directly on ships and up to 200 on support transports.

The deployed Air Force group included more than 700 combat aircraft, of which about 550 tactical strike aircraft of the US, British and Australian Air Forces, stationed at air bases (AVB) of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, as well as 43 strategic bombers US Air Forces based in the UK, USA and Oman. At the same time, part of the B-2A bombers was for the first time stationed not at its regular Whitement air base, but at the air base of the island. Diego Garcia, where special hangars were equipped for them with a system for maintaining a certain temperature and humidity regime.

The total composition of the air attack forces and means of the air force and navy of the coalition group was about 875 attack aircraft and more than 1,000 sea- and air-launched cruise missiles.

The deployment of the coalition group of ground forces was carried out with a lag behind the build-up of the Air Force and Navy in the region. Direct supervision of its creation in the area of ​​the upcoming operation was carried out by the headquarters of the 3rd Field Army of the North Central Command of the US Armed Forces. Since the second half of 2002, the headquarters' efforts have been aimed at deploying a combat command and control system; obtaining intelligence information about the state and activities of Iraqi troops; creating conditions for the rapid reception and deployment of ground troops. For this purpose, five brigade sets of ground forces weapons were stockpiled in Kuwait in advance. The advance creation of reserves of material and technical means and the storage of weapons and military equipment in the theater made it possible to reduce the deployment time of ground formations from 40 to 15 days.

At the beginning of the operation, the combat strength of the coalition ground forces included three divisions, seven brigades and eight battalions. To support them, the 11th operational tactical group (OTG) of the army aviation, 75 OTG field artillery and OTG air defense/missile defense of the US ground forces were formed. The group consisted of up to 112 thousand people, up to 500 tanks, more than 1,200 armored combat vehicles, about 900 guns, MLRS and mortars, over 900 helicopters and up to 200 anti-aircraft missile systems.

The basis of the coalition forces was the “South” group, which included three divisions, seven brigades and two battalions. Most of it was located in field camps in the north-west of Kuwait, and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Battalion (EBMP) of the United States and the 3rd Marine Brigade (BRMP) of Great Britain were located on landing ships in the waters of the Persian Gulf.

The West group was created on the territory of Jordan. It included two battalions of the 75th Ranger Infantry Regiment, a US Army Special Forces battalion and up to a UK Army Special Forces company. Units with a total strength of about 2 thousand people were stationed in the field in the eastern part of the country. In the north of Iraq (territory of the Kurdish Autonomous Region), up to two battalions and up to a company of Special Forces of the British and US ground forces were concentrated. Their actions were supported by up to 10 helicopters.

FIRE!

Operation Iraqi Freedom, as planned, began at 21.00 on March 19, 2003 with the massive use of special operations forces in Iraq. The combat operations of the coalition ground group began a day before the planned date and before the start of the massive use of forces and means of air attack (air offensive operation).

The troops of the South group in the northeastern operational direction went on the offensive in the early morning of March 20, simultaneously with the coalition launching selective missile and bomb attacks on Iraqi targets. The invasion of Iraqi territory was carried out in pre-battle formations with the support of artillery, army and tactical aviation. There was no fire preparation for the attack. Military units and units of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Division (EDMP), 7th Armored Brigade (BRBR), 1st Armored Division (BRTD) and 16th Separate Air Assault Brigade (ASBR) developed an offensive on the city. Basra, and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Battalion (EMB) - to the city of Umm Qasr.

On the night of March 21, an amphibious landing operation was carried out. The landing on the Faw Peninsula was carried out in a combined manner using helicopters and amphibious assault forces with the support of naval and coastal artillery. As a result, the task of taking control of the southern oil terminals was successfully completed. At the same time, the main forces of the coalition group in the northeastern operational direction failed to capture Basra and Umm Qasr on the move and had to abandon further advance in the direction of Basra - Amara.

In the northwestern operational direction, the troops went on the offensive on the evening of March 20. The first echelon, consisting of military units of the 3rd Mechanized Division (MD), advanced mainly in pre-battle formations through the desert area along the right bank of the river. Euphrates. In the second echelon were military units of the 101st Air Assault Division (vshd). Brigade tactical groups (BRTG) of the first echelon tried to immediately capture bridges and bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Euphrates near the cities of Nasiriyah, Samawa and Najaf. However, the stubborn resistance of the Iraqi garrisons forced the Americans to switch to positional actions.

Under these conditions, the advanced military units of the 3rd MD continued their offensive to the north and by March 25 reached the first defensive line Iraqi defense on the approaches to the capital in the area of ​​​​Karbala, covering about 400 km in four days. At the same time, further advancement was not possible, since up to two-thirds of the division’s forces were tied up in battles near Nasiriya, Samaw and Najaf. Due to large gaps between military units, there was a threat of attacks by Iraqi troops on the exposed flanks and rear. The great extent of communications made it difficult to solve problems of logistical support for the advancing troops.

In the current situation, the command of the “South” group suspended the offensive and regrouped its troops. Military units and subunits of the 1st infantry battalion, 2nd brigade and 15th infantry battalion were redeployed from the north-eastern direction to the area of ​​the city of Nasiriyah, and the 101st airborne division (second echelon) was tasked with releasing military units of the 3rd infantry division on the approaches to the cities of Es-Samawa and Najaf. One brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division (Airborne), withdrawn from the operational reserve, was sent to strengthen the West group. The second brigade also received a new task: it was supposed to guard the supply routes for the troops.

