They tried to remove Dmitry Zakharchenko, a protege of the FSB, from the GUEBiPK structure twice. General Sugrobov was categorically against Zakharchenko’s candidacy, but powerful forces lobbied for it. When Zakharchenko’s subordinate was taken for a bribe, he was sitting at the next table. I made sure that the money was actually transferred. Zakharchenko was caught only for the third time. But even the fabulous billions did not bring any of the leadership or high-ranking patrons of Zakharchenko to the pre-trial detention center.
Two faces of the anti-corruption headquarters
General Denis Sugrobov and Colonel Dmitry Zakharchenko are figures from different camps. They tried to bring them together, but they could not work together.
Major Dmitry Zakharchenko came to the GUEBiPK (Department “P”) under General Denis Sugrobov and was involved in suppressing crimes in the consumer market.
Sugrobov positioned himself as an uncompromising fighter against corruption, believing that he had been given carte blanche by President Dmitry Medvedev for almost any action, and Zakharchenko at that time was a gray mouse, but with an already tarnished reputation.
A PASMI source explained that conflicts immediately began to arise between them, so General Sugrobov decided to fire Zakharchenko.
But Sugrobov’s actions were limited by FSB officers, who coordinate all appointments of employees of the central apparatus of the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and quickly supervise even prosecutors and judges. On Zakharchenko’s personal file there was a so-called “red corner”, indicating that he had curators from the special services. Officially, the curators are employees of the “M” department of the FSB of the Russian Federation, but in the case of Zakharchenko the story was different.
Zakharchenko, as the media write, was a protégé of a very famous person in narrow circles Oleg Feoktistov. Until recently, Feoktistov held the position of deputy head of the “special unit” - the FSB Internal Security Service - an “office” in the “office”, overseeing, among others, the “M” department of the FSB SEB. Feoktistov himself is Igor Sechin’s man, who needs no introduction. Until 2008, he headed the famous 6th Internal Security Service of the FSB, which was created in 2004 on the initiative of Sechin himself, at that time Deputy Prime Minister and curator of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the “six” received the unspoken nickname “Sechin special forces”.
In addition to fair and honest laws protected by the Constitution, there is an unspoken table of ranks. What is allowed to Jupiter is not allowed to the bull. According to the law, no one had the right to prohibit the GUEBiPK operatives from developing the exposed FSB employee, but according to the concepts of the table of ranks, this is a daring trick and an unforgivable mistake. Feoktistov, as our source says, conferred with the head of the FSB Internal Security Service, General Sergei Korolev and first deputy director of the FSB, general Sergei Smirnov. They decided to “kill” not the operatives developing the FSB officer, but the GUEBiPK as a whole, in order to defeat the main board, reformat it for themselves and remove the looming threat of exposure.
After carrying out the provocation, special forces of the FSB FSB searched the building of the GUEBiPK and brought the deputy heads of Directorate “B” of the GUEBiPK to the Investigative Committee. Alexey Bodnar And Ivan Kosourova. High-profile arrests began, which were accompanied by a powerful wave of information. It was the time of the Sochi Olympics and Maidan.
Vladimir Putin received the news in Sochi, he heard it in the interpretation of Oleg Feoktistov, who had exclusive authority to personally report to the president.
Evgeniy Shkolov- the assistant to the head of state, who lobbied for the appointment of Sugrobov to the post of head of the GUEBiPK, came to the reception with Putin second, but his position turned out to be much weaker. Surprisingly, Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev did not support the general. The unspoken table of ranks turned out to be stronger.
The rise and fall of Zakharchenko
After the defeat of the GUEBiPK of the Internal Security Service, the FSB kept control over further appointments in the headquarters, promoting and nurturing its own. Zakharchenko immediately rose from obscurity and already under the next head of GUEBiPK Dmitry Mironov became deputy head of the department. He also did not particularly stand out in his position as acting head of Directorate “T” of the Main Directorate for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption, but no matter how hard he tried to keep a low profile, it did not always work out. PASMI wrote how in 2015, Colonel Astemir Sokurov was accused of fraud in one of the capital’s restaurants. He was recently sentenced to six years in a general regime colony.
Our source said that when Sokurov was detained, Colonel Zakharchenko - his direct superior - was sitting in the same restaurant at the next table. True, he was interrogated, but was not brought into the case even as a witness.
The colonel's invulnerability was ensured by the FSB's Internal Security Service. Thus, the anti-corruption headquarters became the best cover for any actions.
Different approaches to detaining police officers
Andrei Kurnosenko, the current head of the GUEBiPK, remained in the system after Zakharchenko’s arrest and did not even lose his position. “Incomplete official compliance,” in fact a reprimand, is the only sanction applied to Kurnosenko. At the same time, Denis Sugrobov went to Lefortovo three months after the first arrests of his men. Although there are no billions in the Sugrobov case. There is no commercial component to it at all. A German businessman unfoundedly accused Sugrobovites of extortion, To. The police were accused of taking million-dollar bribes during the arrest of officials. Investigators were never able to explain what selfish goal the police pursued by uniting into a “criminal community.” And 8 billion, obviously, is not a reason to look for possible accomplices.
Restoring the status quo of M management
After the destruction of the anti-corruption headquarters, the “special department” of the FSB took over some of the powers that belonged to the “M” department.
Then a key event occurred that completely changed the situation in the law enforcement agencies. July 19, 2016, exactly a week before the professional holiday, Investigative Officer's Day Russian Federation, FSB operatives detained high-ranking employees of the Investigative Committee of Russia: deputy head of the Main Investigation Department (GSU) for Moscow Denis Nikandrova, head of the internal security department Mikhail Maksimenko and his subordinate Alexandra Lamonova.
There is information about Zakharchenko’s direct involvement in this case, they say that he warned Denis Nikandrov about the ongoing operational activities. Representatives of the authorities are “throwing” refutations into the media, saying that Zakharchenko has long been in the development of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but perhaps the real reason for Zakharchenko’s detention is hidden.
The detained investigators of the Investigative Committee, according to media reports, like Zakharchenko, were members of Oleg Feoktistov’s unofficial team.
Let us remind you that the detainees are charged with Part 6 of Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - receiving a bribe on an especially large scale. According to investigators, Investigative Committee employees were offered five million dollars for refusing to prosecute the crime boss. Andrey Koichukova by nickname Italian from the environment Zakharia Kalashova known as Shakro Molodoy. These are echoes of the case of the shootout near the Elements restaurant on Rochdelskaya Street. The detainees allegedly managed to receive one million.