Marine formations and military units concentrated in the Nasiriyah area were given the following tasks: to block Iraqi garrisons in populated areas with part of their forces, to concentrate their main efforts on a breakthrough in Mesopotamia and an accelerated approach to the Iraqi capital, which meant the opening of hostilities in a new operational direction (Nasiriyah - Kut - Baghdad).

On March 27, military units and subunits of the 1st infantry battalion and the 15th infantry battalion, reinforced by 24 infantry fighting vehicles brought into battle from the operational reserve, crossed the river with the support of aviation. Euphrates, went to Mesopotamia and developed an attack on the city of El-Kut. After crossing the river. Tiger and the blockade of El-Kut, part of the forces and assets of the Marine Corps was redirected to capture the city of El-Amara from the northern direction, together with units of the British Armed Forces operating from the south. The main forces of the 1st Airborne Forces continued their offensive along the Kut-Baghdad highway and on April 5 reached the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the capital.

In the northwestern direction, the brigade tactical groups of the 3rd Mechanized Division, having transferred the captured lines on the approaches to the cities of Nasiriya, Samawa and Najaf, moved to the city of Karbala, which made it possible to resume the offensive on Baghdad. After blocking a group of Iraqi troops in the Karbala-Hill area, the main forces of the division made a roundabout maneuver along the shore of the lake. El-Milkh and by April 5 reached the southwestern outskirts of Baghdad.

For three days, American artillery and strike aircraft systematically destroyed fortified positions, resistance centers and individual firing points of the Iraqi defense on the closest approaches to the capital.

The assault on Baghdad, which, according to the Anglo-American command, was supposed to be the most difficult part of the operation, did not happen as such. The inglorious result for Iraq of the “strange defense of Baghdad” was the result of an operation to bribe senior Iraqi military leaders, including the commander of the Republican Guard in the capital, General Al-Tikriti. Later, the American side, represented by the commander of the OCC, General T. Franks, generally admitted that it resorted to widespread bribery of Iraqi commanders, forcing them in certain cities to lay down their arms without a fight.

After capturing Baghdad, the main efforts of the “South” group were focused on capturing Tikrit. In the direction of the main attack (Baghdad - Tikrit) there were military units of the 3rd MD, 1st Edm and up to two BrTGr 4th MD, which arrived from Kuwait. Part of the forces of the 1st Airborne Forces was used to eliminate one of the last centers of resistance in the area of ​​​​Ba-Aquba (about 80 km northeast of Baghdad). However, with the fall of the capital, the garrisons of other Iraqi cities stopped resisting. Tikrit was abandoned by Iraqi forces on April 13. On the same day, British troops established control over Umm Qasr.

In other areas, the content of the military operations of the coalition forces generally corresponded to the plans of the operation.

On March 27, the deployment of the coalition group of ground forces “North” began. Its basis consisted of the 173rd airborne brigade and the battalion of the 10th infantry division with an attached company tactical group of the 1st infantry division. There is evidence that the core of the group was supposed to be the 4th Infantry Division, which was supposed to deploy in Turkey, but was unable to do so for political reasons (it did enter Iraq from the south, a month after the start of the operation). Weapons and equipment were airlifted to airfields in the Kurdish Autonomous Region of Iraq. Most of personnel were parachuted. By the beginning of April, the “North” group, which, in addition to the transferred military units, included special forces units of the US and British ground forces operating in the northern regions, numbered about 4,000 people. Military units and divisions of the group, together with Kurdish armed forces, with the support of aviation, during the fighting on April 10, captured the city of Kirkuk, and on April 12, Mosul. At the final stage of the operation, part of the forces and means of the North group took part in the capture of Tikrit.

BATTLE IN THE AIR

The success of the coalition forces in the operation was achieved thanks to the organization of close interaction between all types of armed forces. At the same time, according to the American command, the main role in its achievement was played by the combat actions of the Air Force and Navy, which ensured absolute dominance in airspace, information superiority over the enemy, as well as powerful support for the actions of ground forces.

The massive use of air attack forces and means as part of the air offensive operation was carried out from 21.00 on March 21 until the end of the day on March 23. During the VNO, two massive missile and air strikes (MRAU) were carried out. In just two days, aviation carried out about 4 thousand sorties. About 3 thousand units of high-precision weapons were used against Iraqi targets, of which up to 100 ALCMs and 400 SLCMs.

From March 24 until the end of the operation, aviation was used in the form of systematic combat operations with single and group missile and air strikes. Every day, Air Force and Navy aircraft carried out an average of 1,700 sorties. At the same time, there was a tendency towards a decrease in the proportion of sorties to destroy pre-planned targets (from 100% during military operations to 20 percent during systematic combat operations). With the start of the ground offensive operation, direct air support for ground forces and marine groups was carried out with limited forces, and from March 25, up to 75% of strike aircraft sorties began to be allocated to this task.

US strategic bombers accounted for more than 500 sorties, with the most actively used B-52 H aircraft based at Fairford Air Base (UK) and Fr. Diego Garcia. On the fourth day since the start of hostilities, B-52 H bombers went on airborne duty over western Iraq to strike against ground forces, a new way to use these heavy strategic aircraft. In military operations against Iraq, B-1 B bombers from the Markaz-Tamarid airbase (Oman) and B-2 A bombers from Whitement air base (USA) and the island were also used. Diego Garcia.

Tactical aviation of the joint allied air forces, represented by the F-15 E, F-16 C/D and Tornado multirole fighters, F-117 A, A-10 A and Harrier fighter-bombers, operated from 30 airfields in the Middle East. In-flight refueling was provided by over 250 KS-135 and KS-10 refueling aircraft.