Three days after the arrest of high-ranking employees of the Investigative Committee, Oleg Feoktistov himself was removed from his post by secret presidential decree and transferred to the apparatus of seconded employees (APS) of the FSB. This event, of course, is not particularly advertised, but it has very big consequences for the security forces.
APS is insurance for exes. From there, employees are usually sent to the security services of state corporations, TNCs and banks. Feoktistov now heads the security service of Rosneft.
As soon as Feoktistov left office, the opportunity arose to catch Zakharchenko. The colonel was detained by FSB and Investigative Committee officers on September 8, two weeks after Feoktistov left. During a search in his sister’s apartment, 8.5 billion rubles were discovered, which became an absolute record for the amount of funds seized in Russia.
Denis Sugrobov, having heard about Zakharchenko’s arrest, said the following: “It’s incredible what the central command has turned into in two years!”
The dismissal of Oleg Feoktistov and the high-profile arrests of his protégé both in the Investigative Committee and in the GUEBiPK, as well as the active participation in these cases of the FSB Directorate “M”, allows us to conclude that the status quo of the “emshchiks” has been restored, who were deprived of the opportunity to influence personnel policy in the ranks of the security forces under pressure from the FSB.
According to which, military personnel and civilian personnel of the FSB agencies must, by December 1, 2012, get rid of property the ownership of which is registered outside of Russia (see text of the document). The author of the famous book “The New Nobility: Essays on the History of the FSB” discusses the reasons for this decision and what it will lead to. " And Chief Editor website agentura.ru Andrey Soldatov.
The order of Alexander Bortnikov confirmed the ban on employees of this service to own property abroad, which was introduced back in July 2011 by an amendment to the law “On the Federal Security Service.” The same amendment also introduced restrictions on employees traveling abroad.
The reason for launching a campaign to tighten rules for FSB employees, oddly enough, was the failure of another intelligence service - the Foreign Intelligence Service. In the summer of 2010, a defector from the SVR, Colonel Alexander Poteev, was accused of arresting a group of Russian illegal immigrants in the United States. Among the reasons that Poteev, a hero of the Afghan war and an officer with an impeccable reputation until the moment of his escape, began working for the Americans, were the availability of real estate in the United States and the fact that his daughter lives and studies in America.
Until recently, on the orders of FSB General Oleg Feoktistov, governors, large businessmen and even a minister were arrested economic development, searched the head customs service(and were shown with boxes of money on all central TV channels).
And now - a pension in a village with the telling name Yabedino, in a modest house by today's general standards of some 110 square meters.
Correspondents of the Open Russia Investigation Management Center found out how the former head of the “Sechin special forces” lives.
family nest
On the Internet there is the only reliable photograph of Oleg Feoktistov, or, as he is also called, “General Fix” (it was posted on the Rosneft website) - and that one with a blurred face. But we managed to see the general’s twin brother, so readers will be able to get an idea about him.
As the LRC managed to find out, Oleg Feoktistov lives in the village of Yabedino near Istra. According to Rosreestr, in this village he owns a land plot with a total area of 2100 square meters. m, a residential building (110 sq. m) and a bathhouse.
This is not some acquisition of recent years - the general spent his childhood and youth here, and his mother and father are buried in the local cemetery. From here, after graduating from school, Oleg Feoktistov went with his twin brother to study as a paramedic, and then served as a border guard in Karelia.
Feoktistov's house is quite modest for FSB, FSO or Ministry of Internal Affairs generals of this magnitude. There is another one on the site wooden house smaller, for some reason not included in Rosreestr (daughter Lydia and her children come there for the weekend), several outbuildings and a pond.
We knocked on the general's gate, but no one opened it for us. But a Yorkshire terrier ran out of the house opposite to the noise. The general’s twin brother, Igor, came out behind the dog with the twin Yorkie under his arm. Having reunited the terriers, the owner was about to leave, but I stopped him with a question.
Have you seen your brother for a long time?
They say he is leaving the FSB?
I really can't say anything.
Was he the one who got you the job at Arbat Prestige? - I tried to continue the conversation.
I have never used my brother's administrative resource.
Did you know that the real owner of the company is Semyon Mogilevich?
I didn’t know,” Igor finally closed the gate.
As the LRC found out, in 2006, when General Feoktistov was already in charge of the 6th Internal Security Service of the FSB, his brother Igor was the chief security officer of Arbat and Co LLC (which managed the Arbat Prestige perfume and cosmetics stores).
In January 2008, the founder of the Arbat Prestige OJSC holding, Vladimir Nekrasov, and his partner, reputable businessman Sergei Schneider (aka Semyon Mogilevich, in 2009 included in the top 10 most wanted criminals by the FBI), were arrested on charges of tax evasion on 115 million rubles. After this, the largest perfume chain began having problems with payments. The holding, which owed banks and suppliers more than 5.3 billion rubles, began to close stores and initiated the bankruptcy of all its structures.
The arbitration court declared the tax claims referred to by the investigation illegal. In 2011, the criminal case was discontinued due to the lack of corpus delicti. By this time, Arbat Prestige managed to pay off its creditors, but Vladimir Nekrasov lost his assets worth $1.5 billion, and the holding went bankrupt.
Now Igor Feoktistov, who, unlike his brother, followed the security line, works as the director of internal control at PJSC Federal Grid Company of the Unified Energy System. An interesting detail demonstrating Putin’s system of checks and balances: the chairman of the board of PJSC FGC UES is Andrei Murov, the son of the former long-term director of the FSO, Evgeniy Murov, whose resignation is associated with the development of the “Sechin special forces”.
While we were talking with Feoktistov’s brother, and then with our neighbor Vera, who had known the twins since early childhood, there was someone behind the general’s fence. But we didn't know about it then.
Sechin's eyes and ears
While serving in the Kalevala border detachment, Oleg Feoktistov became friends with a KGB military counterintelligence special forces soldier, Sergei Shishin, who later became the head of the FSB Internal Security Service, and then the head of the FSB Economic Support Service. Order bearer Shishin passed through several hot spots and, bypassing the then director of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, directly went with reports to the deputy head of the presidential administration, Igor Sechin, who at that time oversaw all Russian security forces.
At the beginning of 2003, Sechin instructed Shishin to create a special special unit with the broadest powers within the structure of the central apparatus of the FSB. Soon the 6th Internal Security Service of the FSB appeared, nicknamed “Sechin’s special forces” in Lubyanka. The direct selection of employees was carried out by Oleg Feoktistov, who headed the “six”. The backbone of the service consisted of fighters from Alpha and Vympel, as well as natives of Sochi, where Shishin once headed the city department of the FSB.
The most honorary counterintelligence officer, Shishin, in 2007, after a series of high-profile scandals involving the supply of Chinese contraband to an FSB warehouse in the Moscow region (military unit 54729), which involved high-ranking strippers from the Lubyanka, was seconded to VTB Bank, where he still works senior vice president. In his free time from his main job, Shishin participates in the life of the supervisory board of RRDB, the supporting bank of Rosneft (on the board of directors of which he was a member in 2011–2013) and the board of directors of RusHydro.
The eyes and ears of Igor Sechin in the Lubyanka remained Feoktistov, who rose to the rank of first deputy head of the FSB Internal Security Service, and his colleague from the Kalevala border detachment Ivan Tkachev, who later became the commander of the “six”.
Subsequently, in contrast to the “Sechinite” Feoktistov, Sergei Korolev, who belongs to the team of former Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, was appointed head of the FSB Internal Security Service.
“We called Igor Ivanovich (Sechin) Pope, and Oleg Vladimirovich - Batya,” a Six fighter told the TsUR correspondent. “For us, Korolev was something like a wedding general, and all commands for operational development came only from Feoktistov.”
The first mentions of the “Sechin special forces” appeared during the scandalous epic with the Yukos oil company. His fighters blocked security guards for businessmen, broke open office doors, and guarded prosecutors during searches. Since then, the name of General Feoktistov has become associated with high-profile arrests of high-ranking officials or businessmen. Be it searches at the Cherkizovsky market of Telman Ismailov, the case of FSKN General Alexander Bulbov, the history of Moscow region prosecutors who protected underground gaming clubs, the case of General GUEBiPK of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Denis Sugrobov or the detention of the governor of the Kirov region Nikita Belykh. “Oleg Vladimirovich had direct access to the president,” said a source in the FSB. “True, I always reported in the presence of FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov.”
Seconded General
Feoktistov’s unexpected transition from the FSB Internal Security Service to Rosneft was preceded by several key reshuffles at Lubyanka and high-profile events at the Baltic customs. According to one version, Feoktistov was removed from the FSB after searches of Putin’s KGB colleague, head of the Federal Customs Service (FCS) Andrei Belyaninov, who was developed by the “six” under the operational pseudonym “Belyash” for about two years.
Photos of the search in the house of the frightened Belyaninov with wads of dollars in shoe boxes were shown on all central television channels. Everyone expected that he was about to be closed in “Matrosskaya Tishina”, but the Kremlin commanded “all clear.”
As an employee of the “six” said, during the search he clashed with Belyaninov’s security chief, Franz Avgustinovich: “Belyasha had been guarded by Franz for a long time. He used to run with us as a sniper in the mountains. About two years ago there was a fight with him in a restaurant, and then we met again. I said to him: “Why didn’t you tell us about Belyash?”, and he answered with swear words. In short, we almost fell onto the floor again. But the coolest thing is that the money and valuables seized during the search turned out to be declared in advance and everything came together penny for penny. Although everything is clear here: Belyash is a competent financier from intelligence, in the 90s he ruled two banks (REA-Bank and Novikombank - TsUR), through which the station’s money passed, and there were no questions for him.”
Following Belyaninov, long-time enemies of the Chekist “special unit” (USB), who were considered untouchable, resigned - the head of the Economic Security Service (counterintelligence in the credit and financial sphere) of the FSB, Yuri Yakovlev, and the head of Directorate “K” of the SEB of the FSB, Viktor Voronin (a person involved in the Magnitsky list).
According to some reports, the reason for the resignation of the generals was a loud scandal associated with the detention in November 2015 at Pulkovo Airport of 35 thousand smuggled iPhones and iPads and 15 thousand Lenovo A560 smartphones.
Searches and arrests of businessmen connected with the supply of smuggled electronics began. According to investigators, Pavel Smolyarchuk, an operative of the Main Directorate for Combating Smuggling of the Federal Customs Service, undertook to resolve the situation with the seized goods. As it later turned out, Smolyarchuk’s sister was the wife of the immediate supervisor of St. Petersburg customs, head of the 7th department of Directorate “K” of the FSB SEB Vadim Uvarov.
The “six” were involved in the operational support of the criminal case, and their materials were included in the report to the president, who, by his decree, dismissed generals Yakovlev and Voronin from the FSB SEB. The vacant chairs were immediately occupied by the “wedding general” from the FSB Internal Security Service Sergei Korolev, who replaced Yakovlev, and the head of the “six” Ivan Tkachev, who moved into Voronin’s office.
And Feoktistov, instead of the expected promotion to the head of the entire “personnel”, was transferred to the staff of seconded FSB officers. A month later he ended up at Rosneft.
Igor Sechin at the opening of the monument to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Photo: Rosneft press service
He served as the head of the oil company's security service for less than six months, but managed to attend with Igor Sechin the opening of the monument to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and at negotiations in Indonesia and Egypt. And then the story happened with the arrest of Minister Ulyukaev.
“Kostin from VTB, together with Feoktistov, came to Putin and reported that Ulyukaev was hinting at some kind of bonus for the privatization of Bashneft (before the arrest, Kostin and Ulyukaev were close friends, the role of the banker in the story with the transfer of money to the minister is still not clear.- TsUR), - said the fighter of the “six”. - The President, as always, avoided a direct answer, like decide for yourself. Then Sechin said that he takes full responsibility upon himself. And our general turned out to be the extreme one.”
On March 7, 2017, the media reported the departure of the seconded special officer from Rosneft. Meanwhile, they started talking about Feoktistov’s upcoming resignation at the end of February, when his name was not among the oil company employees nominated for state awards. According to Presidential Decree No. 95 of March 1, 2017, “For a great contribution to the development of the country’s economy, strengthening Russia’s position in the global oil industry and the successful solution of problems to improve the investment climate in the Russian Federation” with the Order of Honor and “For Services to the Fatherland” 2nd degrees were awarded to 12 top managers of Rosneft. According to a TsUR source in Rosneft, the general’s name appeared on the list, but at the very last moment it was crossed out. Information about Feoktistov’s departure from Rosneft was also confirmed by Igor Sechin, who stated that the general was returning to military service. According to some reports, they planned to appoint him as head of Directorate “P” of the FSB (engaged in counterintelligence support for industrial enterprises), but something did not work out.