The use of carrier-based aircraft was planned to be carried out from the aircraft carriers of the 50th carrier strike force (AUS) from the northern part of the Persian Gulf and the 60th AUS from the areas of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. In the latter case, the choice of combat maneuvering areas was determined by the need to fire at Iraqi armed forces groups in the northern regions of the country.

Sea-launched cruise missiles were launched against Iraqi targets from surface ships and nuclear submarines from the Persian Gulf, northern Red Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The first missiles were launched on March 20, two hours after the US President made the decision to carry out selective strikes.

As part of the implementation of the concept " conducting combat operations by dispersed platforms united by centralized networks“For the first time, a method of massive use of nuclear submarines (SSNs) against enemy coastal targets was implemented. Thus, in the first MRAU of the air offensive operation, 14 submarines took part (US Navy - 12, British Navy - 2), from which about 100 cruise missiles were fired. It is estimated that during the air campaign, submarines of the US and British Navy used about 240 Tomahawk SLCMs. In total, up to 23 NK and 14 submarines were involved in missile strikes, using a total of more than 800 missiles (62% of the total ammunition).

In just 25 days (20.3-13.4), aircraft of the US and British Air Forces and Navy carried out about 41 thousand sorties, and consumed about 29 thousand ammunition. Taking into account the use of SLCMs and ALCMs, the share of high-precision weapons was 68%.

RESULTS

The main outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom is of geostrategic significance. The United States has expanded the strategic foothold for its further advance in this region.

In military terms, the trend towards an increase in the role of the Air Force and Navy, reconnaissance and precision weapons in achieving the objectives of the operation was confirmed. A qualitatively new stage in the development of high-precision systems was the implementation of the concept of joint and interconnected in time and space use of space, air, sea and ground reconnaissance and destruction means integrated into a single system.

The results of military operations in Iraq had a direct impact on the content of the main programs for building the US armed forces. The priority areas that will receive the most intensive development in the coming decades were: improving surveillance, reconnaissance and information collection systems; increasing the accuracy of destruction of air and sea strike weapons and increasing their capabilities in striking targets at long range, including both the weapon itself and its carriers; expanding capabilities in the field of data transmission and networking of all the above tools and systems.

Based on materials from an article by V. Chernov, “ Deep surgery. The use of a “new concept” by the US and British armies in NATO military operations» , as well as a number of comments (I express my deep gratitude to all participants in the Military Review forum).

International relations. Political science. Regional Studies Bulletin of Nizhny Novgorod University named after. N.I. Lob Achevsky, 2011, No. 5 (1), p. 268-274

UDC 94(430).087

GERMANY'S DIPLOMATIC PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFLICT AROUND IRAQ (2001-2003)

© 2011 A.I. Egorov

Dzerzhinsky Polytechnic Institute of Nizhny Novgorod State technical university them. R.E. Alekseeva

[email protected]

Received by the editor 09/02/2011

The problem of Germany's diplomatic participation in the conflict around Iraq in the period 2001-2003 is considered. It was revealed that Germany was pursuing its interests by playing a double game. On the one hand, official Berlin sought to maintain partnerships with the United States, and on the other, it took an anti-war position by entering into an informal alliance with France and Russia.

Key areas: Iraq, Germany, anti-war tions, UN Security Council resolutions, weapons

The strengthening of Germany's geopolitical position due to its unification allowed the federal government to intensify diplomatic efforts in strategically important regions of the world. The latter included the Persian Gulf zone, where Iraq traditionally played the role of one of the key subjects of the international process. Its importance was determined primarily by large reserves of energy resources. According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in the early 2000s. Iraq had the second largest crude oil reserves in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia.

Germany pursued primarily economic goals in relation to Iraq. Germany's interests were in maintaining bilateral trade, the annual volume of which was estimated at approximately $350 million, and in addition, with the involvement of intermediary countries, German sales to Iraqi counterparties amounted to approximately $1 billion.

At the same time, Germany had to take into account the continuously deteriorating political climate in relations with Iraq, which was greatly facilitated by such factors as the danger posed by the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, as well as the negative attitude towards the regime of President Saddam Hussein from a significant part of the world community . The latter was largely fueled by the aggressive foreign policy actions of the regime, in particular, trying to annex Kuwait in August 1990.

Lacking its own effective leverage over Hussein, Germany

diplomatic alliance, international inspectors of mass destruction, pacifism.

gave priority to multilateral mechanisms to influence the situation in Iraq. She considered the UN to be the key instrument for resolving the situation, and therefore supported the adoption of Security Council Resolution No. 687 of April 3, 1991, according to which Iraq had to unconditionally agree to the destruction, removal or neutralization under international control of all chemical and biological weapons and all agent inventories, all related subsystems and components and all associated research, development, maintenance and production facilities; all ballistic missiles with a range over 150 km and related major parts and repair and production facilities. To control the disarmament of Iraq, UNSCOM was created - the UN Special Commission, whose inspectors did a lot of work to identify chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, and together with the IAEA - objects related to the creation of nuclear weapons. The commission carried out its functions until December 1998, but then Saddam Hussein terminated relations with the UN and expelled international inspectors from Iraq, which served as the basis for the aggravation of the situation.

Rising tensions around Iraq in the early 2000s. coincided with the approach of the next parliamentary elections in Germany. Because of this, the coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Greens found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, it was forced to take into account the serious pacifist potential in the country. Public opinion polls showed that the majority

the Germans were tuned to peaceful resolution Iraq problem. On the other hand, the government sought to be loyal to its overseas ally, which was heading towards preparing an armed struggle against the regime of President Hussein.