Incriminating evidence on the general
Over the years of service in the security secret service, Oleg Feoktistov made many enemies on Staraya Square, his native Lubyanka, in the FSO, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Inspection bodies read anonymously about Fix and his people. They told how the general holds all Moscow judges in his fist, assigned his brother to the authoritative businessman Mogilevich in Arbat-Prestige, and his subordinates organize noisy parties in the Shield and Sword restaurant on Lubyanka (now the owner of the restaurant, Konstantin Piskarev, has been arrested for organizing 18 contract killings. - SDG), and then they drive around Moscow drunk and send traffic cops.
However, in the “Sechin special forces” alcohol while driving was not considered a special sin and Feoktistov himself ran into trouble with traffic cops. Thus, according to the traffic police database, on February 2, 2002, Oleg Feoktistov in his Mazda was stopped by inspectors of the 5th department of the Moscow traffic police, who recorded in the protocol “the driving of a vehicle by a driver who was intoxicated.” The administrative material was sent to the Moscow commandant’s office, and then ended up on the desk of the “patron” Shishin. The case ended happily - with a fine.
The media also often found out dirt on the general. For example, an anonymous person sent messages to several editorial offices at once that Feoktistov, still in the same Istra district, illegally received a plot of land. According to Rosreestr, the owner of a plot in the Dachny Island village in the village of Podporino with a total area of 1305 sq. m. m Feoktistov became in 2012, and his neighbors turned out to be several generals from the central apparatus of the FSB and relatives of Putin’s close friends.
The administration of the Istrinsky district told the LRC that the land for the Dachny Ostrovok DNP was allocated legally - in response to a letter from the FSB with a request to help combat veterans with real estate.
Man behind the fence
The next day after the trip to Yabedino, we analyzed the shooting from a copter. When we zoomed in (see video), we noticed that there was someone behind the fence of General Feoktistov’s dacha while we were talking with his brother and neighbors. And then this someone went into the house.
Whether it was Feoktistov himself or one of his acquaintances could not be established. But if he himself, then his cheerful gait did not betray a man who, according to Novaya Gazeta, had just experienced a hypertensive crisis after learning about his retirement. The information that Feoktistov is alive and well was also confirmed by his neighbors.
Two years ago, while celebrating his fiftieth birthday in a small circle, Oleg Feoktistov suddenly announced that when he retired, he would write memoirs. Deathly silence hung over the table. The general smiled and continued: “I’ll just ensure the safety of the family first.”
When the retired general sits down to write his memoirs, the family may live on the income of his wife Lyudmila. She once worked at the FSB hospital, and in 2012 she founded Medtech-Progress CJSC, which in 2012-2016 won government contracts for the supply of medical equipment totaling 1.73 billion rubles. In 2014, the Cyprus offshore Tekori Investments limited and NP Promtekhnologii LLC became the new shareholders of the company, but Feoktistova continued to manage it until mid-2016. Interestingly, the Medtech-Progress office is still located on Kolpachny Lane, a stone’s throw from the building where Sechin’s special forces are based.
Next door to General Oleg Feoktistov, in the DNP “Dachny Island” in the village of Podporino, Istrinsky district, the head of the FSB Directorate for Moscow and the region, a native of St. Petersburg, Alexei Dorofeev (a protégé of the head of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev), received thirteen acres. In 2006, after mass riots in Kondopoga, General Dorofeev was removed from his post as head of the FSB Directorate for Karelia, and for a long time he was listed in the reserve. In 2012, the general headed the capital’s security officers, and their former boss, Viktor Zakharov, after a series of publications about his daughter’s American husband, went to the office of Mayor Sergei Sobyanin.
Nearby, the plot is registered to Dorofeev’s assistant, a native of St. Petersburg, FSB Colonel Marat Medoev, who is called the chief curator of Rosreestr.
The former head of the “M” department, Vladimir Kryuchkov, who now holds the position of deputy head of the FSB control department, and the ex-head of the CSS of the Russian customs, Igor Zavrazhny, received plots in “Dachny Ostrovka”. Several years ago, Zavrazhny intensively worked on Feoktistov, and on January 19, 2010, the customs officer was relieved of his post.
Feoktistov’s former colleague from the Sechin special forces, deputy head of the FSB Internal Security Service Nail Mukhitov, who later moved to Rosneft, also ended up on the “island”. From 2012 to 2015, Major General Mukhitov, with the rank of a seconded FSB officer, headed the Security Council of Rosneft, but after scandalous publications about extortion and extortion by his subordinates from the suppliers of the oil company, he resigned and now works in the office of Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.
In 2009, Elizaveta Molchanova, a native of Leningrad, appeared among the members of the DNP “Dachny Island” - the wife of the ex-senator of the Federation Council from the Leningrad Region, billionaire and founder of LSR Group LLC Andrei Molchanov. Moreover, Mrs. Molchanova not only joined the DNP, but became the new owner of the plots previously owned by security officers Vladimir Kryuchkov and Marat Medoev, and Alexey Dorofeev and former customs officer Igor Zavrazhny sold their 13 acres to the top managers of LSR Group LLC.
The father of the founder of LSR Group Andrei Molchanov, 65-year-old Yuri Molchanov, from 1987 to 1999 worked as vice-rector of Leningrad State University for educational work with foreign students. Vladimir Putin was listed as his assistant after his dismissal from the KGB. After leaving Leningrad State University, Mr. Molchanov took the position of Vice-Governor of St. Petersburg, and then moved to the position of Senior Vice President of VTB.
They keep an eye on “strategically important” companies. Russian journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan wrote the book “The New Nobility: The Restoration of the Police State in Russia and the Legacy of the KGB” in 2010. The book was published in Great Britain and has not been translated into Russian. We are publishing several excerpts.
Putin's rise has given an entire generation of intelligence service veterans a chance to return to the highest echelons of power. They took high positions in universities and television channels, in banks and ministries. Having replaced their uniforms with business suits, people from the secret services moved to where power was concentrated, sometimes swearing allegiance to their new masters, sometimes working undercover.
The saying about “former security officers”, who do not exist, is not so far from the truth. Many intelligence officers, supposedly retired, were sent as active agents to business, media and the civilian sector, still reporting to the FSB. To designate them, a special euphemism was used - “ODR”: active reserve officer. In 1998, active reserve officers were renamed APS - an apparatus of seconded employees, but the essence remained the same.
The status of an active reserve agent is considered a state secret, the disclosure of which is prohibited by law. This army of secret FSB officers is hidden from the rest of society and works in complete secrecy, sending reports to their superiors in the FSB and actively recruiting new employees. It is difficult to guess how many people work in the active reserve, but the total number is probably in the thousands.
One of the most surprising examples of this phenomenon is the appointment in 2002 of FSB representative General Alexander Zdanovich (who also served in military counterintelligence and was the chief official historian of the FSB) as deputy general director of VGTRK. At first they said that Zdanovich would be responsible for the company’s security service, but it soon became clear that his powers were much broader. When in October 2002 terrorists seized the theater on Dubrovka During the screening of the musical "Nord-Ost", Zdanovich essentially told journalists how to cover the event. At the height of the crisis, Zdanovich was officially part of the task force - thus, he worked simultaneously in the security service and in the news service. In September 2004, during school siege in Beslan, the authors of the book met Zdanovich on the streets of the city two hours before the assault. The general was invited to Beslan by the special services, despite the fact that formally he was an employee of the TV channel.
Not all active reserve officers held such high positions. Many deliberately avoided attention, even with a certain amount of power. For example, Mikhail. He is in his mid-fifties, has Asian features, simple manners and a modest suit. He looks like anyone, but not an FSB colonel. An ethnic Tatar, in his youth he voluntarily joined the KGB for idealistic reasons. Early in his career, his responsibility included monitoring Islamist movements in Uzbekistan. After the collapse of the USSR, he was transferred to Moscow, to the central office of the FSB, where his specialization was useful to the department for combating terrorism. After participating in the first Chechen war, he was returned to Moscow; by the mid-2000s, he became a colonel and was sent to the Moscow government as an “active reserve officer,” where he became in charge of the city’s policy towards Muslims. Working at the mayor's office, he quietly recruits agents in ethnic communities, observes Islamist trends, collects information and passes it on to the FSB.
According to rules inherited from the KGB, active reserve officers must receive only one salary. If the salary in the FSB was higher than in the company to which he was sent, he was allowed to keep the difference. But if the salary in the FSB was lower, the difference had to be returned to the FSB. If the officer did not want to (as happened in most cases), he was offered to refuse his salary in the FSB.
Active reserve officers have time and again failed to overcome conflicts of interest. It was assumed that when employees went to work for another company, they remained loyal to the FSB. But many of those who were appointed active reserve officers during the rapid growth of capitalism in Russia came to feel more loyal to their profitable companies than to their home department. In some cases, they treated the company as their top boss and the FSB as a source of valuable information and personal connections.
The employees who were sent to small companies, mainly majors and colonels, generally remained loyal to the FSB and never refused a salary because they wanted to continue their careers in the security service. On the contrary, the generals in the active reserve, who were lured by the largest corporations and banks with huge earnings, quickly forgot about their relatively small general salaries. They became powerful representatives of business in the FSB. For the most part, these were people of retirement age: they acted, clearly realizing that they hardly had a future in intelligence.
Tensions grew between generations of security officers, with younger officers becoming disheartened at the sight of the fortunes made by their older colleagues. Colonels and majors began to doubt the wisdom of a policy that gave an advantage to generals. One FSB colonel, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the authors of the book that “the main issue is the old clause about two salaries. I was sent to work under partial cover, and I had to do my official work, and then work for the FSB, meeting with agents at night. So why was I denied a second salary? This rule was established by a secret order from the head of the FSB, but this order was not properly registered with the Ministry of Justice, so there is no way to challenge it.” The FSB was a very large landowner. And although the dachas on Rublyovka officially belonged to the state, the secret services had been in control of them for so long that they actually considered them their own.
In 2006, State Duma deputy for the Odintsovo district, Viktor Alksnis, discovered that in 2003–2004 the state distributed to private individuals 40 hectares of land along the Rublevo-Uspenskoye Highway - 80 plots, 38 of which were withdrawn from the funds of the Logistics Administration with the consent of the management (UMTO) FSB of the Russian Federation.
The land was transferred to former and current senior officials of the FSB. According to Alksnis, the transfer of land was carried out according to the simplest scheme: letter of request, approval - and change of ownership. This is, for example, what Aleksey Fedorov, deputy head of the FSB Economic Security Service, did. He sent an application addressed to the head of the Odintsovo district, attaching a letter from the deputy head of the FSB UMTO Semenenko with a request to transfer the land to him. The land, Alksnis says, was state-owned, and Semenenko did not have the right to transfer it to a private person. By law, the land had to be transferred to the Federal Agency for State Property Management for subsequent sale.
While studying the documents for the allocation of land, we noticed that the highest ranks of the FSB appear in them without indicating positions and titles. For example, major generals are defined as “military personnel whose total duration of service is more than 15 years.” In addition, at least three senior FSB officials received land for free. These “soldiers” were Alexander Fedorov from the FSB Economic Security Service, Mikhail Shkuruk, head of the border control department of the FSB PS, and Boris Mylnikov, head of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center (this post is equivalent to the position of first deputy director of the FSB). Mylnikov received his plot at a nominal cost of $5 per hundred square meters.
The chief personnel officer of the FSB, Evgeniy Lovyrev, and the former head of the FSB Anti-Terrorism Center, Vyacheslav Volokh (who by that time had left the service and served as assistant minister) also got hold of free land Agriculture) and Sergei Shishin, head of the FSB's Internal Security Directorate. All of them received plots in the prestigious Gorki-2 village. While the generals received gifts of land in an elite area, discontent grew among the lower ranks of the FSB. Tensions reached a boiling point when it was decided to introduce new salary rules called the “2.2 Factor”, under which FSB employees in administrative positions would receive 2.2 times more than undercover officers of the same rank. By 2008, FSB officers began suing their leadership in the Moscow military courts, demanding apartments and benefits promised by Russian law. In response to this, the FSB created a department that was supposed to protect senior officials from such claims. One of the FSB colonels told us: “This department was created to protect the leadership of the FSB, and not ordinary employees. At one meeting, generals from my department were asked why salaries varied so much. They replied that once upon a time the Motherland had no money. Now that the country has the resources, they should be paid for their efforts.” In 2008, we learned that several FSB officers appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, claiming that the FSB leadership was pursuing a policy of discrimination. The first decision on the cases was announced on January 14, 2010 - the court sided with the plaintiffs.