On September 18-19, 2001, German Foreign Minister J. Fischer visited Washington, where he met with US Deputy Secretary of Defense P. Wolfowitz. The American side spoke sharply about an adequate response to the challenges of international terrorism, emphasizing that it sees its mission in liberating a number of countries from their “terrorist governments”, without stopping to use military force. Although the list of such countries was not announced, it became clear that Iraq would not occupy the last place on it.

Meanwhile, from mid-2002, Germany began to distance itself from the power course of its American ally. On August 7, 2002, J. Fischer presented a broad justification for the position of the German government regarding the Iraqi problem. It was the first time that critical statements were made against the United States, whose focus on military methods of resolving the conflict situation was considered unacceptable. In addition, Fischer made it clear that Washington’s emphasis in posing the problem was incorrect.

From the point of view of official Berlin, Islamic terrorism took first place among the threats facing the international community at the beginning of the 21st century. The connection between Saddam Hussein's regime and terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, has not been proven. Having no doubt that the American military machine was powerful enough to defeat the Hussein regime, Fischer considered President George W. Bush's hopes for a complete transformation of Iraq in the spirit of democracy and in a short time to be illusory. “It will take decades and a permanent US military presence in the region,” warned the German Foreign Minister. Moreover, the hypothetical possibility of withdrawing American troops from the region until the situation was completely stabilized was regarded by Germany as a risk factor, because it threatened to explode the situation in the Persian Gulf area, which could negatively affect the security of European countries.

On August 15, 2002, in an interview with the influential newspaper “Die Zeit,” Federal Chancellor G. Schröder tried to show the legal inconsistency of the position of supporters of the military invasion of Iraq by the fact that the Security Council

The UN did not authorize such actions. However, Germany proposed technical assistance, and also supported the continuation of the UN inspectors' mission in Iraq, insisting on their unrestricted access to all suspicious sites.

The anti-war line at that moment was also maintained by the conservative opposition in the person of the candidate for the post of Federal Chancellor, Bavarian Prime Minister E. Stoiber, who on August 28, 2002 presented his views on the advisability of military intervention in Iraqi affairs. Stoiber warned the United States against independent action and allowed the Bundeswehr to participate in the anti-Iraq campaign only if it received a corresponding mandate from the UN Security Council and developed a consolidated position of the European Union regarding this problem.

In September 2002, under pressure from the international community, the Iraqi leadership agreed to the return of UN inspectors to the country without preconditions. A new UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC, was formed, which continued the work of UNSCOM in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 1284 of December 17, 1999.

The stronger anti-war stance taken by the government coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens helped it gain voter support and became important factor which ensured victory in the parliamentary elections. After the formation of the renewed government, Federal Chancellor G. Schröder spoke on October 29

2002 with a government statement in which it confirmed Germany's previous course regarding the Iraqi problem. He outlined as a goal a consistent policy of disarmament and international verification of Iraq.

By this time, the situation around Iraq began to heat up again. On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1441, which is quite tough in relation to Iraq. The document regretted Iraq's failure to provide accurate, complete, definitive and comprehensive information on all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and on all stocks of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations , as well as all other nuclear programs, including those that the Iraqi authorities claim are carried out for purposes other than materials that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.

The Security Council asserted that Iraq repeatedly obstructed access to sites designated by the UN and IAEA special commission, did not cooperate fully and unconditionally with weapons inspectors, and ultimately ceased all cooperation with them in 1998. Since December of that year, Iraq lacked international observers, inspections, and controls regarding weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

The Security Council provided Iraq with a final opportunity to fulfill its disarmament responsibilities by deciding to introduce an enhanced inspection regime to ensure complete and verifiable completion of the disarmament process.

Baghdad was to provide "immediate, unhindered, unconditional and unrestricted" access to international inspectors to any and all Iraqi sites that the inspectors deem necessary to inspect.

The UN Security Council warned Iraq that further violation of its responsibilities would lead to serious consequences for it.

In accordance with the requirements of the resolution, it was planned to resume the activities of international inspectors in Iraq no later than

On December 23, 2002, and no later than 60 days later, they had to submit a report on the work done to the UN Security Council. Already on November 27, 2002, UN inspectors resumed their work in Iraq.

Based on the results of the first stage of its activities, the new mission of inspectors prepared a report that did not contain any significant reproaches against Iraq regarding the presence of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, a number of questions regarding Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons development programs remained unanswered.

This gave the United States and Great Britain a reason to declare that they did not trust Saddam Hussein and demand acceptance into as soon as possible a tough, ultimatum resolution of the UN Security Council, which would actually authorize the use of military force against Iraq. This position was approved by a number of states, including the countries of Eastern Europe, which in 2004 were supposed to join the European Union. At the end of January 2003, they issued an appeal containing full US support in the Iraqi issue.

The active diplomatic offensive of the war supporters was expressed in the fact that on February 24, 2003, Spain, Great Britain and the United States submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council, paragraph 1 of which stated: “The Security Council announces that Iraq has missed the opportunity to use the last chance given to it in accordance with resolution No. 1441."

On February 26, 2003, American President George W. Bush made it clear: the United States sets itself more global goals than identifying and eliminating Iraq's hypothetical weapons of mass destruction. This assumption turned into certainty on March 17, 2003, when the US President announced the need to eliminate Saddam Hussein's regime as part of the war on terrorism.

In this situation, Germany faced a difficult choice: to continue its anti-war line, risking seriously damaging transatlantic relations, or to follow Washington’s aggressive foreign policy course.

Official Berlin was forced to play a double game. On the one hand, the federal government had no intention of questioning its partnership with the United States. On January 29, 2003, speaking at the World Bank office in Washington, the coordinator of German-American cooperation at the German Foreign Ministry, K. Voigt, convinced the George W. Bush administration of Germany’s loyalty to the letter and spirit of the transatlantic partnership. This, the German diplomat emphasized, is best demonstrated by the actions of the federal government.

First of all, what was meant was Germany’s adequate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States that took place on September 11, 2001. “No one expressed grief and sympathy for the American people better than the Germans,” Voigt said. Moreover, Chancellor G. Schröder guaranteed “the unlimited solidarity of Germany with the United States in their fight against terrorism.”

In addition, in November 2001, the Federal Chancellor decided to provide Bundeswehr units to participate in Operation Sustainable Freedom in Afghanistan, and a year later the German Bundestag renewed the German mandate for participation in this operation.

At the same time, Voigt stated unequivocally that the Bundeswehr is not able to simultaneously participate in military campaigns around the globe. “The German commitment is concentrated in Afghanistan, where our country

“is ready to lead the ISAF group together with the Netherlands,” the German diplomat emphasized.

As for the Iraqi issue, he tried to soften the contradictions, proving that the positions of Germany and the United States converge on three fundamental points. First of all, we were talking about a fundamental assessment of the political regime of Saddam Hussein, who was called “a cruel, aggressive dictator who does not respect the resolutions of the UN Security Council.” The parties were also unanimous in the opinion that Iraq cannot possess weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. Finally, the United States and Germany demanded that international inspectors be given unhindered access to Iraqi military installations.

Consequently, the German diplomat stated, both countries had a common goal in relation to Iraq, but differences emerged in their understanding of the means to achieve it. Germany believed that the solution to the problem lay in effective multilateral action carried out within the UN. In this regard, Germany recalled UN Security Council Resolution No. 1441, which, in its opinion, opened the way for a political solution to the Iraqi problem.

Recognition of the priority of non-military means pushed official Berlin towards closer cooperation with Moscow and Paris, which opposed a military solution to the Iraqi issue. The period from December 2002 to January 2003 was marked by consultations between the German Foreign Minister and his Russian and French colleagues. Thus, on December 27, 2002 and January 26, 2003, telephone conversations took place between Russian Foreign Ministers I.S. Ivanov and Germany J. Fischer, during which the main attention was paid to the situation in the Persian Gulf area. Speaking in favor of the elimination of Iraq's possible weapons of mass destruction, the parties insisted on the continuation of inspection missions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 1441.

In this regard, the position of official Berlin regarding the military method of resolving the conflict has even become tougher. A statement was made that Germany would under no circumstances take part in military action against Iraq, regardless of what the Security Council decides.

At the beginning of February 2003, the anti-war diplomatic alliance acquired clearer outlines, formalizing its priorities in resolving the conflict around Iraq. On February 10, a Joint Statement of France, Russia and Germany was signed in Paris, in which the countries

advocated the speedy completion of the process of disarmament of Iraq, as provided for by UN Security Council resolutions. Any decisions, in the opinion of the parties, were to be based on the principles of the Charter of this organization. France, Russia and Germany saw the basis for achieving the disarmament of Iraq in the steady implementation of Security Council Resolution No. 1441, emphasizing that not all the opportunities that this resolution opens have been used.

Inspections carried out by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in Iraq, according to members of the anti-war coalition, have yielded positive results. France, Russia and Germany advocated the continuation of these inspections, as well as their significant strengthening in personnel and technical relations by all means within the framework of resolution No. 1441.

The parties warned against the use of force, believing that this was the last resort to solve the problem. “There is still an alternative to war... Russia, France and Germany are determined to provide all the necessary conditions to complete the process of disarmament of Iraq peacefully,” the statement of the three countries emphasized.

On February 13, 2003, German Foreign Minister J. Fischer gave a speech to the Bundestag in which he outlined three principles for resolving the situation with Iraq. First of all, Germany insisted that Iraq cannot have weapons of mass destruction and must cooperate on disarmament with the UN on the basis of Security Council resolutions. Further, Fischer demanded a tightening and intensification of the inspection regime; finally, control mode expected to be maintained in the long term.

The countries of the anti-war diplomatic alliance sought to convey to the world community their concern about the worsening situation around Iraq. On February 24, 2003, a letter signed by the permanent representatives of Russia, Germany and France to the UN Security Council was published, where it was reported that these countries had developed a Joint Memorandum on the situation in Iraq.

In the memorandum, the alliance members outlined their position, trying to diplomatically stop the impending military intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq.

According to Russia, France and Germany, no evidence was ever provided of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction or technologies capable of producing such weapons. Inspections that began in Iraq made it possible to move on from the dead

points of control process, which showed progress as Iraq's cooperation with the international community slowly but surely improved.

As the countries of the anti-war alliance noted, to resolve the situation, measures must be taken that are adequate to the current situation. They boiled down to the following points.

Firstly, the memorandum demanded the development of a clear program of action for UN inspectors in Iraq. According to UN Security Council Resolution No. 1284, the control, verification and inspection commissions of the United Nations and the IAEA were required to submit work program for approval by the UN Security Council. Russia, France and Germany proposed speeding up the presentation of this program, giving priority attention to the tasks of disarmament of Iraq. Special attention focused on what Iraq must do to complete each task as part of its disarmament program.

Secondly, priority in the disarmament of Iraq was given to enhanced inspections, whose regime was determined by UN Security Council Resolution No. 1441. It was planned to take measures to strengthen inspections: expansion and diversification of inspection mission personnel; creation of mobile units that exercised control; introduction of a new air control system; systematic processing of the received data.