The leaders of the FSB not only accumulated material wealth, but also enriched their family members. Land on Rublyovka was given to two sons of the head of the FSB Anti-Terrorist Center in the early 2000s, German Ugryumov - Alexander and Vladislav. The son of FSB director Nikolai Patrushev Andrei became Advisor to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rosneft oil company Igor Sechin. In 2007, President Putin awarded twenty-six-year-old Patrushev the Order of Merit for the Fatherland. By that time, he had worked for seven months as an adviser to the chairman of Rosneft and for three years in the Economic Security Service of the FSB.
On the same day, Nikolai Patrushev’s brother Viktor, who worked for seven years at Megafon, was awarded the Order of Friendship. This strange choice of nominee for the order, usually awarded to artists and foreign athletes “for their contribution to strengthening cooperation between peoples,” may be explained by the fact that in early 2006, Viktor had already received the Order of Honor from Putin “for services to the development of physical culture and sports." The brother of the FSB director worked as an adviser to the president sports club Dynamo, which has been patronized by the security service since the 1920s.
With valuable land, luxury cars and state decorations, members of Russia's new security service did more than just serve the state - they were landowners and power players, able to influence important personnel decisions and promote their friends and relatives into power.
From the book The New Nobility (Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan). Published with permission from PublicAffaires, part of the Perseus Books Group
Having discovered and read on the Internet published in December 2003 in “ Novaya Gazeta» article about the problems of the security agencies of the Russian Federation, their inability to adequately counter the threats and challenges facing Russia, and the need to reform the FSB, we asked ourselves to receive and familiarize ourselves with full version Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev’s appeal to President of the Russian Federation Putin in 2001.
From one of the journalists who participated in the preparation of this article, we received copies of: an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation, responses to it from the administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the Federation Council (in 2004, after the terrorist attack in Beslan, this appeal was again sent to President Putin with minor changes).
In our opinion, the conclusions and proposals outlined in the address to the President of the Russian Federation by Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev are absolutely relevant today, judging by the “effectiveness” of the fight against embezzlement and corruption in Russia (or rather, as shown by real life, its imitation).
I will begin the publication with the first cover letter of Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev dated June 15, 2001.
To the President
Russian Federation
Putin V.V.
Moscow Kremlin
For possible use in carrying out reforms in the “power” structures of the Russian Federation and taking measures to eliminate shortcomings in the work of the FSB of Russia, I consider it my civic duty to inform you about my vision of the problems occurring in the activities Federal service security, ways and means of solving them.
(Copies sent to the Chairman State Duma Federal Assembly RF Seleznev G.N. and Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation E.S. Stroev)
Officer of the Federal Security Service of Russia
In the Sverdlovsk region
Lieutenant colonel
K.N. Kazantsev
I will continue with the covering letter from Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev for the repeated appeal to Lieutenant Colonel Putin dated December 17, 2004.
To the President of the Russian Federation
Putin V.V.
Moscow Kremlin.
Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich!
In order to draw your attention to the shortcomings in the activities of the FSB of Russia and the need for its reform during the implementation of measures taken in the Russian Federation aimed at strengthening government bodies, I consider it my civic duty to once again inform you about my vision of these problems, ways and means of solving them.
In June 2001, I sent similar information to your address, and received a response signed by Yu.F. Borodin that “the appeal received in the name of the President of the Russian Federation was submitted for consideration to the Office of the Security Council of the Russian Federation,” where it “sank” without a trace (I know that the document was sent to the Russian FSB).
In June 2002, I sent a copy of the information to Authorized Representative President of the Russian Federation for the Urals Federal District P.M. Latyshev No reaction.
In January 2003, seeing neither the expediency nor the benefit of further service (although “I would be glad to serve”, but not imitate), morally worried about what was happening in the FSB system, having the legal right to retire (upon reaching the age of 45 years and length of service), before the expiration of the contract, I wrote a report and quit.
Based on your words from your address to Russian citizens after the tragedy in Beslan: “We are obliged to support the initiatives of citizens in their desire to fight terror with our practical actions” and, most importantly, “We simply cannot, should not live as carelessly as before “, I decided to send you the information again, hoping that it will be in demand.
Lieutenant Colonel of the FSB of Russia
in reserve K.N. Kazantsev
12/17/2004
And now, for your attention, I present to you the original repeated appeal of Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev to Lieutenant Colonel Putin. It is not much different from the first appeal and for this reason I decided not to publish the first appeal. Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev sent a repeated appeal to Lieutenant Colonel Putin after the tragedy in Beslan. So, I present to your attention the original text.
The tragedy in Beslan once again shocked Russia.
We saw again:
- unorganized, uncoordinated, confused actions of different levels of government and management during the release of hostages;
- populist and trivial statements by the heads of a number of departments about “improving” and tightening anti-terrorism legislation; on the launching of preventive strikes by the Russian Armed Forces on terrorist bases anywhere in the world; on intensifying and strengthening the fight against international and domestic terrorism;
- decisions of local anti-terrorism commissions that create the appearance of strengthening anti-terrorist measures: to “check” the state of anti-terrorist protection of various objects, take “effective” security measures in places where people are crowded, take “special control” of schools, hospitals, residential neighborhoods, shopping centers.
Time passes, we constantly hear statements “Terror is a declared war on Russia,” calls to unite, stand up for the country, and be vigilant; We are assured that everything possible is being done to ensure that this does not happen again. But is this so, are we not once again “talking over” the long-overdue problem of the fight against corruption and terrorism for Russia, if the executive and legislative bodies of the country are once again avoiding consideration of such issues as:
Why is the law enforcement system in this country so ineffective?
- Why have the intelligence services actually admitted that they are powerless to prevent terrorist attacks?
Why does one tragedy follow another and no one bears any responsibility?
And the answers to them, I take the liberty to say, are not complicated, if not obvious:
- success in the fight against terrorism and corruption cannot be achieved through the efforts of security forces, special operations and military-police measures alone, no matter how effective they are;
- Over the past 15 years, Russian law enforcement agencies have degraded so much that at present they are virtually unable to resist terrorism, corruption, or organized crime.
What to do in this situation?