Thirdly, the question was raised about the timing of the inspection’s activities. The calendar plan, developed by experts from the countries of the anti-war diplomatic alliance, provided for the following schedule: from March 1, 2003, data on aircraft and launch vehicles, chemical weapons and related materials, biological and nuclear weapons were to be provided; UNMOVIC and IAEA messages assessing the results of assignments would be provided by inspectors 120 days after the approval of the work program in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 1284. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 1441, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA transmitted to the Security Council UN information about every instance of interference by the Iraqi authorities in the activities of inspections.

On March 15, 2003, the foreign ministers of Germany, the Russian Federation and France issued a joint statement, which was the last attempt to stop the impending war. Appealing to the decisions of the UN Security Council and referring to the reports of the General Directorate

Rector of the IAEA, the parties argued that the disarmament of Iraq had begun and could be completed in a short time. Referring again to the UNMOVIC work program, which was supposed to be submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration in the near future, France, Russia and Germany, if approved, proposed immediately convening the Security Council at the level of foreign ministers in order to accept the tasks of disarmament and approve a calendar plan for the implementation of this programs .

On March 19, 2003, Federal President J. Rau held consultations with representatives of German political parties, where the situation in Iraq was discussed. As a result of the consultations, Rau stated that there was no immediate threat to the population of Germany due to the possible outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, although he did not rule out an increase in the danger of terrorist attacks on its territory.

After Hussein did not accept the provisions of the ultimatum addressed to the allied coalition led by the United States, its armed forces launched a military operation against Iraq on March 20, 2003.

During the war, German diplomacy was active. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, Federal Chancellor G. Schröder made a televised address to the nation. He stated that a "wrong decision" had been made and expressed hope for a speedy end to the war.

On March 24, an interview with J. Fischer appeared in Der Spiegel magazine, in which he regretted the lack of willingness of both sides to compromise. The next day, speaking at the Plenum of the 59th UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Fischer raised the issue of the threat to human rights due to the fighting in Iraq. The German representative called on the members of the Commission to appeal to the warring parties on the subject of compliance with international humanitarian law.

German diplomacy shifted its attention to developing principles for a post-war settlement of the situation. In a speech delivered on April 3, 2003 before the Bundestag, Federal Chancellor G. Schröder proclaimed a program for creating “a just and democratic order in Iraq and throughout the region.” According to this program, the territorial integrity of the country was preserved, and independence and political sovereignty were fully restored. The Iraqi people were given the right to determine their own future, and the country's resources remained in their possession and control, including oil fields.

In general, the crisis of 2001-2003 around Iraq showed the impossibility of finding a compromise between controlled disarmament and a clear course towards a military solution to the Iraqi problem. The alliance represented by France, Russia and Germany was unable to resist the authority of the United States, supported by its allies in Europe. Also, the attempt of official Berlin to strengthen its influence in the international arena by pursuing an anti-war line was not crowned with success.

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DIPLOMATIC PARTICIPATION OF GERMANY IN THE CONFLICT AROUND IRAQ (2001-2003)

The article deals with the problem of diplomatic participation of Germany in the conflict around Iraq during the period of 2001-2003. It has been revealed that Germany realized its own interests while playing a double game. On the one hand, official Berlin sought to maintain a partnership with the United States, on the other hand, it took an anti-war position by entering into an informal alliance with France and Russia.

Keywords: Iraq, Germany, anti-war diplomatic alliance, international inspections, resolutions of UN Security Council, weapons of mass destruction, pacifism.

And strategic missiles. The commission operated until December 1998, when it was forced to leave Iraq due to the refusal of Saddam Hussein's government to further cooperate. In addition, the UN Security Council introduced air zones in the north and south of Iraq, in areas densely populated by Kurds and Shiites, in which flights by Iraqi military aircraft were prohibited. These zones were patrolled by American and British aircraft.

In January 1993, the air forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France carried out missile and bomb attacks on the positions of Iraqi anti-aircraft missile systems in the south of the country, which posed a threat to allied aviation. Subsequent incidents in Iraqi airspace occurred periodically from December 1998 to March 2003, and their number increased from mid-2002. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US government decided to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq by force, but began concrete actions only in 2002 after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since mid-2002, the United States began demanding the return of international inspectors to Iraq. The Americans were supported in this demand by their Western European allies, primarily Great Britain. The demand for renewed international control over Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction was supported in November 2002 by a UN Security Council resolution. In the face of a direct threat of hostilities, Saddam Hussein agreed to resume the work of a special UN commission. International inspectors arrived in Iraq but found no evidence of renewed production of weapons of mass destruction.

In 2002-2003, the administration of US President George W. Bush made great efforts to prove that Saddam Hussein's regime posed a danger to the international community. Iraq was accused of resuming the development of weapons of mass destruction and of collaborating with international terrorist organizations, primarily al-Qaeda. However, the facts and evidence cited by the Americans were incorrect and falsified. The UN Security Council refused to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. Then the US and its allies launched an invasion in violation of the UN Charter.
The military operation against Iraq began on the morning of March 20, 2003. It was codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, Allied forces launched a ground offensive without a lengthy air campaign. Kuwait became the springboard for the invasion. The coalition command intended to organize an invasion of Iraq from the north from Turkish territory. However, the Turkish parliament refused to agree to the introduction of invading troops into its territory.

The Allied Expeditionary Force included five US and British divisions. They were opposed by 23 Iraqi divisions, but they did not put up serious resistance. The Iraqi air force was completely inactive. Already on April 9, the capital of Iraq was taken without a fight. Continuing to move north, on April 15, American troops took Tikrit (the hometown of Saddam Hussein), ending the active phase of hostilities. Iraqi cities were overwhelmed by a wave of looting; in an atmosphere of anarchy, many private houses, shops, and government institutions were looted. During the month and a half of the war, coalition losses amounted to 172 people killed (139 Americans and 33 British).

The interventionists divided Iraq into several occupation zones. The north, west and center of the country with Baghdad were controlled by American troops. The Shiite-populated areas south of Baghdad became the area of ​​responsibility of multinational forces (Poland, Spain, Italy, Ukraine, Georgia). In the far south of Iraq, a British contingent was stationed in Basra. To govern the occupied country, the Coalition Provisional Authority was created at the end of April 2003. Its task was to create conditions for the transfer of power to the new Iraqi government. One of the first steps of the Interim Administration was the dissolution of the Iraqi army and police. The Iraq Survey Group was looking for weapons of mass destruction. In 2004, the group concluded its work, finding that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction.

Immediately after the formal end of hostilities in Iraq, guerrilla warfare. In the summer of 2003, the process of organizing guerrilla groups was underway, initially consisting mainly of Baath Party activists and supporters of Saddam Hussein. These groups had a significant stockpile of weapons and ammunition obtained from Iraqi army warehouses. In the fall of 2003, the partisans carried out the so-called “Ramadan offensive,” which coincided with the Muslim holiday of Ramadan. The partisans managed to shoot down several American helicopters. In November 2003, 110 coalition troops were killed in Iraq, while in previous months 30-50 people died. The guerrillas' stronghold became the "Sunni triangle" to the west and north of Baghdad, especially the Al-Anbar province, where the center of resistance was the city of Fallujah. The rebels fired mortars at the occupiers' locations and set off explosions on roads as military convoys arrived. The danger was posed by snipers, as well as suicide attacks with car bombs or explosive belts.

In August 2003, rebels succeeded in bombing the Jordanian embassy. Among the victims of the terrorist attack at the headquarters of the UN mission in Baghdad was the head of the mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The Italian military suffered great casualties as a result of the explosion of their barracks in Nasiriyah. The response operations of the coalition forces were aimed at finding and detaining the leaders of the overthrown regime. On July 22, 2003, Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed in a shootout with soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul. On December 13, Saddam Hussein himself was arrested in the Tikrit area by soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division. However, there was no decline in the partisan movement; leadership in the resistance movement passed from the Baathists to the Islamists.

In late 2003, Iraqi Shia leaders demanded general elections and the transfer of power to a democratically elected government. The Shiites hoped to gain full power in the country, which had traditionally been in the hands of the Sunni minority. The Provisional Coalition Administration hoped in the future to transfer power in Iraq to a transitional government formed on the principle of equal representation of all sectors of Iraqi society. This position of the United States caused discontent among the Shiites. The most radical representative of the Shiites, Mullah Muqtada al-Sadr, advocated the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq and the creation of an Islamist state. Under his leadership, armed units known as the Mahdi Army were created. In April 2004, Shiites rebelled in the south of the country against the occupying forces.

At the same time, the situation in Fallujah, the center of Sunni resistance, worsened. The US Marine units, which replaced the 82nd Airborne Division previously stationed here, practically lost control of the city. In early April, fierce fighting took place in almost all cities of Central and Southern Iraq. During the same period, a series of kidnappings of foreign specialists working in Iraq occurred. The kidnappings were carried out by the Sunni group Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musaba al-Zarqawi. By the end of April 2004, the occupying forces managed to suppress the main centers of resistance. However, the rebels managed to maintain their control in several areas of the country. A special Iraqi brigade was created in Fallujah to monitor the maintenance of order in the city. Against this background, on June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred its powers to the Iraqi transitional government led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Thus, the period of foreign occupation of Iraq officially ended. International coalition troops remained in the country at the request of the new government and in accordance with the UN mandate (UN Security Council resolution of June 8, 2004).

According to the plans of the Provisional Coalition Administration, it was envisaged to hold elections to the National Assembly, a referendum on a new constitution, and the creation of new bodies of state power and administration. At the end of 2003, the formation of a new Iraqi army and police began. The transitional government did not have the strength to independently maintain order in Iraq or ensure democratic elections to the new government bodies. The multinational forces were tasked with regaining control over all areas of the country. In August 2004, coalition troops managed to crush Shiite resistance in the south. Muqtada al-Sadr was forced to abandon armed struggle and switch to peaceful political activity. Coalition troops then suppressed Sunni resistance in settlements they controlled. By the end of November 2004, the Americans finally captured Fallujah, depriving the Sunni guerrilla movement of support.

The American authorities were subjected to sharp criticism for the conduct of the war in Iraq, both in the United States and throughout the world. At the end of April, a scandal broke out around the abuse of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison. The Iraq issue featured prominently during the American presidential election campaign. Despite the criticism, George W. Bush was re-elected as President of the United States, which meant the continuation of the occupation of Iraq by American troops.

On January 30, 2005, multi-party parliamentary elections were held in Iraq. In a number of Sunni areas, voters boycotted the elections, but throughout the country they were recognized as valid. The Shiite United Iraqi Alliance won the election with 48% of the vote. In April, a new transitional government was formed, whose task was to prepare a new constitution for the country. On October 15, Iraq held a referendum on a new constitution, which was adopted despite the opposition of the Sunnis. On December 15, new parliamentary elections were held, in which the United Iraqi Alliance again won, receiving 128 seats in the National Assembly. All Sunni parties received 58 seats, the Kurds - 53 seats. In 2005, the efforts of the interethnic occupation forces were aimed at suppressing outside support for the Iraqi insurgents. To this end, the American Marines conducted a number of operations in the border areas with Syria. To suppress the increasing number of terrorist attacks in Baghdad, Operation Lightning was carried out, in which more than 40 thousand American and Iraqi military personnel participated.