1. Adjust socio-economic policy. While the bulk of the Russian population vegetates in poverty, misery and complete hopelessness, without the constitutional opportunities to change the situation for the better; and a small part, ignoring the norms of morality and ethics, having become insolent to the point of lawlessness, squanders billions of dollars on the purchase of palaces and football clubs, yachts and airplanes abroad, fertile ground for crime, incl. terrorism, and not only in the Caucasus, will increase; and calls for unity and cohesion will remain slogans and nothing more.
2. Understand that the creation of additional coordinating structures: anti-terrorism centers, operational control groups cannot provide anything significant for the fight against terrorism in a proactive mode. The essence of the problem is the lack of objective, timely and accurate information about terrorists and their plans, for which the FSB of the Russian Federation is primarily responsible, within which the Department for Combating Terrorism operates in accordance with certain functions of the law. Therefore, it is the Federal Security Service of Russia, in close cooperation with the Foreign Intelligence Service and with anti-terrorist commissions in the regions, that must plan, organize, coordinate the activities of all structures implementing this task: law enforcement, military, civilian, and be responsible for the results. Legislative and executive bodies The country's authorities, in turn, are obliged to create conditions under which all structures involved in the fight against terrorism work professionally and do not imitate vigorous activity; their leaders are responsible for their unprofessional actions or inaction. It may be necessary to consider the feasibility of separating the FSB Counter-Terrorism Directorate into an independent agency, changing its name and expanding its powers in order to create an effective system for identifying and preventing terrorist threats.
3. From discussing the problems of corruption, terrorism and organized crime at the level of political declarations or within the framework of the pre-election period, move on to the real fight against corruption, without which successful counteraction to terrorism is impossible. Create the necessary conditions for this, and first of all:
- amend the section of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Crimes in the Economic Sphere”, primarily in terms of introducing articles: “concealment of income” and “tax evasion”, bringing them closer in terms of qualification of acts, punishment for the act and implementation mechanism to the practice of criminal legislation of a number of developed countries Europe and USA;
- recognize the futile debate on the topic of linking the possibility of solving these problems with the introduction or abolition of the death penalty for especially serious crimes, since the main thing in this problem is to ensure the implementation of the principle of “inevitability of punishment” for the offense committed.
4. Reform the law enforcement system, incl. FSB of Russia.
Realizing that with the existing financial and material support It will not be possible to create law enforcement agencies in Russia that are capable and incorruptible for the criminal world and corrupt officials by allocating them additional funds, it is necessary to ensure control over the effectiveness of the use of the latter, so that a significant part of them does not go into the “sand” as now.
Long overdue reforms in the Federal Security Service cannot be carried out without understanding and solving the many problems inherent in this system.
In the 90s, security agencies underwent numerous renamings from the KGB to the FSB, but there were no real, well-thought-out, necessary reforms. There were senseless, disorganizing, destructive “events”, once again implicated in political expediency and expediency. In personnel policy, the principles of “protégé” and “personal loyalty” prevailed; the leadership of the FSB of the Russian Federation, with rare exceptions, was formed from people of 2 types:
1. “Grey”, controlled and dependent ones from among those who showed complete failure at the turn of the late 80s - early 90s. employees of the KGB of the USSR. Representatives of this category, heading the main structural units of the intelligence service in the Center and the local directorates, “justified” the calculations of the Russian political elite of the 90s: they resignedly accepted its actions, which contributed to the degradation of the country’s law enforcement system, including security agencies, and aimed for the implementation of fraudulent and essentially criminal privatization of property.
2. Intelligent and professionally wealthy, but without honor and conscience, hypocrites and opportunists by nature.
Under these conditions, the overwhelming majority of honest, experienced, competent professionals were forced to quit.
As a result, the FSB of the Russian Federation is experiencing a systemic crisis: the level of its operational investigative work is low; it is incapable of conducting a serious and objective analysis of emerging threats and developing systemic solutions to ensure the security of the Russian Federation, which is confirmed by even a superficial look at what is happening in Russia.
Currently, corruption, terrorism, and organized crime are the most serious factors threatening the security of the country, but there are very few significant criminal cases with prospects for implementation in court.
Against this background, the FSB opens a lot of “small” in terms of level, and even ridiculous signal collections and operational accounting cases; after six months or a year of “work”, the vast majority of them are closed on the grounds: “the information was not confirmed”; “the information was confirmed, the situation has been normalized by the measures taken,” etc.
The service is bogged down in paperwork: duplicating plans with positions repeated from year to year with minor adjustments; numerous reports with a heap of empty numbers that are not clear for what or to whom; orientations and instructions most often with general and non-specific information (in the style of “about everything and nothing”), often more like slogans with appeals: “strengthen, improve, increase.”
The operational staff often acts without understanding what they are protecting, and the loss of what economic, political, and technological information is detrimental to the country’s security interests. As a result, forces and means, incl. technical ones are not used effectively, being distracted by an “unusable” object.
In the regions, they do not feel the leadership role of the central apparatus units in matters of generating ideas and improving the practice of operational investigative activities in contrast to the constantly improving techniques, methods, forms and methods of work of criminal structures, corrupt communities, and foreign intelligence services. Professional studies are characterized by formalism and are far from current problems. As a result, we have low professionalism of employees.
The security agencies actually do not have an intelligence apparatus, and therefore no information about criminal activity, allowing timely implementation of measures at the stage of inquiry and investigation, the use of special technical means for collecting, documenting information and its use as evidence in criminal cases or, in particular, for “carrying out targeted strikes against terrorists.” This is a consequence of many reasons, including:
- The decline in the reputation of the FSB: growing corruption in security agencies and fears of potential sources that they will be “turned in”;
- Lack of motivation for cooperation. In the context of the imposition of “Money above all” values for almost twenty years and the disregard of public and state interests, the moral and patriotic basis to some extent takes place in the field of “traditional” counterintelligence; it does not exist, where there is corruption, terrorism, organized crime, money, blackmail, threats rule there;
- The lack of the necessary professionalism and often general erudition among a significant part of the management and operational staff, which is a serious obstacle to establishing contacts and developing agent relations (“They are greeted by their clothes, they are seen off by their minds”).
As a result, this very important component of the activities of the special services was transformed into outright profanation: on paper there are a huge number of plans, in annual reports a large number of people involved in cooperation are reported; in fact, it is absolutely useless wasted time and money, since the overwhelming majority of these “agents” do not have the ability to either receive important operationally significant information, or even participate in the development of case objects.