The coming to power of the Shiites in Iraq aggravated the political situation in the country. Confrontation with foreign occupiers faded into the background. On February 22, 2006, the Shia shrine Al-Askariyya Mosque in Samarra was bombed. In the following weeks, a wave of sectarian violence swept the country, claiming up to a thousand victims every month. By October 2006, about 365 thousand Iraqis had left their places of permanent residence. On May 20, 2006, a permanent government was formed headed by Nouri Maliki. On June 7, an air strike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which claimed responsibility for many terrorist attacks. In general, American troops were unable to turn the situation in their favor; the introduction of additional military contingents only led to additional casualties. The Iraq War was not popular in America. A number of Sunni areas were not controlled by either the Iraqi government or coalition forces. In October 2006, the Sunni underground organization Mujahideen Shura Council proclaimed the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq.

Growing criticism of the actions of the George W. Bush administration in Iraq led to the fact that after the next elections to the US Congress in November 2006, the Republican Party lost its majority in both houses of the US parliament. After this, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, considered one of the main initiators of the invasion of Iraq, was replaced by Robert Gates. At the end of 2006, the trial of Saddam Hussein, who was accused of mass killings during the suppression of the Shiite uprising in 1982, was completed in Iraq. He was sentenced to death in November 2006 and hanged on December 30.

In January 2007, George W. Bush put forward a new strategy military policy The United States in Iraq, known as the “Great Wave.” He admitted that he made mistakes on the Iraqi issue and noted that the reasons for the failures were the lack of troops and insufficient freedom of action of the American command. The new strategy included sending additional troops to Iraq. Whereas previously American troops had left areas cleared of militants, the Great Wave meant that they would remain there to maintain security.

In response, Iraqi insurgents launched an offensive to force George W. Bush to admit defeat and evacuate American troops from Iraq. At the end of January and beginning of February, militants managed to shoot down several American helicopters. In March 2007, during a visit to Iraq by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the building where he spoke came under mortar fire. In the spring of 2007, the Green Zone, a protected government and diplomatic area of ​​Baghdad, was regularly shelled. Interethnic forces controlled no more than 20% of the area of ​​the Iraqi capital. By June 2007, the bulk of American reinforcements had arrived in Baghdad, allowing the fight against the insurgents to intensify. The operation to clear Baghdad of militants continued until November 2007.

Simultaneously with the fighting in Baghdad, a campaign was being waged in the Diyala province northeast of the Iraqi capital. Iraqi rebels have virtually established control over the provincial capital of Ba'quba. The American command in March 2007 was forced to transfer additional forces to the province. As a result of a military operation in June-August 2007 with the participation of 10 thousand troops, the Americans regained control over Baakuba. In the province of Al-Anbar, the American command was able to reach an agreement with the leadership of Sunni armed groups on cooperation, in particular in the fight against Al-Qaeda. In response to the ceasefire, local militants began to receive monetary rewards, and their leaders began to receive real power on the ground. The success of the experiment prompted the American command to try to expand it to other provinces, which displeased the Shiite government of Nuri Maliki.

In the spring of 2008, the Iraqi army and security forces carried out operations to establish full control of the Shia regions of Iraq, and then in Mosul, which was considered an al-Qaeda stronghold in Iraq. In the second half of 2008, there were no active hostilities, although in a number of regions of the country the situation remained tense, and militant attacks and sectarian conflicts continued. After a peak in 2006-2007, the number of major terrorist attacks and militant attacks has decreased significantly. In 2008, international coalition forces suffered the smallest losses since the beginning of the war (320 military personnel).

In 2008, the process of strengthening the Iraqi security forces and transferring more and more areas under their control continued. By October 2008, only 5 of the country’s 18 provinces remained under the control of international forces in Iraq. On November 17, 2008, an agreement was signed on the status of American troops in Iraq, which determined the conditions for their presence in Iraq after the expiration of the UN Security Council mandate (December 31, 2008). The agreement provided for the withdrawal of American troops from populated areas by July 2009 and their complete withdrawal from the country by the end of 2011. Due to the expiration of the UN mandate at the end of 2008, the military contingents of most countries participating in the multinational force left Iraq. In addition to American and British troops, military units from Australia, Romania, El Salvador, and Estonia remained in Iraq.

On December 14, 2008, during George W. Bush's visit to Iraq, an Iraqi journalist threw two of his shoes at the US President, calling it "a farewell kiss from the Iraqi people." Bush dodged both boots and characterized the incident as "a sign of a free society." During 2009-2011, there was a process of gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq. In the summer of 2009, the last contingents of US allies left Iraq; by August 1, only American and British troops remained in the country. By the beginning of August 2010, the main contingent of American troops was withdrawn from Iraq, leaving about 50 thousand US military personnel in the country who were training and supporting local law enforcement forces. In July 2011, the last contingents of British troops were withdrawn from Iraq, and on December 15, 2011, American troops left the country.

The total number of American troops in Iraq reached 250 thousand people, the British - 45 thousand. Other countries were represented by significantly fewer soldiers, sometimes purely symbolically. The losses of American troops amounted to 4.48 thousand people killed and 32.2 thousand wounded. The multinational force (21 countries) lost 317 fighters killed, 179 of them British.