The apparatus of seconded FSB officers is degrading at an increasing pace, which, with different approaches to its formation and organization of work, could have been effective tool in solving problems facing security agencies. The counterintelligence performance of many officers of this apparatus, as a rule, deputy directors for the regime of enterprises, primarily in the military-industrial complex, is practically zero. The positions of the latter are mainly filled by “our own”, “necessary” people, whose main energy is spent on implementing tasks that have nothing to do with ensuring the country’s security interests.
Information and analytical work is carried out at a weak level; if the selection and recording of information received by operational units in databases is somehow carried out, then there is virtually no systemic processing and systemic analysis.
The bodies of the FSB of the Russian Federation do not have optimal criteria for assessing the activities of operational employees, there is no motivation for active and effective work, especially taking risks. Increase wages is achieved mainly through promotion and length of service and is not actually linked to the results of operational investigative activities.
The structure of the FSB of the Russian Federation is cumbersome and ineffective. There is a lot of parallelism and duplication in the activities of the units, irrational use of forces and means, and inability to maneuver them.
One example: the Office of Counterintelligence Operations is responsible for identifying the aspirations of foreign intelligence services and preventing their intelligence activities. These same functions are the main ones for the majority of employees of the Directorate for Counterintelligence Support of Industrial Facilities. As a result, the operatives of the divisions of these structures are actually dealing with the same issues in parallel or, even worse, “competing” with each other, incl. preventing each other from accessing the so-called. primary signaling information.
The practice of working for show is being cultivated; in pursuit of the necessary indicators, in the absence of corpus delicti, not only operational registration cases are opened, but also criminal cases (some facts of such activities of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in the Sverdlovsk region in July of this year became known to the public).
Due to the growing corruption of the FSB apparatus, work on serious materials with signs of corruption in crimes is often blocked at the stage of operational development (information confirming the last thesis using the example of the FSB of the Russian Federation in the Sverdlovsk region is available from both recently retired and currently serving employees of the Directorate).
All this gives rise to lack of initiative, indifference and often inactivity of personnel; morally deforms employees, creates legal nihilism, and creates the basis for violation of the law in the absence of control over the activities of security agencies.
This far from complete list of problems occurring in the security agencies allows us to conclude: it is impossible to bring the Federal Security Service out of the systemic crisis without personnel, organizational, and structural reforms.
What is needed for this?
1. Implement qualitative changes in the leadership of the central apparatus and departments of the FSB of Russia in the regions, strengthen personnel composition generally. Faced with the problem of where to get people, you will inevitably have to think through a mechanism under what conditions, how and which of the former employees can be returned to the intelligence service.
2. Implement measures aimed at structural changes in the FSB, optimizing the use of forces and means, I will note some of them:
- Lead job responsibilities employees in strict compliance with the functions defined for security agencies by the legislation of the Russian Federation.
- Abolish the Department of Counterintelligence Support for Industrial and Transport Facilities, and subordinate employees supervising enterprises of the military-industrial complex and scientific institutions to the Department of Counterintelligence Operations; and employees supervising civil industry and transport facilities should be included in the Departments involved in economic security, the fight against corruption, organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking.
This will allow:
- make more effective use of forces and means, redistributing a significant part of them to the implementation of functional tasks in the area of economic security, the fight against corruption and terrorism;
- eliminate the artificially created gap between the objects of aspirations and the aspirations of the special services of foreign states;
- reduce problems (subjective, opportunistic, “departmental”) in organizing the interaction of various departments, avoid parallelism and duplication of work; simplify the reporting system;
- reduce managerial and administrative positions, and therefore the financial costs of maintaining excess management personnel.
3. Ensure that the level of organization of operational investigative activities of the Federal Security Service is adequate to the emerging threats to the security of society and the state, which is impossible without solving the problems set out in paragraphs 1 and 2.
I will highlight two interrelated and fundamentally important tasks:
3.1. Change work motivation. The main criteria for increasing wages, as well as other forms of incentives for employees of operational, analytical and investigative units of the FSB (for UKRO units, the criteria below are only partially acceptable) should be:
- ongoing and completed criminal cases, material and other assets seized by court decision from criminal communities and criminals (with increased liability, including criminal liability for law enforcement officers for illegal actions, the introduction of a system of fines for law enforcement agencies for unlawfully inflicted moral damage and material damage);
- received materials recorded in information and analytical systems; analytical documents and special information sent to authorities and management.
3.2. To ensure public control over the activities of the FSB of the Russian Federation, for which to oblige the Service as a whole and its regional departments to officially publish the results of their work at the end of the year in the following positions:
- the total number of operational accounting cases opened, broken down by classification criteria of articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation;
- the total number of closed operational accounting cases, broken down by the classification characteristics of articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and indicating the grounds for their closure;
- the total number of criminal cases initiated under articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (specific information at this stage is not disclosed in the interests of the accused and the secrecy of the investigation);
- completed criminal cases with an annotation from the court ruling for each (person involved, fact, event; grounds for initiating a criminal case; decision: under what article and for how long he was convicted, confiscated property (valuables);
- dismissed criminal cases: due to lack of corpus delicti, insufficient evidence, etc. with an annotation from the resolution for each (under which article the case was initiated, the main episodes revealing the reasons for its closure at the investigation stage on the specified grounds);
- the number of special information sent to government and management bodies, broken down by addressee and indicating an assessment of their demand.
By legitimizing this reporting system, as well as the measure of responsibility of FSB officials for providing false data, we, while maintaining openness and multi-party system in the country, will not only actually ensure control over the effectiveness and legality of the activities of security agencies by the relevant state institutions and, most importantly, society, but we will also quickly eliminate the temptation and established practice in the FSB to work for a “tick.”
Reforms in the bodies of the FSB of the Russian Federation are extremely necessary, and not only in connection with the escalation of terrorism. No matter how much many would like this, the situation in the country will force them to do so, since without creating effectively and within the framework of the law operating security agencies and the entire law enforcement system, it is impossible to solve the complex tasks of decriminalization and reform of the economy and political system, and to prevent the growing threats of the collapse of Russia.
FSB Lieutenant Colonel K.N. Kazantsev,
from 01/01/2003 in stock.
Lieutenant Colonel Kazantsev’s appeals to Lieutenant Colonel Putin were not the only attempts to change the situation in the FSB and improve its work. Kazantsev was a signatory of the shocking appeal of sixty employees of the USSR KGB Directorate for the Sverdlovsk Region to the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. We suggest that you familiarize yourself with this appeal by reading it directly in copies of the newspapers “NA CHANGE” and “ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA”.
